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Summary 
 
In the first part of my dissertation I demonstrate that Rorty’s neo-pragmatism and Der-
rida's openness to the Other give rise, in their practical applications, to the same arbi-
trariness as the one usually attributed to a society shaped by Hegelian dialectic. A prob-
lem arises, in a deconstructive attitude in decision-making, when we notice that any 
need, desire and interest of the other is an expression of a preceding arbitrary allocation 
of wealth, occupations and economic potentialities. This makes such seemingly “spon-
taneous” desires a reflection of constrained everyday life economic interests, which are 
incapable of developing an economic system which really reflects equity and the most 
open and beneficial manifestation of skills and potentialities. A similar issue concerns 
Rorty’s invoking the neo-pragmatist figure of the “liberal-ironist”, which, for the same 
reasons, is always in danger of coinciding with an authority perceiving arbitrary desires 
and implementing a pragmatically preferable action according to them. In the second 
part of my dissertation, I lead the concepts of arbitrariness and authority back to the de-
velopment of the self-consciousness of the traditional Hegelian dialectic. I then propose 
an “instrumental” revision of this latter and an application of the obtained concepts to a 
socio-economic analysis, in order to really fulfil the necessity expressed by neo-
pragmatism and deconstructionism. According to the Hegelian dialectic a consciousness 
develops its ethical capacities by becoming aware of the necessity of an agreement with 
the other self-consciousnesses in order to construct what is reciprocally maximally satis-
fying and “natural” within the constraints of intersubjective life. Such a recognition has 
to be understood as the acknowledgement and acceptance of the other’s desires, due to 
the fact that they are seen as having an active role in the recognition and fulfilment of 
one’s own desires. The final goal of this dynamics would be the creation of institutions 
based on solid reciprocity whose effect is the progress of universal benefit. The accent 
on reciprocity, nevertheless, also means that a human being acknowledges another indi-
vidual’s desires only to the extent that she perceives a certain agreement with this latter 
as being convenient. In order to go beyond this aporia I investigate the utilization and 
disposition of economic instruments which would favour the highest possible expres-
sion of reciprocal satisfaction in crucial social environments instead, such as the organi-
zation of roles in capitalist production. I then re-interpret the ethical telos of Hegel to 
formulate a definition of “credit” which coincides with a language game focused on a 
maximization and equalization of reciprocity and mutual expectations. I relegate the 
forms of credit granting which respond to others logics under the category of “arbi-
trary”. I choose the concept of credit because it is the economic tool which, more than 
any other, can be directed to discovering and enhancing each individual’s potentiality 
and mutual material improvement. 
 
Introduction 
 
Horkheimer and Adorno are famed for denouncing in Dialectic of Enlightenment the 
failure of the cultural attitude which was supposed to free human beings from the au-
thority of myth and superstition. The rationality of Enlightenment, in fact, has revealed 
itself to be founded on a similarly biased and partial set of values in order to assess the 
“truth” of a proposition or the worthiness of a form of life. Modern and contemporary 
rationality ends up being “speculative” and even “totalitarian” despite its assuming «the 
form of the sober matter-of-factness by which it purported to distinguish itself from 
Hegel and from metaphysics in general».
1
 In the first chapter of their book, the authors 
elucidate in fact the authoritarian character typical of such a form of reason. 
To the extent that an advance of knowledge produces results which are in function of a 
specific, restricted form of rationality – such as mathematics in the case of that which 
Horkheimer and Adorno refer to as “Enlightenment” – it is doomed to exercise an au-
thoritarian stance over the human conception of truth and “nature”. Modern reason, as 
opposed to myth, is supposed to uncover the effective structure of nature and human 
naturalness, in order to become aware of what rules of action are really preferable to 
feed the human practical spirit. But if such a survey is carried out in function of an ab-
stract, arbitrary rationality any social and political decision following it will be as irra-
tional as a superstition. As the issue here is the discovery of “rules of action”, arbitrary 
means a rationality which does not take into account all practical risks and potentialities 
of a human context, in this case those which cannot be referred to by means of univocal 
logics such as mathematics. 
This is the same fallacious attitude which, according to the authors, can in retrospect be 
established by considering the entire itinerary of the Hegelian dialectic: 
The route of dialectic is supposed to find its reason in the contradictions which emerge 
within each determined form of rationality. Such a contradiction should be the manifes-
tation of legitimate claims of forms of life which had not recognized their “truth” and 
spontaneity in the set rationality. Thus, the synthesis of the preceding state and this con-
tradiction constitutes a new, advanced stage in which reciprocal recognition – and, 
therefore, self-realization – of consciousnesses has improved, with the final stage repre-
senting a supposed optimized relationality in which mutual recognition and realization 
reach their apex. 
                                                          
1
 Horkheimer and Adorno 2002 [1944], P. 18 
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The mythological character which equates Hegelism to “Enlightenment” stands in the 
fact that it is always an arbitrary rationality – in the sense specified earlier – which de-
termines each form of life in its claims and “spontaneity”. If a pre-determined set of 
values or a pre-determined logic contribute to build a consciousness’ awareness of its 
desires and aspirations, the dialectical process ends up running in a pre-established di-
rection and the “absolute” coincides with a biased outcome. The constitution of a simi-
lar outcome, in the form of the State, of the social institutions or of the laws of market, 
reveals itself very soon in its being in contrast with the real specific necessities which 
the singular individuals then experience. 
According to Hegel, although a set institution may not appear perfect from the point of 
view of the singularities, its structure expresses the synthesis between the contradictions 
experienced by a determined culture so far. It is perhaps the highest form of “compro-
mise” or reciprocal overcoming of such contradictions. But, for the exponent of the 
school of Frankfurt, the stress on the privilege of the “affirmative” over the negative is 
just a mythical, metaphysical instrument of the dominant theoretical-political authority, 
similarly to the greater relevance given to the “matter-of-factness” and to “technical cal-
culation” by Enlightenment. 
 
My dissertation reads any manifestation of similar “theoretical” authorities in their radi-
cal pragmatic sense, in the specific practical and political sense to which the acceptance 
or the application of a certain logic corresponds – whether it is the existentially upset-
ting “mere technical calculation” typical of post-Enlightenment sciences
2
 or the sup-
posed universalism of dialectical values. 
                                                          
2
 Modern intellectualism as an existential problem is masterfully described by Weber in his conference in 
1917: «[…] this process of disenchantment, which has continued to exist in Occidental culture for millen-
nia, and, in general, this 'progress,' to which science belongs as a link and motive force, do they have any 
meanings that go beyond the purely practical and technical? You will find this question raised in the most 
principled form in the works of Leo Tolstoi. He came to raise the question in a peculiar way. All his 
broodings increasingly revolved around the problem of whether or not death is a meaningful phenome-
non. And his answer was: for civilized man death has no meaning. It has none because the individual life 
of civilized man, placed into an infinite 'progress,' according to its own imminent meaning should never 
come to an end; for there is always a further step ahead of one who stands in the march of progress. And 
no man who comes to die stands upon the peak which lies in infinity. Abraham, or some peasant of the 
past, died 'old and satiated with life' because he stood in the organic cycle of life; because his life, in 
terms of its meaning and on the eve of his days, had given to him what life had to offer; because for him 
there remained no puzzles he might wish to solve; and therefore he could have had 'enough' of life. 
Whereas civilized man, placed in the midst of the continuous enrichment of culture by ideas, knowledge, 
and problems, may become 'tired of life' but not 'satiated with life.' He catches only the most minute part 
of what the life of the spirit brings forth ever anew, and what he seizes is always something provisional 
and not definitive, and therefore death for him is a meaningless occurrence. And because death is mean-
ingless, civilized life as such is meaningless; by its very 'progressiveness' it gives death the imprint of 
meaninglessness» (Weber 1946 [1919], P. 7). 
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Consequently, authority is here understood as any structure of forces whose power is 
actively recognized or accepted as legitimate. This legitimacy is due to the fact that ac-
cepting such a power is seen as coincident with the preferable way to fulfil contingently 
perceived needs and desires or, in other words, to fulfil a perceived naturalness.
3
 In the 
social and political environment, by which “theoretical” constructions such as Hegelian 
dialectic are particularly underpinned, this preferable attempt of fulfilment is mostly ac-
companied by a compromise between the naturalness of different individuals - also in 
the sense of accepting the lesser evil by subordinating oneself to a violent individual 
and authority. 
The most obvious example of authority is political legitimacy obtained thanks to empa-
thy toward certain necessities and desires contingently perceived by a community. An-
other example is the power given by the possession of economic instruments which can 
offer a larger spectrum of modalities and situations for obtaining wealth with respect to 
other instruments. This is the field of the power to increase the price of a possessed 
building during a property bubble, for instance, or the power to obtain a surplus-value 
from her workers’ labour by an entrepreneur. The agreements reached between the dif-
ferent parts represented by cases like these can be formally interpreted as the mutual ful-
filment of each other’s contextual needs and desires, overlooking the fact that these lat-
ter are already the product of an arbitrary social logic (mostly coincident with a discrep-
ant distribution of resources and power). As will be recalled in the second chapter, Al-
thusser indicates that the criticism of the acceptance of a similar arbitrary logic by the 
“anthropology” of classical economists was already the conceptual innovation of 
Marx’s philosophical proposal. 
 
The first thesis of my dissertation is that the theoretical and ethical outcome of expo-
nents of the “post-modern” attitude such as Rorty and Derrida – who recognize the con-
tingency of human singularities and reject any dialectical or representationalist theory of 
reality, refusing to support the authority of any alleged fundamental or “natural” struc-
ture of the world – betrays the intention of its proponents. The very sense of the neo-
pragmatist and deconstructionist enterprises reveals itself as built on the legitimization 
                                                          
3
 Notice that throughout this dissertation the word “naturalness”, since it identifies perceived needs and 
desires, does not have the same meaning as “nature”. While this latter can be understood as supposing 
a certain essence which is at the basis of the characters of a sentient being, “naturalness” is consistent 
with a pragmatist view whereby there is no difference between what a being is – or perceives itself to 
be - as a consequence of the actions and transformations brought by its context and what a being is per 
se. 
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of some arbitrary authorities’ logic, exactly in the same way as illustrated above with 
regard to Hegelian dialectic and the spirit of Enlightenment. This makes neo-
pragmatism and deconstruction paradoxically emulate the dialectical spirit. 
In particular, in the neo-pragmatist approach of Richard Rorty the dialectical character 
is found in his assuming an authority – the pragmatic liberal-ironist – which would 
simply have the ability to choose what contingent desires, needs and necessities within a 
community are “natural” enough to be legitimised within a context without subjugating 
the “spectres” of other upcoming and potential singularities. The scope of this commit-
ment is to do justice to the natural needs and desires of any part of the “totality” – which 
is also the central feature of a dialectical attitude. But this corresponds again to a proc-
ess of legitimateness of arbitrary needs and desires which may be only “synthesized” as 
a reaction to certain other arbitrary-contingent forms of reason. Since any pragmatist au-
thority inevitably needs to elaborate a pragmatic justification through certain natural-
contingent-arbitrary necessities and desires a simple Rortyan attitude reveals itself to be 
unsuitable, failing to fulfil its goals. 
The same conceptual entanglement of naturalness, arbitrariness and contingency under-
lies Jacques Derrida’s focus on «doing justice to the Other». Derrida’s quasi-
transcendental motivation for his commitment is that any contingent rule shaped by the 
singular event of the Other’s coming would be an unconditioned act of justice; uncondi-
tioned because it would not have as condition of its performance the guidelines of a 
commonly accepted arbitrary model of rationality. Its only basis would be the sense of 
responsibility towards the demand of a singularity. This act, in other words, would not 
need to be justified by external ethics. Of course, according to the French philosopher, 
we need to be conscious of contextual social values in order to do justice to the Other. 
But they would come after a calculation which takes into account the fact that the ques-
tion whether to immediately apply them or not is undecidable, as he says in the essay 
Force of Law. It is undecidable because these values are born from and pass through the 
dissemination which makes them random in comparison with our potentially best 
choice. Only by going through this undecidable moment and by finally breaking it, Der-
rida claims, can we tend to a non-conditioned justice to the other’s contingent “natural-
ness”. 
What the deconstructionist overlooks, nevertheless, is that the stress on the singular 
context of the “other” needs to rely on – similarly to the case of liberal-ironist – the 
naturalness of a certain singular authority which is, at the same time, arbitrary and con-
11 
 
 
 
tingent. That is to say, it is produced only as a reaction to certain arbitrary and contin-
gent forms of dominance. This inter-referentiality and arbitrariness of the singular oth-
ers appears as a circle which is in no way ontologically different from a dialectical de-
termination of forms of reason and, consequently, is in no way less in danger of pre-
venting subjugations of spectres of other arbitrary potential needs and desires.  
 
This criticism of Derrida’s operational outcome may resemble Jürgen Habermas’ ardent 
reaction «against the collapse of all genres of discourse and the obliteration of distin-
guishable culture-spheres»
4
, to which the deconstructionist tendency to label any iden-
tity of a form or character of rationality as “undecidable” is often assimilated. It is fair 
to say that the position expressed in this dissertation may intersect a specific – maybe an 
ad hoc – interpretation of Habermas’ claims of Derrida’s quasi-transcendentalism. But 
it remains quite different in its reading of the role and status of rigorous “reason” and 
“rationality” – in comparison with mere rhetoric – in the “ethical” side of the acknowl-
edgment of dissemination. 
Habermas recognises the paradox whereby Derrida, in order to dismiss all transcenden-
tal philosophies, cannot do so without having recourse to a kind of fundament, even if 
this latter is defined as quasi-transcendental différance.
5
 In order to demonstrate that 
Reason is intrinsically authoritative, the French philosopher presents a reasoning aimed 
at outlining a certain specific structure of reality. The same method which, according to 
Derrida, a form of reason questionably utilises – that is to say to construct a framework 
thanks to a recognition of values and linguistic authorities which are contingent and ar-
bitrary – is embraced by him in order to recognise the “disseminated” coming of the au-
thority of the Other, which determines the features of quasi-transcendental deconstruc-
tionism. Another way to report this interpretation of Habermas’ point is to say that the 
very process of deconstruction, which should unveil the necessity of relying on the 
event of the Other, can be understood and performed as long as the authority of the Oth-
er is recognized. That is to say that the idea of an absolute contingency of any rational 
value can only be conceived after we concretely experience the existence of other po-
tentially legitimate changing authorities within the area where we used to consider only 
some authorities. This means that our acknowledging the process of deconstruction is, 
in the end, our being “conquered” by the performance of these new authorities in their 
                                                          
4
 Schrag 1992, P. 145. 
5
 Habermas 1987 [1985], Pp. 164-184. 
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being in contrast with the performance of other authorities. We have, therefore, the par-
adox whereby our awareness of the necessity of deconstruction is nothing more than our 
being loyal to authorities which are equivalently alienated, arbitrary in comparison with 
hypothetical guidelines for our potential best actions. 
If to indicate a “transcendentalist paradox” can be considered, perhaps forcedly, as a 
junction point between Habermas and the criticism of deconstruction in this thesis, 
things are quite different when focusing on the interpretation of the textual and “stylis-
tic” consequences of Derrida’s move. According to the German sociologist, the assimi-
lation – which différance performs - of philosophical concepts to literary ones operates 
a hierarchical overturning between logics and rhetoric.
6
 Derrida’s philosophy would be, 
in the end, a way of giving up logical “rational” rigor in favour of a bombast, a rhetoric 
justified by the recall to the inevitable contamination and contingency of all forms of 
reasons. This would be, for Habermas, a result solely based on aesthetic experiences.
7
 
What is argued in the pages of this work is perhaps the exact opposite. The contradic-
tion of the performative, ethical outcome of deconstruction, in fact, is that it cannot - 
and should not, in a certain sense - escape the tension toward a “systematic” and all-
embracing survey to discover what is “really rational” according to the totality of indi-
vidualities – or “authorities” – which exist. In the relentless recognition of the desires 
and needs of any “coming” other, in spite of the preceding, conventional and “illusory” 
forms of all-inclusive rationality, the act of doing justice to the Other is an example of 
dialectical improvement. It consists in the acknowledgement of the “total” authentic 
reason which, in a Hegelian sense, comes after the “negative” represented by the con-
sciousness of the aporetic outcomes of all traditional rational concepts. 
From this first picture of my arguments one problematic term stands out. It is ethics, 
which in this dissertation can be read, in a very broad sense, as referring to anything 
which concerns human behaviour and practical rationality. Since “philosophy” can be 
defined as an attempt to rationalize the reality in order to make it maximally adequate to 
our naturalness and living, a philosophical study is always concerned with “ethics” in so 
far as it is concerned with the most suitable way to shape our behaviour and rationality 
– which, under a pragmatist point of view, is always seen as “practical” rationality. But, 
if philosophy is such a wide practice which ends up coinciding with the “sense” of life 
itself as the research of happiness, therefore our interest in ethics inevitably corresponds 
                                                          
6
 Vergani 2000, P. 187. 
7
 See Habermas 1994. 
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to the research of the most suitable ethics which can be used in order to fulfil our de-
sires, maximize our self-satisfaction and, in this way, “rationalize” our living. Hence, it 
can be stated that the stricter meaning of ethics as “the study of what should be done” is 
nothing but the existential specification of the broad, general and theoretical meaning of 
the term. Moreover, this study utilizes a meaning of “fulfilling our desires and maximiz-
ing our satisfaction” which makes that «our» pertain to the totality of human beings 
(and, potentially, to the totality of sentient beings). This is the typical universalistic 
ethical end which, as will be better specified later, is proper of the Hegelian dialectic as 
well as of Rorty’s pragmatism and Derrida’s willingness to doing justice to all singular 
“Others”. To maximize all consciousnesses’ ethical completeness (namely, everybody’s 
happiness) is therefore seen by the main philosophers involved in this study as the high-
est philosophical-ethical realization and it will be seen in this way in the context of this 
text. 
The wide definition of philosophy given above, moreover, can be applied to other disci-
plines and in the case of this dissertation it will be applied to economics, because this 
latter is recognized as a crucial pragmatic field related to human happiness. If philoso-
phy is an attempt to rationalize the reality in order to make it maximally adequate to our 
naturalness and living, we need to admit that within a social environment this can only 
be achieved by dealing with agreements and reciprocity among individuals – or, in a 
Hegelian terminology, among consciousnesses. From this point of view, economics – 
both in theory and in practice - is philosophy considered in its concreteness, since it is 
an attempt to find a rationality in the rules moving the incentives and the expectations 
which everybody has in realising the others’ desires in order to bargain a certain recip-
rocity. Also, in the maximization of everybody’s incentives, expectations and all the 
other tools necessary to realise the others’ desires in order to obtain the highest possible 
bargaining power there is, consequently, the fullest realization of our interest in ethics 
and “justice”, if this latter is conceived as a term describing such a realization. 
 
The second part of the dissertation is fundamentally an attempt to show how, in order to 
assess what is “more suitable” to do in a socially pragmatic sense, the use of another 
logic which is different to the methodological reliance on a certain kind of arbitrary au-
thority is possible. The theoretical development of such a different logic can be ex-
plained by recalling the pro and cons of the methodology of the quoted authors. The 
most pragmatically fruitful aspects of their thought and of their “traditions” can be 
14 
 
 
 
combined and enhanced in order to obtain a “method” which promotes both the respect 
of contingency (typical of Rorty and Derrida) and the systematic purpose (typical of 
Hegel) to establish, in each historical and political environment, the forms of relation-
ships which coincide with the maximum of reciprocal recognition – and, therefore, sat-
isfaction. 
 
With regard to the first of these two theoretical fronts, in fact, we have neo-pragmatist 
positions like Rorty’s which, on the one hand, utilise a sound conception of the contin-
gency of human desires and nature and a sensible recall to the practical sense of any 
human value in its essential goal to approach happiness in general. On the other hand, 
nevertheless, they lack the coherent and “systematic” attitude of focusing - in each de-
terminate cultural, economic social situation – on the calculus of the instrumental distri-
bution which would effectively maximize human happiness. In other words, neo-
pragmatism lacks the courage of venturing into an effective scrutiny of what material 
and intellectual tools would be able, in a certain case, to really optimize mutual utility 
and benefits among human beings. This does not represent simply an insufficiency of 
the “application” of pragmatist ideas, it corresponds to a proper theoretical flaw. 
Such a flaw becomes clear the moment Rorty seeks to identify the “pragmatically ade-
quate” values proper of a context with what is perceived as the most agreeable by the 
different individuals. There is little preoccupation, in this method, over the possibility 
that a similar perception may in turn be the product of a very biased allocation of social 
and economic instruments and that it may, therefore, re-trace the features of a preceding 
arbitrary form of rationality, in a typical metaphysical move. Neo-pragmatism is likely 
to limit its evaluation to what stands out in a certain moment as the conversationally 
agreed solution to a problem, without investigating whether there may be an even “bet-
ter” allocation of instruments and potentialities. 
We have seen how a similar flaw is also located in Derrida, and throughout the disserta-
tion it will be clear how neo-pragmatism and deconstructionism are analysed in depth 
because they can represent, in a certain sense, the “latest stages” of contemporary phi-
losophical routes which have tried to react either to a metaphysical kind of truth or to 
the abstract notion of rationality proper of Enlightenment. The instrumentalist, “post-
idealistic” attitude and the post-structuralist one can be read as having in common a 
theoretical end. That is to say to make clear that “truth” makes sense only if it is consid-
15 
 
 
 
ered as what is each time agreeable according to the specific logic or “nature” of the 
specific forms of life which are involved. 
For instance, we can find in Dewey a methodology which favours a scientific and natu-
ralistic approach because, according to his instrumentalist criteria, the main task of 
knowledge is to survey the degree of “agreement” which is present or can be created 
within a human environment. This particular technique of scientific inquiry can be de-
fined as consisting in procedures which make it possible to perceive the eventual 
agreement or disagreement of the two sets of consequences.
8
 Consequently, Dewey’s 
procedure can be seen as privileging the discovery of contextual regularities and, there-
fore, beneficial harmonies useful to agree on how to chase some general ends. All this is 
in contrast with the idealization of abstract or general values which are supposed to ad-
dress our behaviour. 
In a similar way to Peirce, James, Quine and, then, Brandom, the main role of thought 
according to Dewey is an assessment of the potentiality of certain “structures of forces” 
to be shared. This evaluation substitutes any account of human nature and any represen-
tationalist view of the world for the propensity to look for the greater benefit given by 
the very agreement of “consequences”. Rorty can be read as the most mature expression 
of this positions because he acknowledges Dewey’s intellectual aim but brings it to its 
extreme, refusing its dangerous enhancing of a typology of language which would be 
likely to bring a vision of the humankind backed by a certain essence. That is to say the 
very “naturalistic” and “scientific” lexicon which, according to Rorty, maintains the 
danger of referring to some more “authentic” nature. Rorty’s thought holds and brings 
to its highest consistent development the pragmatist philosophical attitude by rejecting 
any privileged form of language for “understanding” reality – even the scientific one – 
in favour of a pure focus on the practical contingent agreement which a linguistic game 
produces. In the light of this, I will try to show that a more courageous, explicit and sys-
tematic calculus of the contextual instruments which would be able to produce a maxi-
mization of reciprocal benefits within human socio-economic environment can be inter-
preted as the act of reforming and overcoming Rorty’s aporetic neo-pragmatism and, as 
a consequence, the pragmatist “school” in general. 
A similar thing can be claimed about the relevance which the act of going beyond de-
construction has for those whom Derrida defined as his “masters” – such as Foucault - 
or for authors who share with the French philosopher the certainty that the genetic prin-
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 See Dewey 1929, Pp. 323-324. 
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ciple must itself be a differential principle – such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Lacan, 
Deleuze and Levinas. A philosophy of difference, as explained earlier, is analysed in its 
being in debt with the arbitrariness of certain – equally “metaphysical” – authorities, in 
its being the awareness of fragments of arbitrary rationalities. In the wake of this, any 
attempt to give privilege to a specific language (such as an “aesthetic” one), to a specific 
form of humankind (the “aristocratic” one) or to a vitalist creation of singularities as re-
action to more repressive, rigid or derivate forms of Reason is considered as relying on 
equivalent “fragments of arbitrary rationalities” which are thought to be more original. 
These reactions fall back on the same danger of producing violence. Derrida is taken as 
the most explicit proponent of a philosophical tendency to concentrate theoretical and 
speculative efforts on giving relevance to the “variance” in contrast with the “false uni-
formity” of the general, to the spontaneous differentiation as opposed to the abstract 
regularities. But once any cultural singularity is seen as equally alienated, equally de-
rived and shaped by another arbitrary set of singularities, it becomes clear that the point 
is not in the opposition between a “false” uniformity, repressive general moral values 
and “genuine” vitalist singularities. The stress on contingency, which is the positive side 
of these “schools” of philosophy, can coincide with a value added only if inscribed 
within a concrete calculus of the instruments needed in each case to bring mutual indi-
vidual satisfaction to its highest level. 
By means of a methodology which is only apparently very different from the pragma-
tists’ one, philosophers of difference have as a goal, just like the former group, to give 
value to what is each time agreeable according to the specific logic or “nature” of the 
specific forms of life which are involved. Both attempts reveal themselves to be aporetic 
because they lack the boldness to face an explicit enquiry into the socio-economic in-
struments which would be needed within each specific context in order to maximize 
each individual’s quality of life. Even if this is a very hard and uncertain task, to put 
one’s focus on this issue would mean to act as a real pragmatic thinker, it would mean 
to collect one’s effort on an authentic reflection about what effectively produces more 
reciprocal satisfaction. Instead, transforming this task into a speculation about supposed 
more natural, more spontaneous languages or supposed less biased authorities means to 
rely again on generalizations which cannot be “verified”. Such an attitude, in other 
words, shifts the focus from certain arbitrary authorities to other equivalently arbitrary 
authorities, without even approaching a pragmatic application to the problem. 
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The second theoretical front which my proposal utilises and overcomes corresponds to 
the “teleological” side of the method of this dissertation. A commitment to a structural 
analysis of how to maximize reciprocal satisfaction can be found, in fact, in a particular 
interpretation of the Hegelian dialectic. Combined with the pragmatist and deconstruc-
tionist spirit which relentlessly recalls the contingent and non-natural character of any 
supposed “absolute relationality”, a systematic approach which improves Hegelian dia-
lectic, going beyond its traditional format, is elaborated in my work to dismiss a teleol-
ogy applied to a path formed by a series of rational stages (which are always a reaction 
to an arbitrary ‘preceding’ form of rationality and, so, equivalently arbitrary in the de-
sires they try to fulfil). 
My approach, instead, embraces a teleology in the sense that it directly focuses on the 
“material” end of evaluating, in each context, the optimized distribution of tools so that 
each individual can perfect her contribution to the other’s happiness, driven by the de-
sire to gain a certain “bargaining power”. The necessary consequent analysis of what 
this bargaining power is, of how it deals with issues like asymmetric reciprocal expecta-
tions and asymmetric power can be inspired, in effect, by an instrumental interpretation 
of Hegel’s philosophical purpose, in a more methodical and compact way than by the 
texts of quoted macroeconomists. In synthesis, what for Hegel is reciprocal recognition 
of one consciousness by another one, can be understood as the acknowledgement and 
acceptance of the other’s desires, due to the fact that they are seen as having an active 
role in the self-recognition and fulfilment of one’s own desires. 
In order to perform the described task, therefore, it is necessary a structural analysis of 
the fact that human beings are centres of forces who interact with each other in order to 
“bargain” something in their favour. From this analysis some elements emerge, such as 
the recognition of the other’s utility by a certain individual in order to determine recip-
rocal power. The power to fulfil one’s needs and desires within a community operates 
as the “bargaining power” which an individual has over another in a certain agreement. 
The former is recognized by the latter as having or producing something important to 
her and she is willing to concede this product while bargaining something in exchange. 
In this structure, the role of the expectation of this reciprocal utility is implicit: temporal 
and instrumental discrepancies in capacities can undermine an individual’s awareness of 
the others’ ability to give something in exchange. Consequently, even this individual’s 
incentive (and, later, ability) to produce something to be exchanged can be undermined 
in the long run, causing a decrease in the aggregate level of actual and potential recipro-
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cal bargaining power and satisfaction. From this – here very synthesized – aspect, we 
can draw, for example, the preference for an equal distribution of bargaining power in 
respect to an “equivalent” but unequally distributed aggregate amount of power. 
Within this general neo-Hegelian framework I insert an analysis of the logic of contex-
tual socio-economic tools functioning, in order to evaluate in which way they can 
achieve the aims above. For instance, the importance of the performance of the instru-
ment of credit is clear. Its task needs to be that of recognizing each economic agent’s 
potentiality and therefore to supply a loan which would act as an anticipated reward, by 
the community, for the agent’s effort to realize her product. This would mean a continu-
ous maximization of all agents’ capacity to contribute. This has to be accomplished by 
means of a holistic logic of communitarian development and of contextual analysis of 
individuals’ potentialities. In order to fulfil this task, for example, it is inefficacious to 
grant credit using an individualistic logic, as private institutions of credit do.  
 
This kind of reflection about detailed and technical allocation of tools such as credit, la-
bour and means of production is the general approach of the second part of the thesis. 
The most important empirical scenarios of their appearance are observed. The structure 
which their functioning manifests within those specific scenarios is outlined, in order to 
decide in which way they can be best allocated in order to realize the highest reciprocal 
equal bargaining power. Above all, as well as the topic concerning credit, the distribu-
tion of possession of machineries and means of production in comparison with posses-
sion of labour power will be taken into account together with the pragmatic structure of 
a financial bubble. 
The practice of looking for a “structure” in the functioning of these major economic in-
struments within particular contexts is not at odds with the respect of a philosophy of 
contingency. In fact, it is not an “essence” which is found in the nature of determinate 
tools, but a “contingent necessity” which cannot be predicted by a general framework 
and may also be inexistent in several empirical cases. The goal is simply to seek and 
certify its occurrence in each singular holistic context as far as possible. The rigorous 
direction of this contextual investigation towards the discovery of the highest possible 
reciprocal usefulness makes such a methodology respect, improve and overcome prag-
matist-deconstructionist attempts to do justice to any form of life’s satisfaction and 
Hegel’s attempt to theorize highest possible reciprocal “recognition”. 
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As for the structure of the text, in the first two chapters of the thesis I demonstrate that 
Rorty’s neo-pragmatism and Derrida's openness to the Other give rise, in their practical 
applications, to the same arbitrariness as the one usually attributed to a society shaped 
by Hegelian dialectic – which, as it is, is effectively aporetic. In the second chapter I 
also give a concrete example of how Derrida’s philosophical convictions may serve to 
justify damaging political decisions. 
 
In the third chapter I illustrate the phenomenon of authority and how its functioning can 
explain the “arbitrariness” typical of most economic and political measures. I specify in 
detail how the dominance of some authorities’ naturalness in social decisions under-
mines a really pragmatist attitude. Such an occurrence can be described by means of the 
dialectics of reciprocal agreement among individuals who have access to differently 
powerful and useful instruments and, in general, to instruments which are not optimized 
in their overall social usefulness. I then explain the reason why the task of looking for a 
genuine pragmatic thought needs to privilege, in the first place at least, issues concern-
ing exchange economy. The concept of “instrumental maximization of reciprocal bar-
gaining power” is, moreover, found to be consistent with the task of equality and not 
simply with a Paretian logic of maximization of “aggregate” benefit. In the last para-
graph, I face the topic of the development of a financial bubble and I analyse its struc-
ture in terms of the reciprocal bargaining power proper of the specific actors involved 
and the instruments they utilise. I use this example to underline the difference between 
an hypothetical neo-pragmatist political approach and a concrete approach which takes 
into account the problem of maximization and equalization of reciprocal instrumental 
power in economic issues concretely. 
 
In the fourth chapter I discuss the three major “basic economic instruments”: labour 
force, means of production and credit. By means of a discussion about the distribution 
of their ownership-availability to individuals, I hypothesize two scenarios whose reali-
zation may help to assure a maximization of everybody’s utility in an exchange econ-
omy. The particular problem of this chapter is the distribution of the first two instru-
ments: how to deal with the power discrepancy which can manifest itself among differ-
ent entrepreneurs, between the “class” of entrepreneurs and workers or among different 
workers. In the first hypothesized scenario, it is initially claimed that a model of prag-
matically maximized social relationships can be constructed in which the difference be-
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tween employers and employees is maintained. I show how such a scenario cannot 
structurally eliminate imbalances of bargaining power and how such an incapacity bur-
dens on the functioning of the instrument of credit, through the possible alteration of its 
cost compared with the classical scheme - according to which this cost should be based 
on the law of supply and demand. In fact, a diversion from this law would denote the 
possibility of uncertainty in lender’s decisions – that is to say the possibility of one or 
more of the following elements: an imbalanced competitiveness among entrepreneurs 
and/or of an imbalanced bargaining power between workers and entrepreneurs. The 
second hypothesis, according to which there should be a coincidence of the roles of en-
trepreneur and employee, is then assessed as the most suitable for the scope of the chap-
ter. 
The chapter opens with a brief introduction of the meaning of the instrument of credit. 
This is because a discourse is set up about the logical meaning of the functioning of the 
three major economic instruments in the manifestation of power discrepancy today. 
This chapter prevalently treats the problem of uncertainty in credit granting as just a re-
action to other social discrepancies. In the next chapter, I abandon such an approach and 
start talking in depth about the active function of credit in respect of distribution of po-
tentialities and maximization of reciprocal utility. 
 
In the fifth and last chapter of my work I focus on the conception of credit which would 
fit the pragmatic aim of maximizing-equalizing reciprocal bargaining power. I do that 
by means of a reflection about a possible pragmatist interpretation of Hegelian mecha-
nisms of mutual recognition, in which I perfect the overall analysis made so far about 
reciprocal “attraction” and expectations. I illustrate Hegel’s teleological conception of 
mutual acknowledgement – whereby it corresponds to the highest possible mutual rec-
ognition and fulfilment of desires and, therefore, of individuals’ opportunities and bene-
fits. I do that because this conception shares the same ethical preoccupation of doing 
justice to each individual’s features with Rorty and Derrida, by making them flourish 
and succeed within social life. It also shares the same aporias, but the conceptual tools 
of optimizations of mutual recognition and expectation provide us with the language to 
overcome them at a macroeconomic level through an adequate form of the instrument of 
credit – about which I propose a concrete case study. The scope of the chapter is to ex-
plain in detail why a private kind of fund lender and, in general, the currently accepted 
typologies, are not suitable to optimize reciprocal expectation within an exchange econ-
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omy. Since it will be an all-encompassing discussion, I will recall reasons – such as the 
“individualistic” logic in assessing risk and uncertainty – which would actually be dis-
pelled within the economic system I have fostered so far. There will also be a recall, 
however, to banking system behaviours – such as quantitative evaluation of potential 
borrowers or financial speculation - which would be able to prejudice even an ideal sys-
tem made of worker-owned firms with shared skill and technical-organizational ad-
vances. Finally, it will be clear how this “sharing” of advances should also – or, maybe, 
mostly - be the task of this very ethically sustainable form of credit. In this way, the 
proposed system of credit granting will complete the general picture of the economic 
system I would support in order to approach as much as possible the ethical aim of do-
ing “justice to the Other”, which is the underlying problem of the entire itinerary of this 
dissertation. 
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          I 
 
Richard Rorty’s haunting authority 
 
 
 
1 – A neo-pragmatist’s essential concern 
 
What seems to be essential in the features of Richard Rorty’s anti-essentialism is his 
worry about any tendency, present in a philosophical text, to relate the use of a certain 
language to «something that has a purpose on its own». That is to say, to something 
which is naturalistically identified in some particular structure of the subject-object rela-
tion or in some logos or telos which would distinguish human nature and rationality
9
.  
Such a worry finds its theoretical counterpart in the neo-pragmatist debate about anti-
representationalism
10
. According to this approach, the conditions of existence of any 
linguistic – and “non-linguistic” – device, namely its functioning as a pragmatic expedi-
ent which is formed by relations of changing forces
11
, appear to justify, throughout 
Rorty’s texts, the intellectual scope of the neo-pragmatist language-game itself. Such a 
language-game would aim to play a role in the «battle over intrinsicality»
12
, by posing a 
question which has significant implications for what rationality is, or should be, in a po-
                                                          
9
 Rorty 1998, P. 301. 
10
 We will see that one of the greatest differences between Rortyan neo-pragmatism and the 
“classical” pragmatists – like James, Peirce and Dewey - is the very sense in which a lin-
guistic element owns an eminently pragmatic value. For these authors seem to have merely 
substituted the empiricist meaning of “verification”, as Rorty noticed, with «the sense of 
agreeable leading from one bit of experience to another» (Rorty 1998, P. 299). They still 
have, therefore, what Derrida calls “a metaphysical conception of sign”(Derrida 1982, §2). 
For Pierce, for instance, «what the interpreter as translator expresses is that a certain sign in 
one language stands in the same relation to some object as another sign in another language 
stands to the same object» (Smith 1998, P. 136). James talks about the working of a theory 
in the following way: «to ‘agree’ in the widest sense with a reality, can only mean to be 
guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch 
with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed» 
(James 1981, P. 102; also quoted in Rorty 1998, P. 299). For Rorty, on the other hand, we 
can talk of a context as “preferable” because the relations of forces it coincides with “look 
good” to us. In this vision, language is part of such forces, «not as a tertium quid between 
Subject and Object, nor as a medium in which we try to form pictures of reality, but as part 
of the behaviour of human beings» (Rorty 1986. P. xviii).  
11
 See Rorty 1979, Pp 170-180; Rorty 1998, P. 300. 
12
 Rorty 1998, P. 98. 
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litical community: «How do we tell when a complete causal explanation of X must in-
clude statements about X and when it is enough for it simply to explain why people 
think there is such a thing as X, explain why “X” is in the language?»
13
. Once such a 
question is legitimized in any ethical-political discussion, in fact, the border between is-
sues about “what is socially right?” and “what is socially useful?” can be blurred. 
The recurrent remark, fundamental for Rorty’s thought, whereby «there is no basis for 
deciding what counts as knowledge and truth other than what one's peers will let one get 
away with in the open exchange of claims, counterclaims, and reasons»
14
 reflects the in-
tellectual concern to preserve the basic character which makes the pragmatist promote 
the peculiar hope
15
 inherent in the figure of the liberal-ironist. That is to say, the charac-
ter of the lack of any «real standard in the matter of better and worse descriptions: al-
though the thoroughgoing  ironist can use the notion of a “better description”, she has 
no criterion for the application of this term»
16
, except the «conversational justification» 
of a greater agreement obtained within a community, through «social practice»
17
. The 
beginning of the last chapter of Philosophy and the Mirror of the Nature is clear and 
peremptory in presenting the necessity to distance the figure of the «edifying» philoso-
pher, with her aim to share a suitable vocabulary during her conversations, from the 
classical concept of “knowledge”: 
the difficulty stems from a notion shared by Platonists, Kantians, and positiv-
ists: that man has an essence – namely, to discover essences. The notion that 
our chief task is to mirror accurately, in our own Glassy Essence, the universe 
around us is the complement of the notion, common to Democritus and Des-
cartes, that the universe is made up of very simple, clearly and distinctly know-
able things, knowledge of whose essences provides the master-vocabulary 
which permits commensuration of all discourses. The classic picture of human 
beings must be set aside before epistemologically centred philosophy can be set 
aside 
18
. 
   What is significant in this passage is how Rorty manages to include all nuances of the 
“representationalist” view of man into a general definition: the tendency to consider, as 
                                                          
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Guignon and Hiley, 2003, P. 11. 
15
 See, above all, Rorty 1986, Rorty 1999 and Rorty1989. 
16
 Geras 1995, P. 122, my emphasis. 
17
 Rorty 1979, P. 170. 
18
 Ibid, P. 357. 
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the essence of man, the aim “to discover essences”. For once we have accepted it as a 
description of the general drives which would lead the epistemological enterprise, the 
source of the problem Rorty talks about seems to be decisively shifted. It moves from 
the actual constitution – and pragmatic effects - of any possible «picture of human» 
which can be theorized to the privilege of an attitude, which can even lack a definitive 
and “objective” result. 
Rorty, in effect, claims that the general suitability or acceptance of a certain vocabulary 
– which is simply equivalent to context-related tools «that may prove useful for some 
purposes and not for others»
19
 -, does not depend on any epistemological or structural 
criterion. It does not depend on a criterion which would indicate the presence of an in-
trinsic and independent structure of human nature or language which, therefore, would 
carry its own purpose, sense or telos. Once she becomes aware of that, the ironist is al-
lowed to take on the task of creating what she considers a more suitable human condi-
tion, by choosing equally either logic or rhetoric, rational or non-rational methods
20
. 
Rather than arguing for a better normative parameter in order to improve human knowl-
edge and ethics, her social goal becomes just «trying to make the vocabulary she prefers 
look better than the vocabulary of objection to it»
21
; it becomes the enhancement of the 
reciprocal agreement which exists within a community through the attempt «to make 
the vocabulary [she] favours look attractive by showing how it may be used to describe 
a variety of topics»
22
. 
It could be necessary, as well as essential, to have a chance to explain the structurality 
of the necessity of Rortyan insistence on the question of putting aside any scientific, 
“epistemological” «spirit of seriousness», which «can only exist in an intellectual world 
in which human life is an attempt to attain an end beyond life, an escape from freedom 
into the a-temporal»
23
. An insistence which is so hyperbolic and paradoxical that goes 
so far as to recognize the danger of granting the status of “general, natural structure car-
rying its own purpose” even to the cultural commitment of any possible philosophical 
approach: 
we might move out from under the shadow of Kant's notion that something 
called a "metaphysics of experience" is needed to provide the "philosophical ba-
                                                          
19
 Guignon and Hiley, 2003, P. 15. 
20
 Rorty 1989, P.78 and P. 83. 
21
 Geras 1995, P. 121. 
22
 Rorty 1989 P. 9 and P. 44; quoted in Geras 1995, P. 122. 
23
 Rorty 1986, P. 87. 
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sis" for the criticism of culture, to the realization that philosophers' criticisms of 
culture are not more "scientific," more "fundamental," or "deeper" than those of 
labour leaders, literary critics, retired statesmen, or sculptors
24
. 
   The reason for our interest in justifying why the necessity felt by Rorty is essential for 
his philosophical approach is precisely that, given the premises of such an approach, 
such necessity could have been not as essential as he makes it appear. 
This prospect has something to do with the parameters which would let us say, accord-
ing to Rorty, that a «language game helps us to cope»
25
. It does not resort, however, to 
the misleading objection made by Norman Geras, who maintains that 
coping [...], appearing to furnish by implication some neutral yardstick, actually 
poses as its own question: coping with, or in, what? Here Rorty may allow him-
self sometimes to say 'coping with the world'. But coping and not coping with 
the world are themselves features of the world -- of which it is asserted that there 
is not a Way It Is apart from our descriptions of it. With the powers imputed by 
him to description, anything must also be construable, presumably, as (useful) 
coping or as (useless) failure to cope
26
. 
   In effect, the same connotations which could have made unessential, for Rorty’s holis-
tic vision, the requirement of setting aside any idea of what Nature is seem to be ne-
glected by a criticism of that sort. In fact it would ignore the very connotations Rorty 
bestows on his holistic conception of «coping». 
For one should note that if an aporia is set inside Rorty’s interpretation of what «cop-
ing» means, it is only inferable, paradoxically, from how consistently the neo-
pragmatist would be willing to state that a preferable “description of the world” shapes 
itself through its interaction with other beliefs and “forces”. Still better, it is inferable 
from the extent to which the neo-pragmatist would affirm that any “description of the 
world” is nothing but this interaction of “forces” – and that it does not require, in this 
way, any subject-object structure to function. This clear anti-representationalist vision 
of what «coping» means contains, in fact, the source of an aporia within its very possi-
                                                          
24
 Ibid. In his presentation of the history of the "metaphysics of experience" and of the “theory of knowl-
edge” which characterizes Western philosophy, Rorty locates Kantian particularity in his advancing «to-
ward a conception of knowledge as fundamentally “knowing that” rather than “knowing of” [...], toward a 
conception of knowing which was not modelled on perception» and Kantian mistake into «a confusion 
between predication (saying something about an object) and synthesis (putting representation together in 
inner space)» (Rorty 1979, Pp. 147-148).  
25
 Geras 1995 P. 123. 
26
 Ibid. 
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bility of being developed. Such aporia is connected to the issue about the possible ex-
tent of an agreement within human community – agreement which coincides, therefore, 
within a context which is an interaction of forces - which is a certain description or vi-
sion of the world. Given the epistemological equivalence of such interactions of forces, 
the problem which one should face is reduced to the best possible determination of the 
extension of certain human desires and needs. Rorty asserts :«If one claims that a theory 
of truth is what works better than any competing theory, one is saying that it works bet-
ter by reference to our purposes, our particular situation in intellectual history»
27
. The 
resulting paradox is well illustrated in an article by James Tartaglia, in which he dis-
cusses the arguments used by Rorty in order to dismiss what, according to the American 
thinker, is still manifested in Quine and Sellars as typical representationalist preju-
dices
28
: 
 The account is that beliefs are not justified individually by the world, but holis-
tically by societal agreements, founded on coherence, which harness causal pres-
sures to serve the social purposes selected for by cultural evolution. The difficul-
ties for this account begin when we note that if justification is determined by so-
cietal agreement, and ultimately social usefulness, then for Rorty‘s position to be 
consistent, it must be justified in the same way. Thus his argument cannot be that 
Quine and Sellars demonstrated objective truths about justification, namely that 
representationalism is untenable because it neglects both the holistic nature of 
justification, and the distinctness of causation and justification. Neither can it be 
that, as a matter of fact, it is impossible for us to step outside our skins‘ by com-
paring our descriptions to the language-independent world. If Rorty were arguing 
this way, then he would be arguing, absurdly, that representationalism fails to 
                                                          
27
 Rorty 1998, P. 303. 
28
 As Tartaglia shows, Rorty is grateful to Sellars and Quine for having supplied the basic theoretical 
elements for his holism: «Rorty has a substantive case for his position, which is most fully developed in 
his critique of representationalism in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. The heart of this case is that 
the combination of Sellars arguments against the Myth of the Given‘ and Quine‘s arguments against ana-
lyticity, undermine any representationalist model of the relation between language and the world. Thus 
Sellars showed that representationalism confuses causation with justification when it locates the justifica-
tion for our beliefs in the causal impact of the environment, while Quine showed that experience bears 
evidentially on our claims only as a collective whole, making it impossible to isolate the support the 
world provides for an individual belief. The combined effect of these arguments, according to Rorty, is to 
show that our beliefs are not justified through a quasi-mechanical transaction between mind and world 
that might be studied a priori by epistemologists, in order to determine the conditions of successful repre-
sentation. Rather beliefs are justified by the out-come of large-scale social interactions that cannot in 
principle be predicted in advance» (Tartaglia 2012, P. 294). However, according to Rorty, while Sellars 
failed to get rid of the necessary-contingent distinction – which Quine brought into question - , Quine 
clung to a certain difference between “stimuli” and “posits” – which, on the contrary, Sellars contributed 
to dismiss (see Rorty 1979, P. 171). 
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accurately represent the facts about justification, and hence is an unjustified posi-
tion. Rather, Rorty can only consistently argue that Quine and Sellars‘ argu-
ments, as well as his own ubiquity of language‘ thesis and consequent intravo-
cabulary conception of justification, are justified by societal agreement
29
. 
   The potentiality of a holistic structure to be shared among individuals is what needs to 
be examined in order to assess the ‘level’ of suitability of a theoretical and pragmatic 
position, according to Rorty’s assumptions. If this consideration appears to be implicit 
in the anti-representationalist and pragmatist attitude proposed in Rorty’s texts, it is 
paradoxically a strict exclusion of any semblance of “intrinsicality” which seems to be 
puzzling, mostly when it is directed toward authors who, in their “epistemology”, agree 
in some way with Rortyan emphasis on the evaluation of the extent of the agreement. 
One of the most evident cases is how «Rorty rejects what he sees as Dewey's privileging 
of natural science over literary culture, just as he refuses to countenance philosophical 
discourse that traffics, as Dewey's does, with non-linguistic entities like experiences or 
ideas»
30
. Rorty himself notices that the methodological preference of Dewey towards a 
scientific and naturalistic approach is based on values which, throughout Dewey’s in-
strumentalism, always involve the survey of the degree of “agreement” which is present 
within a human environment. For Dewey, in fact, «the pragmatist claims his theory to 
be true in the pragmatic sense of truth; it works, it clears up difficulties, removes obscu-
rities [...]; does away with self-made problems of epistemology, clarifies and reorgan-
izes logical theory»
31
. 
A classical interpretation of linguistic phenomena as mirroring internal ideas or percep-
tion is rejected in Experience and Nature, in favour of a naturalistic version of language 
as a tool for transmitting forms of life and behaviours as forces: «language, communica-
tion, discourse [...] in virtue of which the consequences of the experience of one form of 
life are integrated in the behaviour of others»
32
. The input, the “general attitude” which 
drives Dewey’s scientific inquiry seems to be equivalent to the ethical goal of the 
Rortyan ironist, even more so once we accept Rorty’s account whereby any evaluation 
of what is “truth” is a discussion about some particular intellectual and cultural envi-
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 Tartaglia 2012 P. 13. 
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 Shusterman 1994 P. 391. 
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 J. Dewey, A short catechism, P. 9; quoted in Rorty 1998, P. 301. 
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 Dewey 1929, P. 280. 
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ronment, goals or desires
33
. We can consider, for instance, the assessment of what is a 
“true” cognitive perception which Experience and Nature presents: 
That a perception is cognitive means, accordingly, that it is used; it is treated as a 
sign of conditions that implicate other as yet unperceived consequences in addi-
tion to the perception itself. That a perception is truly cognitive means that its ac-
tive use or treatment is followed by consequences which fit appropriately into 
the other consequences which follow independently of its being perceived. To 
discover that a perception or an idea is cognitively invalid is to find that the con-
sequences which follow from acting upon it entangle and confuse the other con-
sequences which follow from the causes of the perception, instead of integrating 
or coordinating harmoniously with them. The special technique of scientific in-
quiry may be defined as consisting of procedures which make it possible to per-
ceive the eventual agreement or disagreement of the two sets of consequences
34
. 
   What is at stake in this passage is a judgement on the potentiality of certain “struc-
tures of forces” to be shared; it substitutes any account of human essence for the attitude 
to look for the greater benefit given by the very “agreement of consequences”. Such an 
intellectual aim is acknowledged by Rorty but, at the same time, it is unveiled by the 
neo-pragmatist in its promoting a typology of language which would be likely to bring a 
“more harmful” vision of the human. It is the very “naturalistic” and “scientific” lexi-
con, structuring expositions like the passage we have seen which, according to Rorty, 
maintains the danger of referring to some more “authentic” nature. For him, the classi-
cal pragmatist’s redefinition of “agreement” and “correspondence” - «in the sense of 
agreeable leading from one bit of experience to another» - «would be harmless enough 
if they were simply ways of saying “truth is what works”»
35
. 
 
 
            2 - The ironist’s haunt 
 
In order to understand what suppositions are at work in such an essential necessity, for 
Rorty, to avoid any description of agreements which recalls something “intrinsic”, it 
could be useful to specify how a difference in the respective theoretical languages re-
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flects itself, in the case of the comparison with Dewey, in a slightly different outcome in 
the respective ethical propositions. Dewey’s lexicon, in effect, manifests a certain con-
fidence in what one could call, from a pragmatist’s point of view, the “contingent neces-
sities” of scientific discoveries and outcomes. That is a confidence in their capacity to 
form a shared environment of values which can lay the basis for a reduction of “recipro-
cal misunderstandings” in any field and an increase in the self-fulfilment of the individ-
ual within a community. This general tendency can be drawn, for instance, from texts 
where terms concerning moral issues and terms describing institutional knowledge are 
closely correlated: 
in fact moral is the most humane of all subjects. It is that which is closest to hu-
man nature [...] Since it directly concerns human nature, everything that can be 
known of the human mind and body in physiology, medicine, anthropology, and 
psychology is pertinent to moral inquiry [...]Hence physics, chemistry, history, 
statistics, engineering science, are a part of disciplined moral knowledge so far as 
they enable us to understand the conditions and agencies through which man 
lives, and on account of which he forms and executes his plans. Moral science is 
not something with a separate province. It is physical, biological and historic 
knowledge placed in a human context where it will illuminate and guide the ac-
tivities of men
36
. 
   A characteristic which stands out here is how the general pragmatic aim of the com-
mon agreement is a deal which strongly involves “public institutions”, whether under-
stood as the body of a discipline and a science or as the common and widespread under-
standing of the features and goals of society. Rorty seems to be suspicious of such an 
identification of the concept “agreement among individuals” with the possible norma-
tivity which can be “shared” and “acknowledged” through public institutions. Institu-
tions which can be consistently identified, if one takes into account Dewey’s conception 
whereby means are holistically parts of the end
37
, both as tools toward such a common 
agreement and as manifestations of the same. The hope identified with the figure of the 
liberal-ironist is based on the suspicion that what public institutions spread as shared 
vocabulary is always in danger of not effectively coinciding with the particular “agree-
ment” needed in a singular situation. For this reason Rorty could never accept a research 
of «regularities or needs that are virtually necessary given the contingent evolution and 
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current structures of human biology and history»
38
, undertaken by or coincident with 
human institutions, at least without decrying them as presupposing the existence of 
some essence of man. It would be still more unlikely that the ironist would share 
Dewey’s conviction whereby «human interactions can be regulated, employed in an or-
derly way for good only as we know how to observe them. And they cannot be observed 
aright, they cannot be understood and utilized, when the mind is left to itself to work 
without the aid of science»
39
. 
I formulate here, therefore, a first characterization of what may be considered the basic 
reason for the essential necessity, present in Rorty, to avert any trace of intrinsicality or 
“independent purpose” of a structure. Such a reason seems to be his structural lack of 
confidence in the possibility of any, inevitably institutionalized, human language to 
“really” match any contingent change of needs, desires, values or meanings. A motive 
which can be also named as the conviction whereby it is impossible, when considering 
«the adoption of the cooperative inquiry model of science in our social lives»
40
 or the 
adoption of any model of institution or language, not to structurally create a risk of 
“violence” towards an individual’s «final vocabularies»
41
, through the ineluctable de-
contextualizations
42
 of such models. Once illustrated Rorty’s theoretical – “structural” - 
approach in this way, I consequently outline two main conditions because of which 
Rorty’s intellectual commitment turns out to be so tied to the need to proscribe any ref-
erences to a “natural” purpose of a structure. It is meaningful to underline that, in the 
absence of such conditions, a pragmatist’s attitude may as well result in what one can 
think of as a useful “therapist” enterprise, that is in an operation of linguistic elucidation 
of the pragmatic sense which various subject theories own; an elucidation which would 
clarify the “best” ways to arrange an agreeable pragmatic relation between different 
parts of “reality” which would be its linguistic and non-linguistic elements – just as the 
“Wittgensteinian therapists” Rorty talks about interpret the purpose of Philosophical In-
vestigations as of clearing «the confusion in the speaker’s relation to her words»
43
. 
The first condition is the persuasion whereby the potential total agreement which could 
be brought by a figure like the liberal-ironist is effectively greater than the potential to-
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tal agreement which any theory of the subject, of human nature and of man’s relation to 
the world could bring. Not surprisingly, in fact, «Rorty wants to protect our cherished 
negative liberties from philosophical tyranny» because «no philosopher, no matter how 
sure of his or her ideal of self-perfection, should be able to prescribe how individuals 
must live their own private lives»
44
. And such a persuasion must have played a role in 
Rorty’s fundamental worry about «something that has purpose on its own» despite the 
fact that a researcher could be persuaded that the language-game, the inevitably institu-
tionalized language she is going to implement, is the outcome of a method which has 
effectively the potentiality to create a greater agreement among humans. A agreement, 
at least, throughout her intellectual context – as in the case of Dewey or in the case of 
the quest for the greater «simplicity, linearity, clarity» of Quine’s extensional lan-
guage
45
, which Rorty analyses in some chapters of Philosophy and the Mirror of the 
Nature
46
. 
The second condition could significantly be read as the condition of the first one. This is 
the assimilation, by the liberal-ironist, of any institution and of any persuasion of its co-
herent working –and, therefore, of its “actual being shared” - to an idealization. The 
condition of existence of such an idealization is an ostensible unawareness of its being 
«perpetually threatened» and «haunted». We can in fact notice, in the passages in which 
Rorty introduces the concept of «final vocabulary», a reference to a certain tension – or 
discrepancy - between, on the one hand, what would justify a belief within the architec-
ture of an institutionalized language – or a «final vocabulary» and, on the other hand, 
the possible perception of a certain unsuitability of such a belief. This tension would re-
call the fact that there is a structural risk of non-coincidence between justifications and 
values modelled within any «final vocabulary» and the exact “language” – or “environ-
ment” – which an individual would need in order to fulfil her contingent needs and de-
sires. 
A «final vocabulary», in effect, is defined as «a set of words which human beings em-
ploy to justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives. These are the words in which 
we formulate praise of our friends and contempt for our enemies, our long-term pro-
jects, our deepest self-doubts and our highest hopes»
47
. But the role such a definition 
plays in Rorty’s text is to open a discussion about the factors which would make the 
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plain acceptance of the general validity of a certain vocabulary and of the agreement it 
would carry the result of a sort of illusion. Consistently with his worry about the de-
pendence of any language on something which «has purpose on its own», Rorty relates 
any feature which would manifest the insufficiency and the danger of relying on a privi-
leged vocabulary to the dependence of any «final vocabulary» on the system of values 
of a certain tradition. In fact, «the opposite of irony is common sense. For that is the 
watchword of those who unselfconsciously describe everything important in terms of 
the final vocabulary to which they and those around them are habituated»
48
. In the end, 
any individual’s, singular and contextualized vocabulary is, inevitably, «made up of 
thin, flexible, and ubiquitous terms such as "true," "good," "right," and "beautiful." The 
larger part contains thicker, more rigid, and more parochial terms, for example, 
"Christ," "England," "professional standards," "decency," "kindness," "the Revolution," 
"the Church, "progressive," "rigorous," "creative." The more parochial terms do most of 
the work»
49
. 
The different approaches through which the ironist and the metaphysician – but also the 
common men – deal with the inherited structures of beliefs reflected by these words 
display that the very functioning of a web of meanings is, in the end, connected with a 
certain degree of deception which these structures cast on the individual. In fact, while 
the ironist is identified as the one who «has radical and continuing doubts about the fi-
nal vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabular-
ies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered»
50
, for the 
“common men” to be commonsensical «is to take for granted that statements formu-
lated in that final vocabulary suffice to describe and judge [their] beliefs»
51
. The ironist 
«realizes that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor 
dissolve these doubts». 
Rorty calls «people of this sort "ironists" because of their realization that anything can 
be made to look good or bad by being re-described». They are «never quite able to take 
themselves seriously because they are always aware that the terms in which they de-
scribe themselves are subject to change, they are always aware of the contingency and 
fragility of their final vocabularies»
52
. 
                                                          
48
 Ibid, P. 74. 
49
 Ibid, P. 73. 
50
 Ibid, my emphasis. 
51
 Ibid, P. 74, my emphasis. 
52
 Ibid, Pp. 73-74, my emphases.  
33 
 
 
 
The metaphysician, instead, «is still attached to common sense, in that he does not ques-
tion the platitudes which encapsulate the use of a given final vocabulary, and in particu-
lar the platitude which says there is a single permanent reality to be found behind the 
many temporary appearances»
53
. 
Rorty seems to stress the fact that what the ironist is aware of is that, since any vocabu-
lary which claims to definitively describe reality cannot help but work throughout – or 
coincide with - a relentless de-contextualization of meanings and intentions, it cannot 
avoid “transforming itself” and being always at risk of causing “misunderstandings”. 
Yet, one could add, since the “common men” inevitably have to think and act by means 
of a privileged vocabulary, they cannot help but use it as the best way to deal with such 
misunderstandings, in any case. Even in the circumstance in which some doubt strikes 
them, they inevitably have to think through their privileged language and have to feel 
persuaded that the “vocabulary” of their doubts, of their “awareness of them” is, as far 
as they are aware, the best available language they can use to deal with reality. The 
common sense persuasion would be, in this way, an inevitable feature – I am arguing an 
essential characteristic – of the functioning of a «final vocabulary». Any language 
would work, as its own structure, as a web of forces which shape a certain kind of 
“power” which would be, in the end, nothing but all features of a “single” context de-
contextualizing itself. In this way, what the context of forces coincident with the “lib-
eral-ironist” would own as a different and specific form would be its substituting a 
“common” kind of persuasion with an “ontologically” equivalent but far more harmless 
and suitable kind of persuasion. 
Hence, to correctly consider Rorty’s assumptions, the central issue would be now to 
clarify why and how the ironist’s move of «re-describing ranges of objects or events in 
partially neologistic jargon, in the hope of inciting people to adopt and extend that jar-
gon»
54
 would be less dependent on a structure which inevitably owns as its characteris-
tic an ubiquitous risk of causing misunderstandings, which seems to be an essential fea-
ture of the formation of a «final vocabulary» and of any alleged “institutional” agree-
ment. It is a crucial issue in order to assess the coherence of Rorty’s position. In fact, 
given what has been said, the ironist’s move itself would be, in the end, dependent on – 
or coincident with - a certain privileged language. 
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When recalling the introduction of the concept of «final vocabulary», I asserted that 
«consistently with his worry about the dependence of any language on something which 
“has purpose on its own”, Rorty relates any feature which would manifest the insuffi-
ciency and the danger of relying on a privileged vocabulary to the dependence of any 
“final vocabulary” on the system of values of a certain tradition». I can now rephrase 
my initial topic with an issue which concerns the very concept of “coherence” in rela-
tion to positions, like Rorty’s, which do not even admit universal presuppositions of in-
quiry which “can cross over the boundaries between paradigms”. It has become evident, 
in fact, that the theoretical weight and pragmatic effectiveness of Rorty’s concern about 
«relating language to some structural criterion, sense or telos» turns out to involve, in 
the light of the clarified conditions of the liberal-ironist’s language constitution, the 
question of the internal coherence of the functioning of Rorty’s discourse itself and, 
consequently, of its “output”. That is to say, once a liberal-ironist is persuaded, accord-
ing to Rorty, of the impossibility of finding foundations for her own vocabulary and 
therefore feels that she is allowed to choose any re-description she senses as suitable 
and to distinguish between re-description for private and for public purposes, is it co-
herent, for Rorty, to tie the presentation of such a figure to such a persuasion and, there-
fore, to a certain criterion, paradigm or general structure of a language? Is it coherent, 
for Rorty, to make the ironist’s language dependent, in this way, on an alleged general 
structure? We can assume that the neo-pragmatist was significantly aware of that: 
As Rorty said, he was glad if his writing was useful, but was concerned that I 
might think it more useful than it actually was: skip the meta-discourse and just 
get on with it! Rorty is out to de-divinize the world, and certainly doesn’t want 
himself or any other philosopher to become an essential reference point, to take 
the place vacated by Truth or God
55
. 
   But would it be more coherent to read this awareness, in turn, as simply the outcome 
of an ontologically equivalent structure, of a certain privileged vocabulary or as a sign 
of the realization that the only way to continue being coherent, for a supposed anti-
foundationalist thought, is to become incoherent? Is it, after all, that the theoretical 
move and will to base his own philosophy on stressing the possibility of the «activity of 
devising new incommensurable discourses[...] as the new impetus for inquiry after the 
demise of objective truth, one which is self-consciously internal to inquiry, rather than 
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provided by an imaginary external goal»
56
 is a sign of a coherence inherent to Rorty’s 
vocabulary? Namely, the coherence which manifests itself in Rorty’s backing out of any 
“ethical” rule, a rule which would have sprung from Rorty’s very conception of lan-
guage and made him face the structural impossibility of choosing a precise vocabulary, 
even his own neo-pragmatist one; a rule which would have taken him away from the 
ability to choose a more suitable language in any contingency. A coherence, therefore, 
which we can find in Rorty’s being able to choose a better vocabulary independently 
from any “paradigm” he might inevitably come across. 
An ability whose conditions are, nevertheless, its making use of a set of language-games 
which de-contextualize themselves and can never coincide with «the exact “language”, 
“intentions” – or “environment” – which an individual would need in order to fulfil her 
contingent needs and desires». 
Does Rorty’s vocabulary coherence undermine itself? In order to be able to make the 
choice we illustrated, the neo-pragmatist has to be unable to make it, he has to be “con-
ditioned”, and his philosophical commitment appears to be not decidable in its theoreti-
cal and ethical contribution and identity. 
 
 
3 – Foucault’s confinement 
 
We find ourselves now at a decisive juncture. It will be revealed as essential to under-
stand the place a discourse like Rorty’s can have within debates about the role of the 
transcendental
57
. If the Rortyan figure of a pragmatist proves to dwell on the sort of on-
tological paradox and the consequent “undecidable” ethical identity we highlighted, the 
concept of “liberal-ironist” itself presumes a degree of ethical and ontological pureness 
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as high as the one demanded for ideally liberal states
58
. Rorty would be committed, in 
this way, to an ideal as strong as the one he criticises and, above all, his philosophical 
position is likely to produce the same ethical and political consequences he ascribes to 
the «representationalist philosophies». 
 
One can find the danger of an undecidability within the ironist’s figure discussed by 
Rorty in a text where he tries to locate the role of pragmatism in relation to the very 
topic of whether we are allowed to “hope” or not, to rely or not on our capacity to 
achieve a better future once we give up thinking that «“the study of man” or “the human 
sciences” have a nature, any more than we think that man does»
59
. In the essay Un-
grounded Hope: Dewey vs. Foucault Rorty, in fact, appears to be engaged in a compari-
son between two opposite ethical reactions to the loss of confidence in «objectivity»; 
two positions which would convey a radically opposite “pragmatic” evaluation of the 
potentiality of what we would call an “ironist”. On the one hand we find Dewey’s inter-
pretation of discourse, this time read from the point of view of his optimistic vision of it 
«as instrumental, as one element in the arsenal of tools people use for gratifying, syn-
thesizing, and harmonizing their desires»; on the other hand the consideration of how 
Foucault interprets his own studies on «the (more or less) coercive practices and subtle 
techniques by which people are subjected and subject themselves to discipline»
60
. 
Rorty underlines how what could be interpreted as a mere difference of «tone» repre-
sents the two possible «ways to go» once «the pragmatist line is adopted». In fact «one 
can emphasize, as Dewey did, the moral importance of the social sciences-their role in 
widening and deepening our sense of community and of the possibilities open to this 
community. Or one can emphasize, as Michel Foucault does, the way in which the so-
cial sciences have served as instruments of “the disciplinary society”, the connection be-
tween knowledge and power rather than that between knowledge and human solidar-
ity»
61
. 
Although Rorty’s essay on Dewey and Foucault can be read as “discussing” the diffi-
culty of attributing a non-conditioned intension to the liberal-ironist, the undecidability I 
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talked about is here faced only in as much as it is excluded from the inside of a dis-
course over the transcendental. That is to say, the danger of an undecidability concern-
ing the efficacy of the pragmatist’s anti-transcendentalist care is seen as dependent on a 
misunderstanding of the debate on human nature and a priori knowledge, not as a struc-
tural feature of such a transcendental debate itself. The danger whereby any vocabulary 
would intrinsically express itself as a structure of power, an «instrument of domination 
and manipulation»
62
 is examined, in Rorty’s text, as a perception coming from some of 
Foucault’s “misapprehension” of the theme rather than coming from a certain function-
ing of language which Foucault’s analysis contributes to display. In this way any debate 
over the undecidability of the ironist’s function is, from its very beginning, deprived of 
a serious transcendental relevance. 
 
A reading of Rorty’s essay can highlight how Dewey’s and Foucault’s approaches are 
mainly described by recalling a pure intellectual attitude which is typical of their “intel-
lectual predecessor”, rather than by an analytical parallelism between the concepts they 
use
63
. Rorty, in this way, frames Foucault into a particular cultural inclination of the in-
tellectual set to which he and Dewey also belong; in effect he praises the French thinker 
for being «a fellow anti-dualist, anti-Platonist, anti-representationalist, anti-essentialist, 
and social constructivist»
64
. After wondering whether Foucault’s «different spin» is due 
to «an ingenuous Anglo-Saxon pose as opposed to a self-dramatizing Continental 
one»
65
, Rorty cites Ian Hacking in order to make clear where Foucault’s different stance 
comes from: 
Foucault said that the concept Man is a fraud, not that you and I are as nothing. 
Likewise the concept Hope is all wrong. The hopes attributed to Marx and Rous-
seau are perhaps part of that very concept Man, and they are a sorry basis for op-
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timism [...]If we're not satisfied, it should not be because he is pessimistic. It is 
because he has given no surrogate for whatever it is that springs eternal in the 
human breast
66
. 
   Foucault, in other words, would have connected values as solidarity and hope to a cer-
tain conception of man perpetrating, therefore, a metaphysical attitude negatively, or, to 
use a metaphor, as its negative. What is meaningful, however, is that Rorty, in this text, 
completely overlooks any argument or terminology which would recall issues as the 
function of the «archive» and of the «subject» for Foucault
67
 and denotes this latter’s al-
leged tendency by using words which appear to invoke the role of a sort of intellectual 
habit or feeling: «What Foucault doesn't give us is what Dewey wanted to give us - a 
kind of hope which doesn't need reinforcement from "the idea of a transcendental or en-
during subject." Dewey offered ways of using words like "truth," "rationality," "pro-
gress," "freedom," "democracy," "culture," "art," and the like which presupposed neither 
the ability to use the familiar vocabulary of what Foucault calls "the classic age," nor 
that of the nineteenth-century French intellectuals»
68
. 
Rorty avoids explaining the structural reasons whereby Dewey’s stance would be more 
suitable, limiting himself to showing the “emotional” obstacles which would prevent us 
from accepting that, even within a prospective which leaves out any natural human te-
los, «the will to truth is not the urge to dominate but the urge to create, to “attain work-
ing harmony among diverse desires”»: «This may sound too pat, too good to be true. I 
suggest that the reason we find it so is that we are convinced that liberalism requires the 
notion of a common human nature, or a common set of moral principles which binds us 
all, or some other descendent of the Christian notion of the Brotherhood of Man. So we 
have come to see liberal social hope - such as Dewey's -as inherently self-deceptive and 
philosophically naive. We think that, once we have freed ourselves from the various il-
lusions which Nietzsche diagnosed, we must find ourselves all alone, without the sense 
of community which liberalism requires»
69
. 
The spirit of this assessment conveys the idea that it is mostly a motion of philosophical 
nostalgia which would drive any of Foucault’s “ethical” judgement of language, 
namely, a theoretically unfounded nostalgia for something which would have «purpose 
on its own». In this sense, Foucault’s suggestion whereby social practices are «systems 
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of control [which] work to frustrate or prevent the fulfilment or satisfaction of some 
‘significant’ desires, purposes, needs or interests, not only directly or ‘negatively’ 
through repression but also (in Foucault’s historical narratives) “by inducing in us a cer-
tain self-understanding, an identity”»
70
 would be a sign of the dependence of his analy-
sis of language on a structural criterion, a criterion whereby the authentic paradigm of 
human nature would be the loss of the possibility of authentically following any telos. 
Any suspicion of undecidability concerning the figure of the liberal-ironist is, in such a 
way, held back within a discussion which is allegedly faulty from its very start. The 
“feeling” supporting Foucault’s philosophical position is, in fact, a priori evaluated as 
fallacious, for its being dependent on a conditioned conception of humanity, which is 
something which is essentially rejected by Rorty’s neo-pragmatism. Its hypothetical ap-
plication to the case of pragmatism would be detrimental because it would draw atten-
tion to a certain structural “nature” of language and human whose idea would under-
mine the possibility of an efficacious liberal-ironist hope. Consequently, once one keeps 
being careful of the existence of these fallacies, it is evident that «there is no inferential 
connection between the disappearance of the transcendental subject-of “man” as some-
thing having a nature which society can repress or understand-and the disappearance of 
human solidarity. Bourgeois liberalism seems [...] the best example of this solidarity we 
have yet achieved, and Deweyan pragmatism the best articulation of it»
71
. 
On the contrary, Dewey’s position seems to be a priori evaluated as pragmatically ef-
fective because, at least within the margins of this specific essay, his intellectual com-
mitment is described as independent and freed from a constraining conception of human 
relations; this feature makes him capable of having faith in the vocabulary of “American 
pluralism”. Dewey, in fact, has already reached «the point at which we can make phi-
losophical and historical (“genealogical”) reflection useful to those, in Foucault's 
phrase, “whose fight is located in the fine meshes of the webs of power”. Dewey spent 
his life trying to lend a hand in these little fights, and in the course of doing so he 
worked out the vocabulary and rhetoric of American “pluralism”. This rhetoric made 
the first generation of American social scientists think of themselves as apostles of a 
new form of social life»
72
. 
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But it would be unfair to simply indicate Rorty’s reaction against Foucault’s post-
humanism as a sort of escape from a theoretical danger. In order to value the real phi-
losophical and practical relevance of Rorty’s worry about transcendental stances, one 
has to be, once more, consistent with the neo-pragmatist’s assumptions. 
In fact, it is right to take into account that, once one has accepted a «conversational jus-
tification» of vocabulary and the pragmatist’s necessity to make it «look good» or 
«bad» according to historical criteria and contingencies, the only way to assess Rorty’s 
argumentations is to weigh the suitability of their language and of the political attitude 
they propose in a precise cultural context. That is to say, we must abandon any theoreti-
cal generalization in favour of a consideration of the actual contexts in which there have 
been the conditions thanks to which the pragmatic purpose intrinsic to any form of 
thought has itself been manifested. In this way, Rorty’s scepticism toward Foucault 
would not seem a blind safeguard of a general theory of human relations but, rather, a 
realization that a kind of progress-without-telos has let men like Dewey offer us «ways 
of using words like “truth”, “rationality”, “progress”, “freedom”, “democracy”, “cul-
ture”, “art”, and the like» without referring to an intrinsic human nature. Such a “pro-
gress” would have allowed our pragmatic behaviour to indeed express itself better, to 
achieve greater human benefits and, therefore, to become “fulfilled”, through the lan-
guage which is typical of Western societies. The issue would be, in this sense, to judge 
Rorty’s criticism as a historical and political configuration of the “pragmatist’s” status 
at her best effectiveness, assessing therefore the actual efficacy of the typology of cul-
ture Rorty supports in order to create human benefits. 
To focus on Rorty’s numerous references to what he considers as contexts of «liberal 
politics» might help to understand how he can draw a substantial line of separation be-
tween his liberalism and Foucault’s supposed theoretical stance. It might help to under-
stand why a «view of the self as a random composite of incompatible quasi selves con-
stantly seeking new possibilities and multiple changing vocabularies»
73
 is conceived by 
Rorty as fitting a liberal society while «Foucault's projection of the desire for private 
autonomy out onto politics»
74
 is read as the result of a kind of nostalgia for the possibil-
ity of sharing authentic human nature values within a community. 
For such opposite evaluations would not be, in “theory”, expected to be so. In fact, sup-
posing that Foucault’s vision of «human subjectivity as a contingent product of contin-
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gently existing forces»
75
 really leads the French philosopher to believe «at least in his 
anarchist moments, that every social institution is equally unjustifiable, that all of them 
are on a par»
76
, it is not difficult to notice that such a conviction would find its roots, 
within Foucault’s thought, in elements which I argued to be clearly “essential” for the 
development of the liberal-ironist’s features. One of them is, for instance, the recogni-
tion that the greatest number of institutionalized privileged languages which enjoy a 
seeming agreement among individuals can, as a matter of facts, «frustrate or prevent the 
fulfilment or satisfaction of some ‘significant’ desires, purposes, needs or interests, not 
only directly or ‘negatively’ through repression but also – as in Foucault’s historical 
narratives - “by inducing in us a certain self-understanding, a certain identity»
77
. An-
other one is the emphasis put on the ineluctable contingency of any linguistic - “holis-
tic” – construction. Foucault maintains: «The enunciation is an unrepeatable event; it 
has a situated and dated uniqueness that is irreducible»
78
. Another one is, still, the re-
fusal to believe that, if we get rid of a false conception of “truth”, rationality and human 
nature, we will definitively be able to give better answers to the traditional problems 
and to unmask a more “authentic” human nature. 
I illustrated Rorty’s scepticism about this belief when I commented his perplexity to-
wards Dewey’s view of «instrumentalism». Even if one might find some ambiguities 
about this theme in Foucault’s later ideas about the «care of the self», it is evident from 
some passages that the importance of «restoring a full and positive relationship with 
himself»
79
 lies, for the French philosopher, in the contextualized evaluation of what are 
the most beneficial “practices of freedom” and not in an alleged liberation of an authen-
tic identity or repressed nature: 
I’ve always been a little distrustful of the general theme of liberation, to the ex-
tent, that, if one does not treat it with a certain number of safeguards and within 
certain limits, there is the danger that it will refer back to the idea that there does 
exist a nature or a human foundation which, as a result of a certain number of 
historical, social or economic processes, found itself concealed, alienated or im-
prisoned in and by some repressive mechanism [...]this act of liberation is not 
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sufficient to establish the practices of liberty that later on will be necessary for 
people [...] I encountered that exact same problem in dealing with sexuality: does 
the expression “let us liberate our sexuality” have a meaning? Isn’t the problem 
rather to try to decide the practices of freedom through which we could deter-
mine what is sexual pleasure and what are our erotic, loving, passionate relation-
ships with others?
80
. 
   What Foucault appears to be «distrustful» of is, apparently, a particular kind of “es-
sentialism” in respect to human nature which may be drawn from his analyses of the 
several forms of power; he is indeed sceptical about an interpretation of a deceiving de-
vice as a product of a “false consciousness” in opposition to a “true” one. In this case, 
his basic ethical purposes would not be so distant from Rorty’s, at least in as much as 
both of them read a “dominant” and “deceiving” vocabulary to be such only in the sense 
of “non-suitable” - although it may seem - to aim at assessing the benefits of our deci-
sions on our being. According to them, therefore, there is no alienated nature to be set 
free but, rather, a relentless commitment to formulate different vocabularies – and prac-
tices - through which we can better determine our «relationship with others». 
For these reasons, according to Rorty, we have the necessity to understand what histori-
cal-political practices of our time are pragmatically more suitable which were under-
rated or disapproved by Foucault’s «attempt to be an ironist»
81
. Hence, too, the need to 
elucidate the relationship which exists between those practices and institutions – fa-
voured by Rorty in their very being as historically developed cultural tools following 
the rise of historically determinate needs – and the possibility of hoping for what Rorty 
himself keeps calling a liberal “utopia”. 
 
 
4- Rorty and the legitimateness of the authority 
 
The legitimacy of such a need is backed – as well as by the looming prospect of the un-
decidability of the ironist’s position I talked of – by the presence of some passages, 
within Rorty’s texts, where the American philosopher appears to soften his usual prag-
matist optimism in regard to a linear «moral progress» inherent to the liberal commu-
nity. It is a perception of uncertainty which is tied, above all, to a question which con-
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cerns the public entity or the authority which may or should take public decisions; 
which concerns the legitimacy of such authority and of its taking suitable decisions. 
Within these passages, philosophy itself seems to play the ambiguous role of an institu-
tion which is acknowledged by the pragmatist as being allowed to teach us the most le-
gitimate technique to confer legitimacy – through its preventing us from giving unfair 
legitimacy to institutions which claim to represent some humane “nature” whilst actu-
ally being mere techniques to deal with reality - ; but it is, at a second glance, recog-
nised in its being itself a mere device, lacking sufficient authority to take suitable politi-
cal decisions. This is coherent with what I quoted earlier about Rorty’s refusal to grant 
the philosopher’s reflection the status of being “more fundamental”
82
. 
First of all, it is important to point out that, for Rorty, a very significant “moral” pro-
gress has been made, throughout the recent history of humanity, in shifting the classical 
question about human nature toward a conception of human being a set of techniques, 
of devices adapting themselves according to the environment in which they are. Thus, 
there is now «a growing willingness to neglect the question “What is our nature?” and 
to substitute the question “What can we make of ourselves?”. [...] We are coming to 
think of ourselves as the flexible, protean, self-shaping animal rather than as the rational 
animal or the cruel animal»
83
. In this respect, it is meaningful to note that «one of the 
shapes we have recently assumed is that of a human rights culture»
84
, for there are two 
ways to interpret it. The first way would still carry a symptom of representationalism, in 
reading human rights as a normativity originating from a stable human feature, like “ra-
tionality”. In respect to such a view, obviously, Rorty «has invariably been negative and 
dismissive»
85
. For, if one connects the conditions whereby a certain right or dignity is 
justifiable to the quality of certain features and behaviours, this latter becomes – to use 
an expression of Foucault – a «site of veridiction»
86
 of the legitimacy of attributing to a 
certain human being a “human” identity; a site which can be “arbitrarily” transformed 
and altered according to the environments and the needs it comes across. 
Moving to a closer analysis of Rorty’s specific observations about the modalities and 
the implications of the use of a pragmatist’s language, we can see that Rorty quotes, 
among others, a report from Yugoslav wars by David Rieff describing the afflictions 
suffered by Muslim men in Bosnia. This is in order to show us that «the moral to be 
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drawn from Rieff’s stories is that Serbians murderers and rapists do not think of them-
selves as violating human rights. For they are not doing these things to fellow human 
beings, but to Muslims»
87
. The failure of a “representationalist” conception of human 
rights is here apparent, for Rorty. The failure stays, precisely, in establishing as “natu-
ral” certain “cultural” and somatic devices in human beings; according to Rorty what 
we should do, while thinking about our human community is, rather, the opposite, 
namely, to think of any human characteristic as a “technical” device. 
For a second way to read the appeal to human rights, instead, brings notion like “ration-
ality”, “intelligence” and “nature”, to which they resort, back to their technical and 
pragmatic function of consisting in devices developed within contexts of forces in order 
to achieve the greatest possible agreement. Here, philosophy turns out to be a mere 
«question of efficiency»
88
, «one of the techniques for reweaving our vocabulary of 
moral deliberation in order to accommodate new beliefs»
89
, a technique for continuing 
the «unprecedented acceleration in the rate of moral progress» which has followed «the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ increase in wealth, literacy and leisure among 
Americans and Europeans»
90
. 
 
But it is at this level of Rorty’s reflection that the whole ambiguity inherent to the func-
tion, the validity and the ethical efficacy of the neo-pragmatist’s philosophical reflection 
stands out. 
Consistently with his non-representationalist approach to rationality, in fact, Rorty de-
clares that «the appropriate intellectual background to political deliberation is historical 
narrative rather than philosophical or quasi-philosophical theory».
91
 “Historical narra-
tive” is intended as a certain vocabulary, a certain “privileged language” which draws 
its justification not from an “external” authority but from its own telling of a story, from 
its talking about some “reasons” and models of intelligence which work well and coher-
ently as shared devices within an environment. 
What represents an “external” authority, a privileged logos, «something that has a pur-
pose on its own» for an «ideal» and «utopian» attitude like that of the liberal-ironist’s, 
for any implementation of the neo-pragmatist’s ideal represents its very condition of ex-
istence and functioning. For the refusal, by the neo-pragmatist philosopher, to assume 
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the authority to choose a certain logos a priori is coincident with the authority - which 
the philosopher attributes to himself – to choose the authority one can rely upon. To 
choose the economic, political, normative authority the citizen can trust in order to hope 
in a wealthier future. The question which turns up could be, at this point, whether these 
two functions – to assume the authority and to choose an authority – are really distinct. 
Is the act of assessing the reason of an authority different from assuming the authority to 
assess and rule a human environment? Is it not always a matter of trusting the authority 
– the legitimacy, the effectiveness – of one’s own privileged language in order to im-
plement an economic, political, and normative logos? Is there a real difference when the 
issue is to put one’s faith in an authority and in its “veracity”? 
One can consider these questions as naturally arising from the dilemma of the ironist’s 
ontological undecidability. And the response which is most likely to be given them 
seems to retrace the theoretical short circuit which makes Rorty feel he is allowed to be 
«still devoted to the utopian social hope»
92
 typical of Western liberal societies and to 
disapprove of those who, like Foucault, do not feel this way. 
Such attempts to dismiss oneself from an assumption of authority and the simultaneous 
inevitability of acting like an authority seem to explain the passages in which Rorty 
states that «social and political philosophy usually has been, and always ought to be, 
parasitic on such narratives».
93
 They explain those in which he invokes the research for 
a certain capacity of decision which would be external in respect to the neo-pragmatist’s 
or the “general” philosopher’s ideal role and conception of human. And this despite the 
fact that the major authors who recall or were influenced by what one can define as the 
most shared “historical narratives” of modern political thought – (including the «post-
French Revolution events» which, according to Rorty, have brought us an amazing in-
crease of wealth and moral progress) –held positions based on models of rationality and 
devices which, according to Rorty, assume the functioning of some “human nature”. As 
Rorty says: 
Hobbes's and Locke's accounts of the state were parasitic on different accounts 
of recent English history. Marx's philosophy was parasitic on his narrative of the 
rise of the bourgeoisie and his forecast of a successful proletarian revolution. 
Dewey's social theory was, and Rawls's political theory is, parasitic on different 
accounts of the recent history of the United States. All these philosophers formu-
                                                          
92
 Ibid, P. 238. 
93
 Ibid. 
46 
 
 
 
lated their taxonomies of social phenomena, and designed the conceptual tools 
they used to criticize existing institutions, by reference to a story about what had 
happened and what we might reasonably hope could happen in the future 
94
. 
   What I am going to question, throughout the next paragraphs, is not so much whether 
Rorty’s point of view is legitimately allowed to speak of these philosophers as paving 
the way for a “pragmatist” efficient culture; it is – rather - whether we would be allowed 
to separate the possibility of the rise of intellectual and political positions – and «his-
torical narratives» - like these from a certain consideration of human and world nature. 
All these thinkers wrote about certain historically situated events and “public reasons” 
and drew from them a certain legitimacy for their authority in defining a set of devices 
so “efficacious” and “agreeable” – according to them – that they ended up identifying it 
with human “nature”. It is this very authority which the figure of the neo-pragmatist 
philosopher lacks, looks for and yearns to find in order to go ahead with their political 
deliberations. This is also because «when it comes to political deliberation, philosophy 
is a good servant but a bad master», since there is the danger that it might establish its 
decisions not on historical narratives but on representationalist theories
95
. 
Let us read, now, the excerpts about the necessity, manifested by Rorty, of such an “ex-
ternal” authority which I have been referring to. In the essay Globalization, the Politics 
of Identity and Social Hope the first topic of the title is tackled after Rorty’s very affir-
mation about philosophy being a “bad master”: «I shall come back to the topic of the 
role of philosophy later. But now let me try to say something about globalization». The 
whole description of this latter phenomenon, within the two pages which focus on it, is 
oriented toward the necessity of creating, choosing or resorting to a global authority, the 
necessity of trusting and having confidence in the “language” of such authority, a lan-
guage which should be as shared as possible among a human community: 
I suspect that the most socially useful thing we can do is to continually draw the 
attention of the educated publics of our respective countries to the need for a 
global polity, which can develop some sort of countervailing power to that of the 
super-rich. [We should] remind our fellow citizens that only global political in-
stitutions can offset the power of all that marvellously liquid and mobile capi-
tal
96
. 
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   The project of such a global authority draws its sense and its necessity of implementa-
tion from its situatedness and inscription in a context of given authorities, dominant au-
thorities which arouse specific needs, desires, personalities and intentions within hu-
manity. Once the causes and the reasons which lead to the ascension of an authority are 
contingently and holistically determined, as a “reaction” and an adjustment to the envi-
ronment, as a consideration about what would be «the best way to act» given the conno-
tations of a context, there is no criterion, Rorty would say, for distinguishing “transcen-
dental” reasons from “pragmatic” and “technological” ones. The “nature” of the global 
authority Rorty talks about would be completely coincident with its being a reaction and 
an adjustment to the “overwhelming” forces of its context. 
In effect, the presence and the “corruption” of these «beyond the control of the laws of 
those state»
97
 authorities is even described by Rorty as “the central fact of globaliza-
tion”: 
We now have a global overclass which makes all the major economic decisions; 
and makes them in entire independence of the legislatures, and afortiori of the 
will of the voters, of any given country. The money accumulated by this over-
class is as easily used for illegal purposes, such as supplying land mines to the 
latest entrepreneurial warlord or financing gangster takeovers of trade unions, as 
it is for legal ones. The absence of a global polity means that the super-rich can 
operate without any thought of any interests save their own
98
. 
   Rorty’s text, whose aim is not to give an accurate historic outlook but, rather, to draft 
the typology of “actors” playing the scene upon which the ideal pragmatist thinker has 
to operate, underlines these dynamics among different authorities and hints at a problem 
of legitimateness as influencing and strictly correlated to the question of the general 
suitability and efficiency of such actions by authorities: 
It used to be the case that the nation laws could control, to an important and so-
cially useful extent, the movement of that nation money. But now [...] the financ-
ing of business enterprise is a matter of drawing upon a global pool of capital 
[...]I admit that the chance of revitalizing the United Nations [...] is slim [...]My 
own country is too poor and too nervous to serve as a global policeman, but the 
need for such a policeman is going to become ever greater as more and more 
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warlords gain access to nuclear arms. No country can ask its own plutocrats to 
defend its interests, for any hard-nosed plutocrat will see economic nationalism 
as economically inefficient
99
. 
   What Rorty recalls here is a strict connection between a relocation of legitimateness 
and a diffusion of a certain modality of obtaining credit and satisfaction from a 
“power”. There is, on one side, the development of a web of “beliefs”, of a pragmatic 
set of devices like, for instance, the one we can call «financialization of world econ-
omy»
100
 with its constitutive elements such as «speculative and excessively liquid fi-
nancial flows that create debt-laden balance sheets, overly short-term perspectives, vola-
tility and mispricing of important asset prices, including exchange rates, and subsequent 
misallocation of resources and unstable economic growth»
101
. And there needs to be, on 
the other side, the process of legitimateness of these devices, granted by the public or by 
the governments; a legitimateness which implies a certain identification of these devices 
with some right to act, drawn from some assessments of human and world features. Be 
this right defined with the purpose to impose a more suitable language on human com-
munity or with the purpose to merely acknowledge the “natural” rights of some human 
nature, “unsuitable” elements such as the ones I quoted above – as «constitutive ele-
ments» of that pragmatic set of devices - are, inevitably, read as the result of the inca-
pacity of certain contexts to adapt themselves to the new system of forces functioning. 
In any case, a certain kind of authority, shaped by a certain typology of legitimacy, 
seems to be inevitably implicit in the diffusion of a set of devices. 
The problem of attributing a real “authority” to private economic powers such as the 
ones quoted by Rorty, though, seems to clash with the definition of the issue given by 
some analysts. What these kinds of powers may elude, in effect, is a concept of legiti-
mateness as conferred by a public institution. As Hall and Biersteker point out: 
While power and authority are closely related, authority is used here to refer to 
institutionalized forms or expressions of power. What differentiates authority 
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from power is the legitimacy of claims of authority. [...]Having legitimacy im-
plies that there is some form of normative, uncoerced consent or recognition of 
authority on the part of the regulated or governed, “the normative belief by an 
actor that a rule of institution ought to be obeyed
102
. 
   But to accept such description would betray the very authority one has to recognize in 
the neo-pragmatist vocabulary in order to rightly draw conclusions from Rorty’s refer-
ences. According to this vocabulary, in fact, we are not allowed to draw any difference 
– whether in terms of ontological “naturalness” or in terms of potential utility – between 
the features of an “officially recognized” institution and the other typologies. Hence, the 
necessity to have recourse to a broader concept of “authority”, whose articulation 
enlarges definitions like the following one so much as to make them structural for an il-
lustration of the assumption of a certain privileged language within a context: 
In what sense, however, do any of these private actors possess authority? [...]to 
have authority, actors must be perceived as legitimate. In order to claim any 
rights of legitimacy, actors in authority must obtain some form of obligation 
from those subject to their authority. As Claire Cutler argues[...], there must be 
an obligatory acceptance of the legitimacy of as well as respect for an authority 
“as a specialist, a scholar, or an expert”. Authority thus requires both the recog-
nition by, and the consent of, those governed by that authority
103
. 
   In order to take into account the ontological equivalence of human vocabularies, typi-
cal of Rorty’s approach, I articulate in the following way the relation of the concept of 
“authority” with his words which I recalled: globalization is a phenomenon whereby 
specific powers, by taking over the «laws of the state», seem to have carried out the 
substitution of the faith in the state authority, as supplying a privileged and legitimate 
language, for the faith in a different model of rationality. A model whereby, for in-
stance, the best way to fulfil our desire and our role within the world is to be situated 
and inscribed in a context of believers in the authority of the state and to have the inten-
tion to impose on them – namely, on the whole context they “are” and contribute to 
shape – our kind of language and to make them adapt themselves. The possibility and 
the opportunity to take an economic and political stand seems to be backed up by the 
necessity of giving credit to one’s authority toward another authority; by the necessity 
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of gaining the faith that the use of one’s privileged language is a better way «to fulfil 
our desire and our role within the world». 
To interpret the choice of a “privileged language” as something involving “authorities” 
means reading such choices as a matter of “imposing” one’s intentions – including 
therefore wills, desires and fears – and as a matter of imposing them in a precise con-
text. Understood in the latter way, the process of development and imposition of an au-
thority as assuming a certain intention – in a broad sense – towards the world makes no-
tions like “assumption of an authentic human nature”, “mere practice of power” and 
“construction of historical narratives” impossible to keep separated. Their process of le-
gitimateness, in fact, as a condition of their rise itself, will always include a concession 
of credit by which the wills, desires and fears forming their intentions are assessed as 
fruits of an authority which is «a specialist, a scholar, or an expert» in the assessment of 
reality; an expert, therefore, in grabbing certain authentic characteristics of reality. Even 
a pure imposition of power or a historical narrative, in short, gain their sense only from 
their resulting to be the most suitable things to do given an evaluation of the “real” 
characteristic of our world. 
 
 
                 5 – Progress and dissemination: random authorities 
 
Are we allowed to draw an ontological or pragmatic distinction between the several 
kinds of practices leading to the process of legitimateness and concession of credit to 
authorities which recall some “natural laws” intrinsic to human beings, an “establish-
ment of a dominant power” or a “construction of a contingent vocabulary”? To what ex-
tent has the liberalism era praised by Rorty produced practices and technologies of edu-
cation, empirical observation, economic assessment which would intrinsically assure a 
smaller possibility of causing harm?  
This latter question can play a part as an essential issue concerning the “ethical ideal” 
and direction which seem to be inherent to an anti-representationalist polemic. In fact, if 
Rorty’s evaluation is “empirical”, based on contingent and apparent “facts” and it is not 
“transcendental” – namely based on tracing general attitudes which would manifest an a 
priori more suitable approach – what is the reason for the need of labelling certain 
“models” – such as “Dewey’s” American pluralism and Western democracies – as 
“more advanced”? For if an evaluation is “empirical” and based on pragmatic occur-
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rences it should not – paradoxically – indicate some typologies of events as manifesting 
a “more pragmatic” or “less transcendental” spirit. It should, rather, take into account 
the purely contingent rise of certain technologies and practices, their gaining a legiti-
macy and an authority because of the fact that the wills, desires, fears and intentions 
they express contingently appear to match a more authentic assessment of human life 
and, above all, it should recognise the merely random, accidental occurrence of their 
producing benefits within a community. Such evaluation should recognise, in other 
words, that the intentions typical of an authority obtain their legitimacy from the con-
flict with the intentions of other authorities and from the support of still other contingent 
intentions. Any authentic view of human life they impose, therefore, cannot prevent it-
self from being an expression of power de-contextualizing itself throughout the singu-
larity of any holistically structured event - it cannot escape the risk of being fatally 
“misunderstood” by the public which gives it credit. The random dissemination of au-
thority intentions always carries the possibility of giving rise to what we would call 
forms of “domination” or of “privileged language which does not match the effective 
needs of the community”; it prevents us from having the possibility of talking about any 
kind “progress” being made apart from the chance happening of suitable contexts of 
forces. 
Once we accept such a mere non-transcendentalist view of human history and human 
authorities, we should also consider that in any human environment something which 
Hall and Biersteker describe in the following way may happen: 
Democracy has already been subverted by the partial or complete collapse of the 
public authority of weak sovereign entities. Illicit (private) authority steps in to 
provide public goods and to meet needs and responsibilities that the sovereign 
(public) authority has neglected or eschewed. To the extent that mafias and mer-
cenaries are visible and successful in providing these public goods, they may en-
joy the partial, popular legitimation of their exercise of private authority. How-
ever, it is difficult to see how these outcomes may be described as democratic or 
accountable (beyond the basic provision of public goods)
104
. 
   The problem which Rorty cannot evade, as soon as he talks about the opportunity of 
political decisions, can be, in the end, articulated into two main factors: firstly, because 
of his essential need to distinguish a very non-representationalist approach from any 
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language which privileges a “more natural” model of rationality Rorty cannot give, not 
even potentially, the same authority to act like an “ironist” to any political system. For 
him it is necessary, in fact, to indicate a culture, a political attitude in which «some pro-
gress has been made», even if this latter concept is at odds with a rigorous non-
teleological view of human rationality. 
Secondly, because of the same need of distinction, Rorty seems to recognize that a neo-
pragmatist philosopher needs to look for some normativity which is, as such, “external” 
to his own expertise
105
, different from an “a priori” philosophical account of a prefer-
able language. But at the same time he cannot help but hint at processes of legitimate-
ness and creation of authorities which can in no way be different from the ones recalled 
by Foucault. He insinuates the lack and the necessity of an «economic planner» and of 
some norms which can give us «a clear sense of how state power should be related to 
economic decisions»
106
. Any building or acceptance of such norms presupposes, how-
ever, «coercive practices and subtle techniques by which people are subjected and sub-
ject themselves to discipline; practices and techniques that, in Foucault’s view, have 
been closely linked to the development of the human and social sciences»
107
. 
 
 
I can summarize these two factors by picturing Rorty’s basic presupposition in regard to 
the figure of authority. This presupposition concerns the capacity to distinguish between 
authoritarian techniques and situations where cultural development mostly involves 
techniques of social organizations and technologies which do not find the justification 
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of their validity in certain evaluations of human nature, regularities, preferable charac-
teristics, or knowledge-of-the-world. 
By relentlessly affirming that «capitalism and free market are, as far as we know, the 
most suitable systems of our time»
108
 and by relating statements like this to the institu-
tional “development” which has occurred throughout the last two centuries Rorty is en-
visaging, therefore, the existence of an attitude which is capable of intrinsically distin-
guishing “more authoritarian” techniques from “less authoritarian” ones. The liberal-
ironist would embody a general attitude which is capable of distinguishing more au-
thoritarian, “dogmatic” and “based-on-a-system-of-knowledge-which-would-reflect-an-
authentic-human-rationality” authorities from “more liberal” ones. With this attitude in 
mind, an implicit reliance on a hope which will be carried by an ideal figure is easily 
theorized within Rorty’s philosophy. This hope and ideal figure would be, moreover, 
boosted by the actual good-working of societies which appear to have been supported 
by a similar attitude. 
The difficulty arises when one becomes aware of the necessity to establish a system of 
knowledge and to disseminate intentions in order to create and implement any “useful” 
technique and technology; when one becomes aware that the very conditions of the 
formation and legitimateness of authorities is, inevitably, the establishment of a certain 
knowledge-of-the-world conveying a specific authenticity of human beings. Any of our 
attempts to imagine a liberal society merely based on freedom and solidarity collides 
with the fact that we will have, in any case, to disseminate our intention within a context 
where the evaluation of the convenience of such a freedom and the choice of the suit-
able and righteous techniques to reach such a solidarity will always be dependent on 
some conception of legitimacy of a discourse: on a contingent, random and always con-
ditioned by (random) interests conception of legitimacy. To this extent, the ethical rele-
vance of Foucault’s remarks on the neo-pragmatist’s intellectual stance for tackling this 
dissemination of legitimacy is very significant. Let me quote, for instance, a passage 
from The Birth of Biopolitics in which Foucault underlines the reference to a truth 
which is implied in the interpretation of the market in a liberal contemporary state and 
which seems to have substituted the function of the classical “raison d’État”: 
The importance of economic theory—I mean the theory constructed in the dis-
course of the économistes and formed in their brains—the importance of the the-
ory of the price-value relationship is due precisely to the fact that it enables eco-
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nomic theory to pick out something that will become fundamental: that the mar-
ket must be that which reveals something like a truth. This does not mean that 
prices are, in the strict sense, true [...] but inasmuch as prices are determined in 
accordance with the natural mechanisms of the market they constitute a standard 
of truth which enables us to discern which governmental practices are correct 
and which are erroneous [...]inasmuch as it enables production, need, supply, 
demand, value, and price, etcetera, to be linked together through exchange, the 
market constitutes a site of veridiction, I mean a site of verification-falsification 
for governmental practice
109
. 
   The ethical attitude which is likely to be supported by a similar analysis would take 
into account the deleterious effects which may derive from a system of technologies and 
devices implemented by a multitude of changing intentions and interests. A situation 
where free market dominates can be in fact characterized by desires, fears and needs 
dependent on an unequal distribution of economic potentialities and interests – and, yet, 
legitimated as an authority by the intentions and the interests typical of single de-
contextualizing junctures. A situation of “liberal solidarity” could not help but be ab-
sorbed in – and, maybe, coincide with - socio-economical contingences like this, whose 
condition of functioning is a certain de-contextualizing perception of truth and “natural-
ness”. 
Once the “structurality” and ubiquity of such conditions is acknowledged, the issue 
turns out to be in no way a distinction between a “more liberal” and “pragmatic” author-
ity and a “metaphysical” one, which would impart to us a «false consciousness» about 
human nature – in a Marxist sense. The issue becomes, rather, to recognise that, if an 
improving of human life quality has been generated within our culture, this was due to 
aimless and random circumstances forming the whole context of the events we are in. In 
this sense, would it not be more effective to consider making our decisions through a 
Foucaldian stance? A stance whereby there is no progress, hope or “liberalism” to go 
along with, but only decisions to be made by means of «modifications of the rules of 
formation of statements which are accepted as scientifically true»
110
? 
Would it not be more provident and suitable to accept the assumption that Rorty attrib-
utes to Foucault whereby «unless there is some interesting connection between what 
matters most to an individual and her purported moral obligations to our fellow human 
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beings, she has no such obligations»
111
? Even if, in this case, Foucault’s question would 
need to be specified in the following way: there is no connection between any Western, 
liberal, non-representationalist attitude and specific purported moral obligations – and, I 
would add, outcomes – in an authority’s intention to her human beings. Therefore, per-
haps we would be better to follow Foucault’s belief that «one’s point of reference 
should not be to the great model of language and signs, but to that of war and battle». It 
would be more appropriate for us to consider that «the history which bears and deter-
mines us has the form of a war rather than that of language.[That it is] a relations of 
power, not relations of meaning»
112
, rather than relying on the liberal-ironist ability to 
pursue and improve «“rationality”, “progress”, “freedom”, “democracy”, “culture”»
113
. 
 
And yet, all this would still not be entirely fair to Rorty’s purposes. So far I have pic-
tured the theoretical and pragmatic aporia the figure of the liberal-ironist comes across 
because of the basic dissemination of the authorities’ intentions she needs to address in 
order to give up her own “philosophical” authority. But does this coincide with an hon-
est pragmatic evaluation? Has the neo-pragmatist theoretical meta-authority really been 
respected? Is it possible that Richard Rorty was not aware of that aporia, to the point 
that he omitted to include it in his assessment of a really pragmatic attitude? For in ef-
fect, given the ubiquity of this aporia, does the act of taking it into account really 
enlarge our prospect of not producing or supporting potentially harmful discourses? 
I stated that maybe «it would be more provident and suitable to accept the assumption 
that Rorty attributes to Foucault» and that «perhaps we would look after us better by 
following Foucault’s belief». But how can such being “more provident” and such abid-
ing by Foucault’s conception of power really escape or diminish a recourse to a similar 
“system of authorities” and avoid falling back into a sort of idealization like the liberal 
ironist’s hope? We might, for instance, be inspired by Foucault’s «illuminating a time in 
Western culture in which one had the ability to create not only one’s self, but one’s 
world» and when self was understood as «malleable, fashionable, as a canvas, as a pro-
ject, [so that] by altering this self, one could form a world which was true and other than 
what was prior, a world that was no longer “counterfeit,” conforming, standard, or 
within the confines of social and cultural limitations»
114
. But, in such a case, can we 
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admit that such a care will not be apparently functioning within a logic of contingent 
legitimateness of behaviours and intentions? 
In more general terms, I can advocate Rorty’s disapproval of Foucault’s language by 
posing the (pragmatic) questions which follow: 
Given the very inevitability of the relentless de-contextualization of the legitimacy of an 
authority and its being a different event each time, does not an excessive focus on iden-
tifying – and dispelling - the practices which would not take into account such a dis-
semination carry the risk, in turn, of privileging a certain typology of practices which, 
however, would not be immune to that aporia and undecidability? Does not a similar at-
titude inevitably propose an essence of language and – through its knowing such an es-
sence - suppose an ability to make decisions which will not be, alas, more uncondi-
tioned by a contingent system of values and by a relentless re-forming of their own 
sense? Can a «decision in the singularity of the event» really be single and “isolated” 
from a certain norm - even in the case that such a norm is not accepted by common 
sense but “only” shaped by a “general” context? At this point, given this further para-
dox, why not to give up this whole question and concentrate on constructing new vo-
cabularies, as Rorty would say? 
 
 
 
 
 
                           6 – Rorty’s Derrida and the method of deconstruction 
 
 
In effect, the danger of institutionalizing and of giving a name to such a practice of deal-
ing with this dissemination through a privileged language is explicitly the target of Ror-
ty’s polemic against the method and the terminology of Jacques Derrida. The pages in 
which Rorty debates against the French philosopher’s «quasi-transcendentalism» are, 
indeed, emblematic in their outlining the “structural” criticism which the neo-pragmatist 
moves against thinkers like Foucault, whose aim seems to be mostly to question the le-
gitimacy and the being innocuous of any language, rather than creating a new one. 
What Rorty denounces throughout his essays on Foucault might be named as a meta-
physical nostalgia for the possibility of grasping an unconditioned human nature in or-
57 
 
 
 
der to formulate one’s ethical commitments. But the same criticism toward an approach 
which reads the hope of a complete success of human intentions as undermined a priori 
gains a deeper connotation throughout Rorty’s essays on Derrida. It acquires the charac-
teristic of a negative judgment of a hypostatization of a method. Such a hypostatization 
would have paradoxically corrupted Derrida’s concerns about «the system of “hearing 
(understanding) -oneself-speak” through the phonic substance—which presents itself as 
the non-exterior, non-mundane, therefore non-empirical or non-contingent signifier».
115
 
Derrida would have hypostatized a method and altered the good effects of his worry 
about the belief in a structural, present meaning in which the empirical and historical 
dissemination and alteration would only be accidents, exterior to the natural and logical 
functioning and telos or empirical manifestations of these latter. 
Rorty explains the mechanism of this hypostatization to us, in a way that makes the 
metaphysical nostalgia diagnosed in Foucault appears to be only one of its symptoms. 
 
Although he recognizes that it is Derrida’s own textual practice which «shares Heideg-
ger's contempt for the very idea of method»
116
 Rorty, nevertheless, insists in pointing 
out the particular kind of “philosophical generalization” which ideas such as trace and 
critique of logocentrism can bear
117
. According to Derrida, in effect, the relentless 
“original” contamination and de-contextualization of structures as universalities and 
identities would prevent any effective and legitimate construction of a «method». The 
very idea of “method”, in fact, would rely on presuppositions – such as the capacity to 
uncover a certain dialectic, a regularity or a manifestation of a basic meaning of a text 
or of its teleological structure – which can be connected to belief in a meaning which is 
ideally-teleologically present and identical to itself. But «the living present springs forth 
out of its non-identity with itself and from the possibility of a retentional trace. It is al-
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ways already a trace»
118
. Namely, the ideal, teleological or historically “circular” mean-
ing is always a result of relentless references to different changing contexts, without the 
possibility of a regulatory centre. The practice of a “method”, as a procedure of “valid-
ity” and “legitimacy”, as a practice of a specific “law” «is not only deconstructible be-
cause of its textuality» - namely, because of how its sense changes at each event of in-
scription within a different context - «but also because the very notion of law is based 
upon the differential between the legal and the non-legal, and between the legal and the 
illegal»
119
. This differential, as a movement of foundation of such a law is, according to 
Derrida, anything but the product of a legality internal to a text which merely refers to 
the legality internal to other texts and other texts ‘before’ these latter. This ineluctable 
play of differences makes law the «ultimate foundation by definition unfounded»
120
. In 
a Derridean conception, therefore, a method and a law «are systems of limits and differ-
ences which, like any textual phenomenon (i.e. any significant or signifying phenome-
non), are inaugurated by a law which ensures the impurity and aporetic nature of all 
law, all texts, all classification»
121
. 
But at the same time in which Derrida’s writing seems to strongly question the recourse 
to a certain generality implicit in any method or order – since the “stable” meaning sup-
posed by such a generality would always be the result of its disappearance and reactiva-
tion within another event through a simulacrum
122
 - it is his very “obsession” for the 
ubiquity of the «dissemination» and for the metaphysical illusion of the simple presence 
which makes him attribute to certain authors a typology of language and purpose which 
they did not mean to pursue. 
The strong accent which Derrida puts on the «impossibility of a closed language» would 
lead him to assess the pragmatic outcomes of a thought only by taking into account its 
willingness to propose a “simple-present” meaning; the French philosopher, therefore, 
ends up propounding «some generalization of the form "the attempt to formulate a 
unique, total, closed vocabulary will necessarily..»
123
. But the occurrences of suitability 
or harmfulness of different historical vocabularies cannot be reduced, Rorty seems to 
argue, to the «history of metaphysics» as Derrida understands it: «Derrida talks as if this 
neat textbook dilemma were a real one, as if there were a terrible, oppressive force 
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called "the metaphorics of philosophy" or the "history of metaphysics" which is making 
life impossible not only for playful punsters like himself but for society as a whole. But 
things are just not that bad, except in special circumstances»
124
. The practice of decon-
struction, in this sense, by focusing on a criticism of a particular language – or aspect of 
language – would not do anything but “de-contextualize” a particular pragmatic prob-
lem and make it stand for a general methodology; the general attitude coming from that, 
therefore, would not necessarily match the cultural needs and desires the creation of a 
new language should be committed to. As Rorty states: 
In my view, the only thing that can displace an intellectual world is another intel-
lectual world — a new alternative, rather than an argument against an old alter-
native. The idea that there is some neutral ground on which to mount an argu-
ment against something as big as "logocentrism" strikes me as one more logo-
centric hallucination. I do not think that demonstrations of "internal incoherence" 
or of "presuppositional relationships" ever do much to disabuse us of bad old 
ideas or institutions
125
. 
   To argue «against an old alternative» is, for Rorty, the basic move of Derrida’s project 
which - to recall my previous illustration of the problem - “given the very inevitability 
of the relentless de-contextualization of the authority legitimacy and its being a different 
event each time, grants an excessive importance to identifying – and dispelling - the 
practices which would not take into account the dissemination of the meaning – the «old 
alternatives» - and carries the risk, in turn, of privileging a certain typology of practices 
– a «neutral ground» - ” which, however, would not be immune to being aporetic and 
undecidable in their effectiveness. Concerned with the “pragmatic inappropriateness” of 
Derrida’s notions, Rorty reminds us, for instance – in a note of Essays on Heidegger 
and Other Philosophical Papers - , of the deconstructive approach to the debate on 
speech acts: 
Derrida was overhasty in picking J. L. Austin as an example of someone who ac-
cepted the traditional idea of meaning being communicated "within a homoge-
nous element across which the unity and integrity of meaning is not affected in 
an essential way [...]When he comes to Austin, he blithely attributes to him all 
sorts of traditional motives and attitudes which Austin prided himself on having 
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avoided. John Searle's criticism of Derrida on this point seems to me largely 
right
126
. 
   Derrida, in analysing an intellectual project through “pragmatic” criteria of another in-
tellectual project, would «miss the point» of the former practical implications and po-
tentialities within its cultural environment. For it is highly likely, as Searle observes, 
that Austin’s plan to list and examine all kinds of speech acts responded to needs – such 
as necessities to clarify social or logic implications of certain typologies of language – 
which would have been typical of his cultural context and cannot be reduced to remarks 
on the ethical repercussions of the “prejudice of metaphysical presence”. Rorty, there-
fore, would agree with Searle that «if Austin distinguishes between a serious or normal 
linguistic act and parasitic linguistic act, this is only for necessities of methodological 
kinds, without any ethical implication and without assuming any metaphysical posi-
tion»
127
. 
To merely interpret language as always about to fall into the metaphysical illusion of 
«simple presence» would be, therefore, the mark of the generalization of Derrida’s phi-
losophical “method”. From this theoretical point of view it is not hard to deduce that 
even what Rorty considers as Foucault’s «anarchist moments» and his being «a knight 
of autonomy» can be read as a «nostalgia for metaphysical values», according to the 
American philosopher, only if we consider this feeling as a corollary of a specific inter-
pretative methodology. Such a methodology would identify as sole criterion of analysis 
of human relations the widespread modalities and instruments by which they are shaped 
as expressions of power, «doing nothing to show – though - that there is something 
wrong with whatever networks of power are required to shape people into individuals 
with a sense of moral responsibility»
128
. In this way Foucault’s commitment would put 
aside a concrete, pragmatic evaluation of the suitability of “historical narratives” in fa-
vour of an examination of “formal” entities such as «strategies and techniques of social 
control and, to a lesser extent, strategies and techniques of resistance»
129
. It would be 
because of this that, according to Rorty, Foucault «was exceptionally good at unmask-
ing the “bad power,” but he was quite bad at helping the ”good one” flourish»
130
. 
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What would Foucault’s general attitude coincide with, in fact, if not with an «arguing 
against old alternatives»? Namely, against certain strategies and structures «the relent-
less “original” contamination and de-contextualization of which would prevent any ef-
fective and legitimate construction of a “method”» to make the study of them relevant 
for the present situation. This attitude would highlight, in effect, certain “privileged lan-
guages of resistances” against dominant powers, languages which would be arranged 
through an investigation of vocabularies which have always been de-contextualized. 
Moreover, to prevalently use the parameter of outlining «coercive social practices» and 
of reading their existence merely in relation to the creation of political hierarchies 
would lead to “concealing” an interpretation of specific practice as «responding to needs 
which have been typical of their cultural context» with the risk, therefore, of idealizing a 
supposed previous more “innocent” language. 
 
 
                    7 – Madness and the problem of pragmatist’s undecidability 
 
What I have tried to do throughout the latest parts of this chapter is «to do justice to 
Rorty» by dispelling the appearance of undecidability in the liberal-ironist’s effective-
ness– which I have theorized throughout my whole argument – by using arguments and 
tools faithful to the neo-pragmatist’s will and intention to assess the most suitable hu-
man vocabulary within an environment. The objection represented by the observation of 
an inevitable recourse, by the ironist, to a de-contextualizing external authority seems to 
be dissipated by having noticed that the philosophical alternatives which take into ac-
count the ubiquity of the presence of a dominant external legitimacy of an authority turn 
out to be, in the end, potentially more harmful than Rorty’s own attitude. Foucault’s 
“inability” to dwell upon a fruitful evaluation of current historical narratives has been 
clarified through the comparison of his methodology with Derrida’s generalization of 
the problem of logocentrism. Both Foucault’s and Derrida’s methods, in fact, would act 
like a strategy of reading texts “imposed from the outside”; that is to say, imposing ex-
ternal values of assessment such as the «failure to function as a simple presence and to 
recognize that» through which Derrida condemns most of the texts he reviews. In this 
latter case, as in Foucault’s analysis of historical forms of domination, the result would 
be another “metaphysical” preference toward a supposed more authentic language 
which would resist better to such dominations. 
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This latest consideration would represent what the ironist perceives as “scaring” be-
cause of its altering or blocking her freedom of inquiry. But it also represents, within 
my argumentation, a last factor of undecidability. An undecidability which is brought 
about by the very reference to Derrida’s textual practice as an element of comparison 
and the aporetic status of this latter as a “method undermining any recourse to a certain 
method”. For even if one can clearly show, along with Rorty, that Derrida’s philosophi-
cal project is based on a language which ascribes a fundamental “metaphysical” struc-
ture to any analysed language, one cannot help but take into account how the idea of 
such an ascription undermines itself. This destabilizes the sense of Derrida’s project in 
respect to Rorty’s criticisms - and one must allow for how, perhaps, it is impossible to 
decide whether such undermining coincides with a pragmatically “positive” or “nega-
tive” outcome. 
The sense of this undermining is based on the motive which leads Derrida to such an 
obsessive attention for the metaphysical notion of presence in any of its manifestations. 
It is a self-undermining implicit in the recognition – by the “deconstructive” practice – 
that any differentiation between method and non-method, “imposition of a structure” 
and deconstruction of the same is wiped out once the condition of existence of the ele-
ments forming such methods and structures is considered. The consideration of the con-
ditions of their sense as being an ideality arisen from its iterations, disappearances and 
reactivations is not only destabilizing for the classical idea of “method” and structure, 
but also for any intention to write about the diffusion, the history, the modification or 
the implication of certain – deplorable or not – methods or structures. 
In order to clarify what I have been saying, it is useful to point out that the reason why I 
introduced Derrida’s notions in this discussion is that the disapproval Richard Rorty 
makes toward them can be seen as summarizing the neo-pragmatist’s point of view. 
That is to say, the point of view which I have been drawing from the analysis I have 
made throughout this work of Rorty’s texts. Even though the use of any language and 
any cultural environment have to face inevitable problems of de-contextualization of 
sense and misunderstanding, it is always better to rely on the capacity of “non-
representationalist” men to create new senses of the world rather than to establish a gen-
eral sense of these de-contextualizations and misunderstandings in order to set up a 
privileged method-language to deal with them. 
But what if Rorty’s interpretation reveals itself, in the end, to cover the concrete poten-
tialities of a “deconstructive” sense – or, better to say, “quasi-sense” - of «dealing with 
63 
 
 
 
these misunderstandings»? What if Rorty’s exposition of writings such as Derrida’s dis-
guises, after all, the essential condition whereby the “authority”, the “external” and im-
possible to dominate authority of such writings is perceived as blocking the liberal-
ironist’s «road to inquiry»? 
For if one wants to accept Rorty’s view of de-constructive motions constructively as at-
tempting to picture a certain structure of «the diffusion, the history, the modification or 
the implication of certain methods or structures» one has also to specify how to connect 
this view with the fact that, for instance, Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Foucault’s 
History of Madness coincides with a thorough criticism of the same attempt. An attempt 
which Rorty attributes to deconstruction – as implemented by a philosophical or literary 
discourse. A criticism which would highlight why when Derrida speaks about the notion 
of «writing presented as a false brother, traitor, infidel and simulacrum in opposition to 
the meaning always present to living consciousness»
131
 as «a pattern that dominates all 
of Western philosophy»,
132
 he cannot in any way, paradoxically, be speaking about a 
pattern of cultural and philosophical domination which unravels itself throughout our 
history. Instead, he is speaking about the basic impossibility to talk about models, pat-
terns, historical concepts beyond their coinciding with a different singular context of 
privileged reasons and of their meanings, affairs, interests and consequences each time 
these “historical concepts” manifest themselves. 
In regard to this, a particular concept of “break” is central in the Derridean vision. Its 
specificity is well expressed in the way the French philosopher reinterprets what is, for 
Foucault, the exclusion and the reduction to silence of the “language” of madness in the 
determination of the Cartesian Cogito and, above all, in the way he reinterprets its sig-
nificance in respect to the history of rational structures. According to Foucault, in fact, 
«Descartes is an actor in modern history principally for having excluded from the perils 
of sceptical self-doubt the possibility of one's own madness»
133
. That is to say, the event 
of Descartes’ treatment of madness within his Meditations is, for Foucault, emblematic 
of «a schism, a caesura, a separation, a dissection»
134
 which interrupted the dialogue be-
tween “reason” and “madness” in a more or less defined historical moment. More pre-
cisely, Descartes would always «master the danger of madness and the risk of the crisis 
of reason, during the practice of methodical doubt and of the subtle applications of such 
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a doubt to the hypotheses of perceptual errors, dreams and madness»
135
. Moreover, «the 
very hypothesis of the evil genius would appear to be, in reality, a controlled methodo-
logical hypothesis»
136
. 
What Derrida observes, first of all, is that Foucault’s reading does not provide sufficient 
emphasis in the hints about the aporetic dynamics of any “crisis of reason” and of any 
“reduction to silence” of what would be the “contrary” of a certain reason. In order to 
put into effect an «archaeology of silence» - as Foucault names his project of writing the 
history of madness «on the basis of its own experience and authority»
137
 - one should be 
able to use, in fact, an «organized language, a project, an order, a sentence, a syntax, a 
work»
138
 through which to transpose the “original” sense of that silence into another 
context. One should be able, in other words, to manage, to handle the break-of-logos 
provoked by the haunting (non) presence of that silence – that is to say, by the relentless 
transformation of contextual needs, desires, interests and of the ‘general’ rationality 
suitability to satisfy them – through the institution of a de-contextualized “general” lo-
gos. This logos would be the result of a holistic re-adjustment and de-contextualization 
effected by the “previous” logos in order to deal with the risk of losing itself in “mad-
ness”. But to do this, such a logos had to acknowledge the always (non) present danger 
of this break. 
Understood in such a way, the concept of “madness” reveals itself to recall a “general” 
dynamics of functioning of language, rather than the specificity of an historical event of 
an historical given reason dealing with a break. As Derrida says, «in order to evoke the 
singularity of the classical moment, [...], perhaps it would be necessary to underline [...]  
those aspects in which, and especially for what end, its own structure of exclusion is 
historically distinguished from the others, from all others»
139
. If one interprets “mad-
ness” and the danger of it as the risk that one’s own language may become senseless be-
cause of its inevitable dissemination throughout single and previously indefinable con-
texts and breaks, it is hard to see how Foucault’s work can describe a model, a history 
of rationality in the sense of the history of a certain sense of rationality modifying, 
transforming, interrupting or re-appropriating itself. His discourse would rather talk 
about the impossibility of narrating such a history apart from a mere reference to events 
which are always singular, holistically different and random, shaped by the necessity of 
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ensuring one’s language against the risk of radical breaks – namely, the risk of singular, 
holistically different and random events of “madness” which always haunt such a lan-
guage. 
 
For this reason Derrida reads Foucault’s narrative as «an example as sample and not as 
model»
140
 and shows us that what Descartes actually does is not to exclude madness 
from his argumentations but, rather, to recognize the ubiquitous risk of “madness” – for 
instance, during the analysis of the possibility of the perceptual error – and, conse-
quently, to insure the “rationality” of his own language through a «discontinuity and a 
transition to another order of reasoning»
141
. Moreover, «Descartes is concerned not with 
determining the concept of madness but with utilizing the popular notion of insanity for 
juridical and methodological ends, in order to ask questions of principle regarding only 
the truth of ideas»
142
. That is to say, according to Derrida, Descartes’ hyperbolical pro-
ject could be distinguished from the specific historically situated Cartesian system of ra-
tionality, in the sense that it reflects, rather, on the conditions of possibility of the truth 
and intelligibility of that – and any other – system of rationality. 
Such conditions of possibility are recognised, in other words, in the iterability of a code 
throughout any possible context and despite any danger of radical break – namely, any 
danger of its reduction to silence due to the «relentless transformation of contextual 
needs, desires or interests and of the suitability of this code rationality to satisfy them». 
The de-contextualization of an idea of rationality – a de-contextualization which can 
even be radical, so as to holistically transform the total sense of a contextual reason – is 
seen as the condition of its being “ideal”, understandable. The Cogito would represent, 
therefore, the instant of hyperbolic and extreme possibility of radical “madness” which 
the existence of a logos has to face and despite which – given the aporia in the manifes-
tation of madness and “silence” - its sense and its capability of being “communicated” 
can maintain itself. In regard to this, in fact, Derrida makes us notice that «as soon as 
Descartes has reached this extremity, he seeks to reassure himself, to certify the Cogito 
through God, to identify the act of the Cogito with a reasonable reason»
143
. In other 
words, once madness and the always (non)-present danger of it is acknowledged, such a 
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madness is necessarily incorporated and made to disappear within a “new” «reasonable 
reason». 
This would be, according to Derrida, the «most illuminating»
144
 element we can find 
within Foucault’s History of Madness – and, I would add, throughout Foucault’s “gen-
eral attitude”: the highlighting of the structural necessity – by a certain “reason” - of 
overcoming “madness” by means of an economy. Or, better to say, the structural neces-
sity of “idealizing” itself in new contexts to deal with the structural possibility of com-
ing madness. The emphasis put on rationality by Foucault as being always a “system of 
power” or domination implies – or, better to say, supposes as a haunting idea, in order 
to be meaningful - the always (non)-present possibility of the event of madness and the 
consequent suspicion of an always possible incorporation of madness - an «incorpora-
tion of madness» which coincides with a mad, random, unruly, chaotic de-
contextualization of a form of reason. 
What the liberal-ironist despises is «a method of interpretation of forces indifferently 
read as ubiquitous relations of power and violence», which carries the impossibility of 
relying on an “ideal” attitude and pragmatist hope in order to create a better future. But 
such an impossibility is nothing but the result of the impossibility of dispelling that 
haunting and that movement of incorporation of madness it coincides with. It is the im-
possibility of ignoring and dispelling all the ethical and structural consequences of the 
contingency and dissemination of human “vocabularies” which Rorty himself – as I 
analysed during the second paragraph of this chapter - takes as his theoretical starting 
point. 
The Foucauldian authority “imposes” on the “neo-pragmatist” the idea of a “transcen-
dental” structure of language as always possible incorporation on madness, a “tran-
scendental” vision of human nature which, coherently with Rorty’s worry, diverts the 
liberal-ironist’s from her focus on – and her ability to create - “a non-representationalist 
assessment of historical narratives in order to decide about a better looking vocabulary”. 
But it does so because it inserts a non-transcendental transcendentalism which de-
contextualizes and destabilizes any criticism of rationality and any reliance on a mere 
“neo-pragmatist” stance or “neo-liberal” ideal progress which a liberal-ironist can take 
up. The “authority” which comes from Foucault’s texts would force the liberal-ironist to 
see her choices and the outcomes of the same, the general suitability or acceptance of a 
certain vocabulary as dependent on a certain «intrinsic and independent structure of 
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human nature or language», a “structure” which is so “scaring” because of its very be-
ing so non-structural as to dismiss and destabilize the sense of any criticism toward ty-
pologies of structures. 
In this sense, from the point of view of his philosophical purpose, Rorty is “right” to re-
ject thoughts of authors such as Derrida, but for a reason which is the opposite of his ar-
gument. What we call «deconstruction», in fact, not only cannot be reduced to a method 
of interpretation of rationality which claims to be applied to the whole of history. It also 
blurs the border between the concept of “method” and “lack of a method” and, conse-
quently, between a “deconstructive” thinker and a “constructive”, “pragmatist” or “tran-
scendentalist” one – supposing that a “more deconstructive” thinker can exist. In effect, 
«deconstruction» would be a way to denounce the fact that any of these kinds of think-
ers cannot help but rely on a – socially, linguistically, “naturally” legitimated – author-
ity whose effect and rational structure are made undecidable by the relentless «incorpo-
ration of madness», by its inevitably «mad, random, unruly, chaotic de-
contextualization of a form of reason». 
From this point of view, the “notions” of deconstruction and undecidable question any 
account of a history of specific differences between models of rationality as much as an 
account of their own identity as “notions”. This undecidability turns out to “be” the im-
possibility of deciding whether an event, with its unique factors and specificities, has to 
be included within a certain «narrative of rationality» or another. Such explosion and 
dissemination of any identity of «narrative of rationality» concerns both a “neo-
pragmatist” decisional model and a “classic” one. In this way, the undecidability makes 
the difference between the pragmatic working – and, therefore, the “identity” - of a neo-
pragmatist attitude and of a classical one vanish. 
The other face of such an undecidability concerns the ubiquitous possibility of a “struc-
ture” of rationality being “legible” even in its not being the same structure of rationality, 
because of the mad de-contextualization of its context, of the needs, desires, interest to 
which it was “addressed”. In this case, the inevitable necessity of making a decision 
plays an ambiguous role
145
. It involves at one and the same time the impossibility of es-
tablishing – throughout the dissemination of the events – the «kind of rationality» which 
our decision will implement and the ineluctable “illusion” of having the capacity of 
choosing a specific kind of rationality within an event abstracted from its own de-
contextualization. An “illusion” which recalls the roots and the broad consequences of 
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what Rorty only partially examined as the non-ironist’s illusion about the agreement 
settled by a certain vocabulary within a community – which I mentioned in the second 
part. 
Derrida’s sentences such as «this absence [of the addressee] is not a continuous modifi-
cation of presence; it is a break in presence, “death”, or the possibility of the “death” of 
the addressee, inscribed in the structure of the mark» refer to this very undecidable legi-
bility of an inscribed rationality which can keep being the same only by not being the 
same. And the «deconstructive thinker» does not assume herself to be immune to this 
undecidability and dissemination. The sense of what could be hurriedly called a «decon-
struction of presence» “is” in fact that such a practice cannot have a sense, cannot «de-
scribe or intervene on a model, a history of rationality in the sense of the history of a 
certain sense of rationality modifying, transforming, interrupting or re-appropriating it-
self». It can only function throughout «always singular, holistically different and ran-
dom events, shaped by the necessity of reassuring one’s language against the risk of 
radical breaks»; in this way, it operates as a different event of rationality each time. 
Consequently, the pragmatic outcome of its functioning – of any practical decision 
made once a “deconstructive” outlook is taken into account - remains undecidable in its 
suitability; it rests on the undecidability of each event of madness. 
All this is reflected in Derrida’s assertions like «the word “deconstruction”, like all 
other words, acquires its value only from its inscription in a chain of possible substitu-
tions»
146
 and «dissemination means nothing [...] it produces a non-finite number of se-
mantic effects»
147
. Such an ubiquity of deconstruction produces the necessity of making 
our decision, aporetically, within the undecidability of an event of authority and ration-
ality; an authority and rationality which can never decide “what” they are, “what” we 
should consider them, and “what” they may be. The paradoxical necessity of also being 
wary of «deconstruction» also derives from this. But, above all, the necessity of stress-
ing the too “idealistic” character of a position which assumes a “general typology” of 
attitude – typical of the pragmatist and liberal-ironist figure – as more capable to recog-
nise a certain historical and pragmatic progress and to select a kind of technique which 
would not be the result of relations of powers or of a “based-on-human-nature” legiti-
mateness of an authority. 
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The aporia of the neo-pragmatist’s non-transcendentalism which is such only by falling 
back into transcendentalism discloses the ineluctability of deciding in very close contact 
with the specific authorities. These are at stake within our specific, singular context and 
always, inevitably, suppose that they are in “contact” with a more authentic human ra-
tionality. The inevitable need for dealing with – or coinciding with - haunting «tran-
scendentalist» authorities (political, social or economic ones) is the concrete “destiny” 
of the thinker, whether pragmatist or deconstructionist -, to the extent that it seems, per-
haps, “senseless” not to converse directly with them. 
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             II 
 
         The call of the Other as a dialectical alternative 
 
 
1 – Naturalness of pragmatic legitimacy 
 
The most significant claim of the previous chapter is that the fallacy of the liberal-
ironist’s transcendental logic has been definitely demonstrated as such. Shown not 
through a purely theoretical debate on the nature of language but, rather, by showing the 
necessary interconnection – or, better to say, coincidence – between any pragmatist ini-
tiative and an always contingent economic-political “authority”. The essential assertion, 
though, has not been that the figure of liberal-pragmatist advocated by Rorty carries a 
transcendental interpretation of language. The neo-pragmatist’s task and attitude, in 
fact, has not been questioned as problematic for suggesting a certain privileged view of 
what language is or should be but which then turns out to be “wrong”. It has been criti-
cized, more precisely, for not being able to talk about a certain coherent view of lan-
guage and for not being able to talk about a “liberal” and pragmatist attitude as different 
from any other attitude on the grounds of authority. 
The peremptory contingency of the economic-political authorities, their being «at work 
under a law of undecidable contamination»
148
 has been examined together with the fact 
that the legitimacy of any authority comes from its considering certain historically situ-
ated events and “public reasons”. Authority draws a certain rule from these events or 
public reasons. These are recognized as, or become, a general preference and, therefore, 
a set of devices so “efficacious” and “agreeable” that they end up being identified with 
what is “natural” to do or to be for an individual or a community, at least in a circum-
scribed moment. 
Even if oriented toward a radical pragmatic or instrumentalist sense, what ultimately 
makes an economic-political choice work is a reference to what would be preferable for 
an individual or a group – a reference to its “natural inclinations” - or, at best, a refer-
ence to what would be most suitable to do in respect to a certain “reality”. Individuals or 
groups, according to these natural inclinations, “naturally” prefer to do or to be specific 
things. A pragmatic or instrumentalist decision is therefore dependent upon a factor 
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which is neither pragmatic nor instrumentalist, but dependent on an authoritative im-
plicit assumption about nature and reality. As A. Seligman notes, even when the notion 
of authority is formally shifted from «primordial and transcendent loci» to a more in-
strumental conception concerning simple power, it inevitably has to originate from the 
awareness of a certain common, shared feature of a society:  
[we are here describing “authority”] as power simpliciter; that power of public 
opinion rooted in conformity to the statistical mean, role incumbency rather than 
transcendental freedom. People, however, continually seek to fulfil needs that are 
slighted by these modern terms of identity and are continually reintroducing other 
forms of communal affiliation and self-identification. It is, however, possible that 
the continued re-emergence of more primordial and purely transcendent loci of 
authority (and self and community) have in fact always been part and parcel of 
modernity for precisely this reason
149
. 
   The move from a transcendent, or transcendental, conception of legitimacy toward a 
instrumentalist one does not involve a change in the fundament necessary for justifica-
tion: the perception of the basic working structure of the society and of the individual to 
which one has to conform in order to fulfil better everybody’s general needs and identi-
ties. As a matter of fact, such a justification seems to put into question the difference be-
tween a transcendent-transcendental justification and a pragmatic one. 
This character, combined with the realization of the singularity of any “event of author-
ity”, gives rise to two issues which concern the conclusions reached in the first chapter: 
1 – Once we state the pragmatic and “theoretical” fallacy of a general attitude – as in the 
case of Rorty – by showing that a consistent pragmatic-theoretical general approach is 
not possible, we are outlining a scenario in which the only way to criticise a general 
logic is to show that what we are criticising does not exist at all. For to name a certain 
“logic” is to use a pragmatic tool which is each time different and coincidental with a 
different context, and which only for a random effect in the disposition of forces of our 
contexts emerges as being empirically the same name. A general attitude does not have, 
in other words, even an unambiguous practical consequence or significance “in general” 
which would differentiate the application of such a “logic” from a situation where an 
awareness of the contingency of the rise of the authorities is predominant. What is, 
therefore, the concrete point of making a similar analysis? If one establishes the ultimate 
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supremacy and ubiquity of totally random and singular legitimacies over the existence 
of any consistent model of rationality, what is the difference between what a «decon-
structive» and a «non-deconstructive» authority can do? 
2 – Any legitimation of authority, despite its being essentially random, cannot avoid be-
ing the expression of how a certain “naturalness” is perceived. A naturalness which is 
perceived as I illustrated above – as being what would be preferable to do or to be for an 
individual or a group, as a reference to their “natural inclinations” or, at best, a reference 
to what would be most suitable to do in respect to a certain “reality”. Legitimation 
modifies itself according to what is detected or sensed each time as the “logic” which is 
justified by a certain totality – which coincides with a singular event each time. Any 
sense of “improving” one’s logic, rationality or criteria of legitimacy, seems to be ex-
plained, therefore, by the necessity of taking into account, of “doing justice” to the 
“naturalness” of all parts constituting such a totality in its development. Any improve-
ment of a logic, therefore, is driven by a necessity of “doing justice” to the “natural-
ness” of all comings of the other, a necessity of considering the rationality of all events 
composing the totality of one’s “single event”. 
If this is the case, even though one of the “definitions” Derrida gives of «deconstruc-
tion» is «a gesture which consists in not naturalizing what isn’t natural, in not assuming 
that which is conditioned by history, institutions or society is natural»
150
, we may also 
interpret a deconstructive intention as aiming for a hyperbolic «doing justice» to a cer-
tain naturalness of the “totality”. It would not be misleading to state, therefore, that a 
Derridean point of view aims at a relentless improvement and modification of an au-
thority and at a relentless improvement and modification of naturalness. But what would 
be the specificity of the legitimacy of the authority of the “other” in a deconstructive 
sense in respect to that of the authority considered in a dialectic sense? Does the recall 
to “contingency” really make any sense in this case, if we consider that contingency is 
already a character equivalently structuring what we can read both as naturalness and 
“violence” which is typical of the rise of all authorities? Where can we locate the differ-
ence between the functioning of a “modification of criteria of naturalness” typical of a 
thought of contingency and the one typical of dialectic and teleological thoughts? 
A telos – as a “more preferable situation to reach” envisaged within each random event 
– would be the reflection of a certain awareness of a historical development of “a ra-
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tionality” conceived by a random authority as much as any “non-dialectic” event of ac-
knowledgement of a logic of the other – equivalently “relative”, “arbitrary” or “con-
structed”. These questions arise from the result of the first chapter because, once we 
have contained – through Derridean concepts - the pretensions of progress and greater 
hope claimed by the neo-pragmatist community we need to remember, before giving 
complete trust to Derrida’s ethics of the hyperbolic attention to «the always 
(non)present possibility of the event of madness», that the same use of deconstructive 
concepts brought us, in the final paragraph, to a wary interpretation of the deconstruc-
tive authority itself
151
. 
 
In order to answer these questions it is important to recognize first of all that what I had 
to establish is a certain rupture which Rorty’s conception of philosophy performs– or 
intends to perform - within our effective interpretation of culture and history. A rupture 
had to be recognized within Rorty’s task or commitment in order to open a discussion 
about his “transcendentalism” and his fallacy in talking about a certain coherent view of 
language as well as about a “liberal” and pragmatist attitude. This rupture is questioned, 
in its pragmatic efficacy and therefore in its very existence, by Derrida. The neo-
pragmatist faith in the ironist’s ability to drag us toward a greater hope in a society 
where decisions are made without relying on any ontological authority can be in effect 
likened, even limiting ourselves to a comparison of the “form” of his intellectual claims 
and commitments, to the faith in a linear and consistent functioning of a privileged area 
of human capacity, such as the Enlightened Reason deeply questioned by Derrida:  
today, in the climate of opinion, people are starting to behave as though one could 
calmly continue the good old discourse of the Enlightenment, return to Kant, call 
us back to the ethical or juridical or political responsibility of the subject by re-
storing the authority of consciousness, of the ego, of the reflexive cogito, of an 'I 
think' without pain or paradox; as though it were again legitimate to accuse of ob-
scurity or irrationalism anyone who complicates things a little by wondering 
about the reason of reason, about the history of the principle of reason
152
. 
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   Whoever «complicates things» is, for Derrida, one who makes the “enlightened” man 
notice that the authority of Reason inevitably explodes into countless specific authori-
ties, as many as the specific events and rules typical of these single events we are in 
touch with. 
As the enlightened man’s task was to impose the authority of Reason by facing the “old 
metaphysical questions through the light of reason”, we can identify in Rorty an attempt 
to «restore the authority of consciousness, of the ego» by translating the language of any 
preceding attempt to restore authority into its pragmatic implications. When Rorty 
translates the language of preceding attempts to restore authority to the “subject”, this 
translation does not necessarily impose the need to reject any practices coinciding with 
an event of the “old” language, as long as it is pragmatically preferable. But he recog-
nizes the previous theories of the subject as being not “complete” efforts to restore a le-
gitimate – suitable, preferable - authority in regards to all contexts. A Platonic idea of 
reason, for instance, is not a priori rejected for any particular pragmatic implication it 
may carry on the social sphere but because, according to Rorty, its criteria of legitima-
tion may not completely coincide with the largest possible agreement, with taking into 
consideration and “doing justice” to as many contingent logics-of-the-other as possible. 
Using the terminology I used above I can say that, paradoxically, what Rorty is afraid of 
is that a theory may not properly “do justice” to the entire naturalness of the contingent 
“totality”. 
This terminology, which seems to be inconsistent with a pragmatist vocabulary, can be 
well explained by drawing attention to the fact that Rorty, (by illustrating the references 
to notions such as truth, theory, and nature from a pragmatic point of view, by saying 
that «it is the vocabulary of practise rather than of theory, of action rather than contem-
plation, in which one can say something useful about truth»
153
) is not actually dismiss-
ing the functioning of structures of forces ascribable to what we consider truth, theory, 
and nature from our culture or intellectual purposes. Since their “success” – or utility – 
is only «pragmatically justifiable» he is trying, instead, to improve the criteria for their 
legitimation by clearly displaying the “nature of naturalness” in its reflecting pragmati-
cally justifiable logics. Therefore, it would not be farfetched to say that all this can con-
verge into an acknowledgment of the equivalent right, to any of these logics, to be con-
sidered “natural”. 
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Even if we cannot find these conclusions among “Rorty’s intentions”, it is implicit in its 
neo-pragmatist rupture in respect to a representationalist, scientific or dialectic episte-
mology that any pragmatically justifiable logic and therefore any «good looking» vo-
cabulary and preferable practical situation is coincident with what somebody “naturally” 
prefers to do or to be in a specific practical moment. Moreover, this co-implication of 
natural and pragmatic – “institutional” – factors is well exposed in Rorty’s famous 
statement whereby «there is no epistemological difference between truth about what 
ought to be and truth about what is, nor any metaphysical difference between facts and 
values, nor any methodological difference between morality and science»
154
. Not only 
«what ought to be» reflects a tension toward a naturally pragmatically preferable situa-
tion, but «what is» is already a pragmatically justifiable logic which cannot be separated 
from that tension. 
Any “rupture” in the interpretation of what is nature, knowledge and truth, from this 
point of view, can be conceived as an effort to improve the criteria for the legitimation 
of what is natural, known, true, an effort to improve the criteria for a pragmatically 
preferable-justifiable logic. But it is consequential from what has been said about the 
concept of authority, that a similar “improvement” can only identify a shift within the 
spectrum of single pragmatically preferable-justifiable logics, and in no way a progress 
in its absolute sense. Given the radical contingency of any authority, any “improve-
ment” of a pragmatically preferable-justifiable logic turns out to be an improvement for 
a specific authority within its specific field of forces, within a specific context of natu-
ralness and preferability and against the pragmatically preferable logic typical of an-
other authority. 
 
If we have to locate a specificity in a deconstructive figure of authority, in its capacity 
to take into account contingency and to do justice to all – or more – singular events of 
“natural logic”, we have therefore to establish that her «effort to improve the criteria for 
a pragmatically preferable-justifiable logic» does not rely (as Rorty and the philosophies 
of subject he intends to “improve” do) on a supposed «rupture» which then winds up as 
being only «a shift within the spectrum of single pragmatically preferable-justifiable lo-
gics». 
We need to display, in other words, that the economic-political authorities which are re-
interpreted by the neo-pragmatist own the characters of what we would traditionally call 
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«dialectic» - to consider a modification of conceptions of naturalness toward a supposed 
improvement which is, in the end, relative and arbitrary – while the economic-political 
authorities which are likely to be shaped by a deconstructive attitude would not. 
According to this hypothesis, Rorty would appear as a “stage” of a philosophical itiner-
ary in which any exponent has, in turn, tried to arrange a logic whose criteria are prag-
matically preferable-justifiable for as many events as possible. The “rigour” in doing 
justice to pluralist vocabularies claimed by the liberal-ironist (which reveals itself as 
equivalently relying on “natural” authorities) appears to be the next stage in the research 
of a “scientific” economic-political vocabulary or logic. That is, in accordance with 
natural necessities, preferences and suitability – aimed at doing justice to “the other”. It 
is important to recall that the very sense of «doing justice» is, in turn, inevitably de-
pendent on what one «naturally prefers a community to be or to do for a community». 
 
 
    2 – Arbitrariness of the Other as of the «totality» 
 
 
It is important to note that the “rupture” which pragmatic-liberalism intends to perform 
as an act of legitimation of certain economic-political authorities would not make any 
sense if the intellectual positions it attempts to “improve” were not perceived as, in turn, 
“ruptures” of other preceding attempts to legitimate some kinds of naturalness. They 
can also been perceived as hiding the legitimate naturalness of many or most of the 
events of our environment, through a certain degree of “domination” on those which 
would be other legitimate authorities. When an intellectual determines certain “natural-
ness criteria”, she can interpret this determination as an improvement only by recogniz-
ing the claim, by the preceding attempts to outline these criteria, to be re-articulations 
and improvements of the legitimacy of authorities. That is to say that the necessity of an 
improvement can never be a rupture in the sense of complete re-invention of the terms 
of the problems but, rather, a process of re-inscription of the “old” authorities into more 
appropriate, more “natural” conditions of legitimacy. These latter are nothing but the 
criteria of legitimation of the “new” authority, whose necessities, parameters, desires, 
awareness – and, therefore, “naturalness” – have been shaped by their inscription within 
the “preceding” context of authorities. Any rupture has to be a manifestation of an on-
going and contingent process of inscription of authorities within other authorities. We 
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could already say that such a determination makes the distinction between a dialectical 
rupture and a “deconstructive decision” undecidable. But it is the very element of con-
tingency, with which we are dealing, which presents us with the necessity of consider-
ing the respective potentialities and particularities of the philosophical attitudes Rorty 
confronts - pragmatic-liberalism, deconstruction, dialectics, representationalism and 
Marxism – not only through theoretical comments but, rather, in relation to historical 
singularities. 
 
When I first pointed out Rorty’s necessity of making any pragmatic decision coincide 
with the parameters of an economic-political authority, I quoted an essay – The end of 
Leninism – which can been read in effect as suggesting the structure of a dialectical 
move. A move in the sense of «considering a modification of conceptions of naturalness 
in order to reach a supposed improvement». The form of the authority inspired by liber-
alism is seen, in fact, as the best solution in order to do justice to the “other’s logic” be-
cause it is interpreted as outclassing and improving the typologies of authority which 
support Marxism and the radical left – as well as «Dewey’s occasional temptations to 
radically reform capitalist society through scientific inclusive planning»
155
. Radical left 
efforts to consider and fulfil the “natural” needs of the oppressed are based, according to 
Rorty, on an ideal, Hegelian and abstract conception of naturalness and, therefore, of 
History. The pragmatist’s suspicion toward the authority of Marxist historical material-
ism – which claims to work as a “scientific institution” - is attributable, as in the case of 
Dewey, to the suspicion that «what public institutions spread as shared vocabulary is 
always in danger of not effectively coinciding with the particular “agreement” needed in 
a singular situation». Therefore, Rorty could never accept a search for «regularities or 
needs that are virtually necessary given the contingent evolution and current structures 
of human biology and history»
156
. 
Marxist ideals are appreciated for being a rupture aimed at improving justice to the logic 
of the other - «[...] I wish that the assumption that we already knew about a satisfactory 
alternative to market economies and private property had been true [but I don’t think it 
was]»
157
 - and acknowledged in the concrete needs it expresses and in the historical 
function it has been carrying out – which we need to improve, re-articulate and re-
inscribe into the liberal-ironist legitimacy:  
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[...] linking the intellectual romance of self-creation with the oppressed worker’s 
desire to expropriate the expropriators. Such linkages help us intellectuals to as-
sociate ourselves with the ideals of democracy and human solidarity. These link-
ages let us have the best of both worlds: we have been able to combine the tradi-
tional disdain of the wise for the many with the belief that the present, degener-
ate bourgeois many will be replaced by a new sort of many – the emancipated 
working class
158
. 
   Marxist ideals and attitude are not fully “rejected”. The authority they represent is ac-
knowledged in its working throughout our days, in its contributing to constitute the 
world in which we dwell, in its carrying the improvement of the just legitimation of cer-
tain naturalness – such as, in this case, the naturalness of those others who need to be 
emancipated from what impedes the achievement of what would be “naturally more 
preferable” for them to do or to be. Marxist authority is taken as being a partial aware-
ness of what the total “naturalness” of all the events is. It is taken as authority in the 
sense of being a legitimate expression of particular necessities, parameters, desires, 
awareness which are those which really exist within our context. Marxism is acknowl-
edged and improved as an authority because the necessities and desires it describes are 
real fields of forces forming our environment. But such a description, nevertheless, does 
not coincide with an openness to the naturalness of all events. Any Marxist authority 
would display, using a Hegelian perspective, a partial, incomplete, one-sided awareness 
of the “total” naturalness. Neo-pragmatism intends to get clear of the obstacles which 
make the “scientific” Marxist conception of reality not coincide with an as large as pos-
sible openness toward a pragmatic preferability within our community: «I would hope 
that we have reached a time at which we can finally get rid of the conviction common to 
Plato and Marx that there must be large theoretical ways of finding out how to end in-
justice [...] »
159
. 
The link to practice underpins Marx’s thought about the authority of its philosophical 
enterprise, as the practice of emancipating oppressed human features after recognizing 
the logic of such oppression – or, better to say, after recognizing how logics of certain 
authorities make logics of other authorities not coincide with what would be “naturally” 
preferable to do or to be for the human beings which can be identified with the latter au-
thorities. But this doing justice is not fulfilled within Marxism because, according to 
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Rorty, its authority cannot entirely respect all “naturally” preferable logics of the other 
without, in turn, imposing its own “natural logic” on the consideration of the same. This 
logic, used in order to analyse the structure of the contexts where the other is situated 
and to envisage its “preferable situation”, results as being not justifiable in any possible 
event. As H. Blanco explains: 
Marx’s famous dictum “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in 
various ways; the point however is to change it”, expressed Marxism's turn from 
contemplative thought to action. It is Marxism that claimed to have turned 
Hegel's idealism upside down. But Marxism as a philosophy is epistemologically 
compromised between a positivist, reductionist theory of knowledge and history, 
and an unwarranted idealism. Lack of adequate attention to the theory of knowl-
edge, or rather uncritical acceptance of the positivist view of science, leaves 
thought and practice without a coherent connection in Marxism. Thus, what 
Marx proclaimed without warrant of his philosophy--a philosophical basis for 
social activism and reconstruction--pragmatism provides»
160
. 
   The neo-pragmatist’s attempt to «do justice», to assure a «warrant» to any “pragmati-
cally justifiable” interpretation of reality can be read as an improvement of the connec-
tion between “thought” and “practice” – between the legitimation of an attitude and its 
implementation – which is not developed enough in Marx. Marx’s “thought” cannot 
completely justify or coincide with a legitimate practice because the logic it proposes 
may leave aside the logic of certain authorities in certain events, it may not comprehend 
all naturalness because it may not comprehend all singular authorities of the total spe-
cific context in which we are. This comprehension is what neo-pragmatism attempts to 
achieve: a coincidence between philosophical-theoretical legitimation and the authority 
of any coming event-logic in its legitimate pragmatic naturalness. Such an attempt re-
veals itself to be fallacious because this legitimation has inevitably to be performed and 
implemented, in an economic-political decision, through the criteria of naturalness of 
certain authorities, as within any dialectical thought. 
It is a coincidence between “legitimation of attitudes” – «thought» - and legitimacy of 
the fields of forces constituting its environment that neo-pragmatism intends to reach. 
That is to say, it is a comprehension of the «totality» which, in a Hegelian lexicon, 
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would recall the coincidence of «Idea» and «reality»
161
. When Rorty says «the persis-
tence on the left of this notion of 'radical critique' is an unfortunate residue of the scien-
tistic conception of philosophy [...]this idea presuppose that someday we shall penetrate 
to the true, natural, ahistorical matrix of all possible language and knowledge»
162
 this 
means that, according to the neo-pragmatist, Marxist authority is the awareness of a 
naturalness which is nevertheless at odds with the naturalness of many other authorities 
in its environment; its legitimacy is therefore abstracted from the total context and only 
this abstractness can confer the appearance of describing a «universal truth or ahistorical 
matrix» to it: «Marxism, like Platonism and Heideggerianism, wants more for human 
beings than comfort. It wants transformation, trans-formation according to a single uni-
versal plan; Marxists are continually envisaging what they call “new socialist man”»
163
. 
The «new socialist man» would be, from this point of view, “what it would be prefer-
able to do or to be” for a Marxist, namely its “naturalness”, and this naturalness – and 
the rupture it consists in - is recognized as being part of the total context of the chang-
ing events-naturalness to whose totality neo-pragmatism tries to do justice. The “spec-
tre” of Marxism – as Derrida would call it
164
 - is, on the one hand, the expression of 
needs, desires, reasons which rose under the implementation of other “preceding” au-
thorities – it is, namely, a historical modification and “progress” of rationality and natu-
ralness driven by the awareness of a more suitable logos. But it is, on the other hand, a 
“progress” which is now recognized in its being in relation with other singular authori-
ties; the totality of these relations is therefore recognized by the neo-pragmatist in his 
authority to choose a particular authority which, each time, would do justice to as many 
singular pragmatic logics as possible. Once interpreted as an act of comprehension of 
the totality of the authorities, the neo-pragmatist discourse resembles the traditional dia-
lectic move of considering a modification of conceptions of naturalness in order to pro-
duce an improvement and a comprehension of any singular events. That is a discourse 
which, each time, winds up as being only «a shift within the spectrum of single prag-
matically preferable-justifiable logics». 
Neo-pragmatism still turns out to be an appeal to a form of totality in its authority to 
choose needs, desires and preferences of a certain authority. The historical shaping of 
the authority chosen by the neo-pragmatist, in its “improving and comprehending in a 
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totality all the events-authorities”, resembles a Hegelian process of continuous accom-
plishment of self-awareness of history and rationality: 
every twist and turn in the history of philosophy regarding knowledge and truth 
is at the same time a twist and turn in our conception of ourselves. Thus the his-
tory of philosophy is also a kind of auto-biography, a Bildung in which humanity 
as whole comes to understand itself. The Phenomenology is essentially our col-
lective memoirs, clarifying finally what we now find that we are. So viewed, the 
Phenomenology is a treatise on self-identity, what each of us, and all of us, ought 
to think of ourselves
165
. 
   By denying a historical essence of self-identity, neo-pragmatism is nevertheless an-
nouncing the institution of an authority which understands history in its “totality”, 
namely in its full naturalness represented by any specific pragmatically justifiable 
event-logic; such an authority needs to construct «a conception of itself» which lets it 
identify itself with the most suitable thing to do or with what is «preferable to do or to 
be» in a context. But such self-identification draws its features – the needs, necessities, 
desires it represents - from the context of “preceding” authorities in which it arises. It 
needs to draw up, therefore, a «biography» of the totality of the succession of other au-
thorities, in order to deduct a certain – naturally – preferable thing to do, a purpose, a 
goal. 
As remarked earlier, the dialectical notion of telos – as a “more preferable situation to 
reach” envisaged within each random event - is the reflection of how a certain random 
authority is aware of the historical development or transformation of “its rationality” – 
the rationality shaping its particular and relative environment and being. This definition, 
though, is also adequate to describe the goal conceived by any “non-dialectic” event of 
acknowledgement of a logic of the other, because this latter – as a «particular environ-
ment» perceived by an authority - is equivalently “relative”, “arbitrary”, “constructed”. 
Thus, the resemblance between the neo-pragmatist authority and the dialectic concept of 
aufhebung is consequential to the fact that a difference between a “dialectical” and 
“contingent” conception of «transformation of rationality» vanishes. Once we establish 
that both a “dialectic” and a “post-dialectical” idea of history can be interpreted as de-
scribing a succession of authorities constructing an interpretation of their historical 
moment which is shaped through the articulation of the preceding authorities criteria, a 
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rupture can be read both as “dialectic” and contingent. In fact, a rupture cannot help but 
spring from the awareness of a totality formed by an always “arbitrary”, “constructed”, 
“relative” naturalness of certain authorities, because the consciousness of certain needs, 
desires, or interests typical of the authority which makes the break will always be a rela-
tive, contingent product of its particular relationship with the authorities it used to be 
dominated by. Such a consciousness will always be, therefore, a “restricted” and arbi-
trary one. The logic underlying the dialectic and the logic supporting the functioning of 
any authority in its rupture with and inscription of other authorities cannot have any 
significant difference in arbitrariness, naturalness or risk of producing “violence”. 
 
 
3 – Althusser and Marx’s rupture: Marxism as an attempt to break humanistic 
economic circularity 
 
 
In order to assess the potentiality of a Derridean attitude to doing justice to the logic of 
the event in comparison with the potentiality of a dialectical and pragmatist thought, the 
issue is raised about whether there can be a choice of one or more authorities which co-
incides with a rigorous openness to the logic of the other. This puts, within a logic of an 
economic-political decision, that «total naturalness» which would be the intended pur-
pose of the authors I quoted at stake. A decision which intends to meet «what would be 
preferable to do or to be» for an individual or a community – to recognise them in the 
authority of their naturalness – necessarily needs to rely on some authorities whose de-
sires, needs and criteria acquire the status of a “science”, at least in the sense of “science 
of the other”, whether in the acceptation whereby it is a “knowledge of the other” or in 
the one whereby it is a “knowledge which the other owns”. The achievement of a suit-
able “science of the other” would involve, both in a dialectical, pragmatist and decon-
structive perspective a creation or distribution of elements and energy which respects - 
«does justice to» - what would be naturally preferable for an individual or a community. 
The problem is to understand whether and to what extent a “science” or an “economy” 
of the other can avoid being identified with the economy of some authority. In this case 
“authority” may not necessarily coincide with the “unity” of an individual, it may coin-
cide with only some of the features that are liable to change. 
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Such an identification, in fact, seems to be necessary for any authority to be able to de-
clare itself as capable of proposing a rupture which is aimed at doing justice to the 
other. This is one of the reasons why Rorty is ungenerous with regards to Marxism 
when he compares the Marxist authority as a method aimed at analysing how can we 
achieve «a creation or distribution of elements and energy which respects what would 
be naturally preferable to do or to be for an individual or a community» with his own 
typologies of authorities. When he describes Marxism as a «metanarrative» involving a 
preconceived view of human nature, Rorty neglects to say that what produces a struc-
ture or a “science” in Marx is not the preconception of a certain human nature but an 
openness to discover the naturalness of any other, within a pretension to universality 
which must be rigorously justified. A failure of Marxism, from this point of view, needs 
to be explained not by the fact that it would suppose a certain human structure or nature 
but, rather, by the fact that any search for «what would be naturally preferable to do or 
to be for an individual or a community» - that is to say, any search for the logic of any 
event – has to be performed by or rely on some authorities whose “science” has to be 
trusted and identified with the logic and the economy of the other. This difference ap-
pears to be slight but it is nevertheless important in order to understand whether an 
«openness to the other» is possible and what it would mean. In fact, if one reads the 
possible failure of Marxism – or of any other “dialectical” position – as produced by the 
obstacle of a certain conception of human nature – which can be decried as ‘representa-
tionalist’ – one assumes the possibility of the existence, in order to overcome such a po-
sition, of a different kind of authority less influenced by a metanarrative. This would be 
an authority whose conception of “naturalness” and whose preference for what to do 
within a context is not produced by the arbitrary and relative naturalness of the authori-
ties forming this context. 
In this case, all this means that Marx as an authority, in order to grasp and emancipate 
as many «events of naturalness» as possible, needed to consider as many authorities of 
his time as possible, with their own naturalness and preferability about what they would 
like to do or to be – such as classical economists, modern philosophers, utopian social-
ists, «proletarian» workers in their concrete life. Once he had done this, he needed to in-
scribe all these authorities into a conception of “naturalness” whose criterion is to do 
justice to as many conceptions of “nature” as possible, namely to as much total natural-
ness as possible. The outlining of the necessity to emancipate the overwhelming mass of 
proletarians would respond to such logic from this point of view. In this way, the «sup-
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position» of a certain human nature turns out to be the product of an “assessment” of the 
totality of authorities needed to be considered in their arbitrary and relative naturalness. 
The «structure of history» displayed by Marxists can appear to be “arbitrary” – as Rorty 
would suggest – inasmuch its totality is the attempt to find a balance among the arbi-
trary naturalness of a set of authorities. Inasmuch, in other words, it is the attempt to 
create a science of the arbitrary naturalness of the other. Any economic-political deci-
sion – whether Marxist or pragmatist - would therefore be doomed to be partial, fallible 
because it results in being an arbitrary dialectical metanarrative constructed through ar-
bitrary contingent authorities. That one has necessarily to choose certain authorities is 
equivalent to stating that the prevalent authorities-of-the-other are contingent. 
Althusser’s text Reading Capital illustrates how Marxist operational logic can be read 
as proposing a total «comprehension [of notions such as profit and rent], either of their 
origin and nature, or of the laws that regulate the subsequent distribution of their 
value»
166
. This is one of the elements which can be depicted as promoting an interpreta-
tion of Marx whereby this latter’s “operational logic” was not primarily the effect of a 
certain doctrine about history and hierarchies of production. It was, instead, driven by 
the necessity of recognising the other in her own logic and of producing a rigorous “sci-
ence of the openness to the other’s naturalness”. This in spite of the fact that, as Gold-
stein warns, Althusser never did «give up the idea that theory grasps reality» and «he 
still considered Marxist theory to be a privileged voice in the chorus»
167
.  
The case of Althusser is significant because he displays Marx’s theorization as the result 
of an inscription of the classic concepts of political economy into a new type of science 
aimed – because of its very being a «science» - at exploring the “real” dynamics of so-
cial relationships and, therefore, the real relationships among the potentially preferable 
naturalness of all authorities. However, he also admits the possible fallacy of the other’s 
authority – such as the proletariat still not fully aware of its own condition - in recogniz-
ing what would be preferable for itself and the others. Consequently, he can make us re-
flect about the aporetic situation whereby the undecidability of whether the authority of 
the other is really “open to itself” can only be solved by the intervention of another, “ex-
ternal” authority. 
Althusser, in other words, offers us interpretative instruments to understand that a 
boundary between an «economy of the other» led by an “ideology” and an economy 
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driven by a “science of the other” is faint or, even, undecidable – and this would clarify, 
again, why a difference between a «dialectical» development of economic-political de-
cisions and a «contingent» one describes only an “empirical”, “psychological” differ-
ence among equivalently “random” and arbitrary developments of authorities. 
Althusser locates Marx’s essential rupture toward the preceding models of rationality in 
1845, at the moment when his evaluation and description of history and relationships 
among humans distances itself from what Rorty would call «foundationalism» or «rep-
resentationalism». Any preceding intellectual acceptance of a certain form a society is 
interpreted, from now on, as the product of a certain supposition of how the “natural 
homo economicus” is constituted: 
In 1845, Marx broke radically with every theory that based history and politics 
on an essence of man. This unique rupture contained three indissociable ele-
ments. (1) The formation of a theory of history and politics based on radically 
new concepts: the concepts of social formation, productive forces, relations of 
production, superstructure, ideologies, determination in the last instance by the 
economy, specific determination of the other levels, etc. (2) A radical critique of 
the theoretical pretensions of every philosophical humanism. (3) The definition 
of humanism as an ideology[...]This total theoretical revolution was only em-
powered to reject the old concepts because it replaced them by new concepts. In 
fact Marx established a new problematic, a new systematic way of asking ques-
tions of the world, new principles and a new method
168
. 
   The notions of «social formation, productive forces, relations of production» and the 
determination «in the last instance by the economy» are the frameworks through which 
the partial naturalness, the relative “truth” coinciding with the old authorities are “ad-
mitted” once they are re-inscribed within a new context-of-naturalness, the context 
which does justice even to the potential preferable existence of “other” social classes. 
The “potential naturalness” of proletariat, what would be «preferable to be» for this lat-
ter is provided with dignity in the sense that proletariat condition is no longer justified 
and uncritically accepted as an effective way to carry out or satisfy natural, anthropo-
logically established human needs and consumption («Political economy tends to re-
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duce exchange-values to use-values, and the latter - 'wealth', to use the expression of 
Classical Economics - to human needs»
169
). 
In regard to this, Althusser recalls that a classical definition of political economy con-
cerns the study of the laws of phenomena such as consumption, profit, production and 
distribution in a «banal» approach, without questioning whether these laws are really 
the reflection of intrinsic anthropological laws and, above all, whether the “evaluation” 
of these laws can be fairly abstracted from the contexts of domination they are origi-
nated from and be analysed as a «homogeneous, quantifiable field»: 
Lalande’s dictionary defines Political Economy as follows: 'a science whose goal 
is knowledge of the phenomena, and (if the nature of those phenomena allows) 
the determination of the laws, which concern the distribution of wealth, and its 
production and consumption, insofar as the latter phenomena are linked to those 
of distribution. Wealth means, technically, everything which is capable of utili-
zation '
170
. 
   Althusser makes us notice that one of Marx’s main elements of rupture is the remark 
on the circularity of the «given» nature of human needs characterizing the social system 
as considered by Smith and Ricardo: «The homogeneous positivist field of measurable 
economic facts depends on a world of subjects whose activity as productive subjects in 
the division of labour has as its aim and effect the production of objects of consumption, 
destined to satisfy these same subjects of needs»
171
. The economic «given» of human 
needs and consumption is showed as a function of the particular model of production 
which is supposed to satisfy these same needs: «The only needs that play an economic 
part are those that can be satisfied economically: those needs are not defined by human 
nature in general but by their effectivity, i.e., by the level of the income at the disposal 
of the individuals concerned -- and by the nature of the products available, which are, at 
a given moment, the result of the technical capacities of production»
172
. 
That Althusser locates here Marx’s rupture in regard to the previous models of rational-
ity is significant, not only because he suggests the “moral” and ontological necessity, 
perceived by Marx, of doing justice to an oppressed naturalness of human beings previ-
ously seen as in function of a dominant conception of «what is naturally preferable to do 
or be». It is significant because this allows us to discuss the fact that any new necessity 
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and perception of a “naturalness” has formed itself by inscribing in itself and re-
articulating the contingency and the arbitrariness of its “surrounding” structures of 
forces. Since any human need can only arise as a function of certain models of distribu-
tion of means and wealth, any consideration of what would be preferable to do within a 
context – in order to transform such context - will be a response to a particular, arbitrary 
system of authorities, which makes the consideration of any other’s naturalness a par-
ticular, arbitrary authority. 
The condition of the proletariat is in fact read as the consequence of the move of certain 
naturalnesses which oppress some others: the notions of «social formation, productive 
forces, relations of production» are functional to an interpretation of reality whereby 
socio-economic relationships are arbitrary and contingent products of dominant concep-
tions of naturalness. But this means that once we declare that the “old” humanistic in-
terpretations of man are arbitrary and contingent ideologies, once we maintain that this 
arbitrariness has shaped the socio-economic relations of power which we abide in, it is 
also necessary to admit that any “other’s” logic one strives to outline inevitably carries 
with itself its own arbitrary and contingent origin produced as a “reaction” within a so-
cial practice of an arbitrary and contingent notion of human naturalness. Althusser says: 
«Every recognized science not only has emerged from its own prehistory, but continues 
endlessly to do so (its prehistory remains always contemporary: something like its Alter 
Ego) by rejecting what is considered to be error, according to the process which Bache-
lard called “the epistemological break”»
173
. 
A question therefore becomes central, if one intends to analyse the specificity and the 
effectiveness of a deconstructive attitude in order to deal with ethical, political or eco-
nomic issues: can the move toward the «openness to the other» be “scientifically” or 
ethically justified “by itself”? Is it really the ethical move par excellence? If we rely on 
the awareness of a certain preferability-of-the-other we should always consider the fact 
that such awareness has shaped itself through the inscriptions of certain authorities - 
which are contingent – and therefore the model of distribution it proposes will always 
be in danger of involving the incommensurable functioning of the «spectres» both of the 
“old” authorities and, above all, of other “new” contingent authorities. The arbitrariness 
of the origin of any other’s logic implies in fact the possibility that this latter involves, 
in the social implementation of its “models”, other authorities whose origin is arbitrary 
and contingent but different. It is important to recall that an «authority» is not necessar-
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ily identified with an individual or a «subject», but with any changing normative con-
text. 
This position can be supported by referring to Althusser’s explanation of what deter-
mines a socio-economic break and by looking into concrete historical cases which re-
flect the discussed features. Firstly, notice how Althusser highlights Marx’s conception 
of systems of production and labour processes, which is distant from a humanist view of 
«creative» transformation. Any description of the history of wealth production as mere 
result of human labour and creativity is rejected, because it supposes the homogeneous 
development or evolution of some natural human characteristics. Far from being linear 
and univocally calculable, what determines the modality in which humans produce 
wealth involves a certain reciprocal dynamic between the laws of natural resources and 
human technology, whose contingent distribution determines the material conditions of 
production. Althusser reports that, for instance, Smith tried to relate the factors just 
quoted to a certain intrinsic value of human labour throughout history: «Smith had al-
ready related the current material conditions of the labour process to past labour: he thus 
dissolved the currency of the material conditions required at a given moment for the ex-
istence of the labour process in an infinite regression, in the non-currency of earlier la-
bours, in their memory [...]»
174
. 
According to Althusser, Smith connected something which is «current», which can only 
be outlined as the current result of contingent and arbitrary interrelationships between 
distribution of natural resources and technologies, to something which is supposed to be 
a determinable factor, the “history of human labour”. This kind of “humanism” is there-
fore equivalent to choosing some authorities – each contingent one which privileges a 
certain perception and awareness of the modality of human labour in order to qualify its 
economic context – and their conception of history in order to do justice to any other 
authority. «Althusser’s worries» - Honneth says - «pertain to the obsessive way in 
which humanist thought conceives history as a continuous self-objectivation of human 
species»
175
. A self-awareness of any coming authority – and, therefore, of the totality of 
our history - through the consideration of certain authorities is the purpose of a “human-
istic” economic attitude. 
But how can a thought aiming at “improving” the contingent and arbitrary distribution 
of wealth within a society by making itself be – or recognizing itself as being - «hostage 
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of the Other’s logic»
176
 avoid choosing the conception of history of certain authorities? 
The «creative transformation» of some “other” authorities is not necessarily “in har-
mony” with any authority which is to be involved in a deconstructive economic con-
crete decision. 
And yet, what Derrida invokes is precisely an act of sacrifice, an act of responsibility 
toward the singularity of the advent of the other, toward her request, regardless of any 
«general ethics» or general justification: 
I can respond only to the one (or to the One), that is, to the other, by sacrificing 
that one to the other. I am responsible to any one (that is to say to any other) only 
by failing in my responsibility to all the others, to the ethical or political general-
ity. And I can never justify this sacrifice, I must always hold my peace about it. 
Whether I want to or not, I can never justify the fact that I prefer or sacrifice any 
one (any other) to the other. I will always be secretive, held to secrecy in respect 
of this, for I have nothing to say about it. What binds me to singularities, to this 
one or that one [...] remains finally injustifiable
177
 
   Such a secret act seems to be the only way to be faithful to the other’s logic without 
altering it with the dominant logic of a dominant authority. It seems to represent, also, 
the outcome of an essential choice between being loyal to some “genuine” others and 
their singularities and an “abstract norm”. From the point of view which has been de-
veloped here, nevertheless, such a choice appears to be, rather, between certain contin-
gent conceptions of naturalness developed by the reciprocal consideration of arbitrary 
authorities and others. If «abstract norm» means “arbitrarily privileging some features 
of a context over others in order to evaluate it” we have to regard it as the specific char-
acteristic of any act of doing justice to some authorities. 
The consequence is that a political-economic reform can be granted to be “philosophi-
cally” considered as a response to the singular event of the coming of the other but at 
the price of seeing such a response «explode», alter itself because of the arbitrariness 
and contingency of the authorities haunting its context. This would display how Derrida 
falls into the fallacy of believing in a particular theoretical attitude which would have 
the quality of dealing with the undecidability – arbitrariness, contingency, madness – of 
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the authorities in a more efficacious way. This particular attitude would consist – as 
well as in the loyalty to the “singularity” of the event of the other - in the very aware-
ness of the self-deconstructive “nature” of any model of authorities. In the awareness, 
therefore, of the contingency of the authorities forming our precise context; in the 
awareness, again, of the undecidability which we need to face when evaluating the 
meaning and the practical consequences of similar models in each singular event we ex-
perience : 
Undecidible is not merely the oscillation or the tension between two decisions. 
Undecidable – this is the experience of that which, though foreign and heteroge-
neous to the order of calculable and the rule, must nonetheless – it is of duty that 
one must speak – deliver itself over to the impossible decision while taking ac-
count of law and rules [...]Once the test and the ordeal of the undecidable has 
passed [...], the decision has again followed a rule – whether given, received, 
confirmed, preserved or reinvented – which, in its turn, nothing guarantees abso-
lutely
178
. 
   How the theoretical meaning of the aporia of the undecidable has not been justly in-
vestigated by Derrida can be pointed out by recalling that an awareness of the contin-
gency of the authorities forming our precise context is never only coincident, formally, 
with an «awareness of the contingency of history». It is mostly coincident with an 
awareness of certain singular contingent authorities which constitute the particular pic-
ture of our «contingent history. It is inevitably through an awareness and acceptance of 
some of these contingent and arbitrary histories that we perceive the undecidability of a 
situation. And it is through the faith in an arbitrary authority that we, afterwards, «pass 
the test of the undecidable». The undecidable, in effect, consists in the awareness of a 
particular modality of interrelation among certain particular authorities and visions of 
naturalness. And any necessary decision and break of the undecidable is an assessment 
made through the elements proper of those arbitrary authorities. Any investigation of an 
undecidable context is already an acceptance of the arbitrary conception of history of 
certain authorities, of certain “others”. An arbitrary conception which can never be, rig-
orously speaking, a “singular” event but which always involves, in its functioning 
within a context, the spectres of other authorities coming from other arbitrary origins. 
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The arbitrariness I am talking about is not only in the sense of the random and particular 
desires, needs and prejudices typical of any “event of authority” and of the spectres of 
any authority haunting the context in which the “event of authority” we decide to rely 
upon takes place. It is also in the sense of the arbitrariness of our decision about what 
event of authority we choose in order to do justice to the other within a context. 
It is important to notice that, in effect, the arbitrariness and the undecidability in the 
choice of the “other’s authority” to which one does justice is already a structural charac-
teristic of economic-political decisions which would respond to a “socialist” or “Marx-
ist” vision of history. The mechanism of privileging some authorities and their arbitrary 
conception of history in order to do justice to the naturalness of as many authorities as 
possible is something that “socialism” shares with dialectics and deconstruction. This is 
why it would be possible to show, through the reference to events typical of socialist 
history, the structural risk persisting - in an always equivalent way - throughout this 
shared structure. It is possible to show, also, how in the concrete contingency of the 
economic-political events there is no structural or essential difference between a deci-
sion attributable to a deconstructive, socialist or “humanistic”, dialectical view but only, 
at best, an empirical and psychological one. 
Althusser is aware of a structural danger of failure present in socialist hope when the 
matter is to consider the “naturalness of the other”. A failure which he tries to ward off 
by clarifying, through the writings of Lenin, that we do not have to hypostatize our con-
fidence in the singular coming of the other and her logic – in this case, of the proletariat 
– because such a logic is ineluctably the arbitrary product of a contingent and arbitrary 
vision of history which may exclude «what would be preferable to do» for some indi-
viduals. In this precise case, notoriously, this vision coincides with the conception of 
naturalness which is the very “dominant” of the proletariat: 
One further point needs to be clarified in this connection. Modern writers, taking 
up, consciously or not, a tradition whose representatives include Sorel and Rog-
danov, have described historical materialism as ‘the immanent philosophy of the 
proletariat’ (Daniel Villey), as a theory that is valid for the proletariat and gives 
expression to its condition and aspirations. This thesis leads to the following 
conclusion: Marxism is a subjective (‘class’) theory, having no claim to scien-
tific universality and objectivity; hence it is a myth in the Sorelian sense, rather 
than a science. Others have sought to ground the scientific nature of Marxism, 
‘the ideology of the proletariat’, in the essence of the proletariat, the ‘universal 
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class’ whose condition – whose very impoverishment – marks it out for univer-
sality and objectivity. Lenin had occasion to discuss this problem in a famous 
text, What is to be Done? Against the advocates of the ‘spontaneity’ of the prole-
tariat, Lenin defends the absolute necessity of ‘scientific theory’. He quotes ap-
provingly the following passages from Kautsky: “[For the spontaneists], socialist 
consciousness appears to be a necessary and direct result of the proletarian class 
struggle. But this is absolutely untrue. Modern socialist consciousness can arise 
only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge. The vehicle of science is not 
the proletariat, but the bourgeois intelligentsia: it was in the minds of individual 
members of this stratum that modern socialism originated”. Lenin shows that, 
‘spontaneously’, the proletariat cannot but be influenced by bourgeois ideology, 
and that Marxism, far from being the subjective theory of the proletariat, is a sci-
ence that must be taught to the proletariat
179
. 
   Proletariat, therefore, develops the perception of its needs and naturalness in function 
of the previous system of authorities, of the particular economic interests this latter pro-
duces and of the human nature this kind of society “creates”. This structural characteris-
tic not only should make us worried about the concrete possibility of the spread of class 
consciousness but, also, wary of the individual economic interests which may arise and 
be implemented within the structure of a socialist or communist society. 
 
The task of making the logic, the naturalness or the coming of the other stand out is not 
an univocal one. In order to state what would be preferable for a community of indi-
viduals in its total context – or even for a “singular” individual in her total context – we 
can be sceptical about relying on a general theory or a historicist attitude as much as on 
a “rule” drawn from what appears to be «the singular event of the other». In each case 
the arbitrariness and the contingency of the rule and of the authority we rely on inevita-
bly produces the risk that the economic value or importance of some measure is not 
evaluated through a reference to a calculation of the greatest total benefit perceivable 
within a context. It is because what is perceived as “naturally preferable” by each of 
these authorities is inevitably particular, arbitrary, “relative”. If we have to admit that it 
is impossible to escape relying on an arbitrary authority, it is also necessary to acknowl-
edge that dialectical thoughts, pragmatism and deconstructionism have advocated the 
use of certain previous general criteria which are seen as necessary or even sufficient in 
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order to improve or to reach a good calculation of what is “naturally” (or “pragmati-
cally”) preferable to do. 
 
 
4 - Economic value of a product: inter-referentiality among arbitrary con-
ceptions 
 
 
We can look at another emblematic example of how an intended “socially revolution-
ary” economic reform can be unmasked as being a reaction produced by arbitrary con-
ception of naturalness proper of the dominant socio-economic structure. Although it can 
be recognized as doing justice to the needs and desires of the other, the vision of how 
the other’s needs should be satisfied reflects an idea of the natural socio-economic rela-
tions which is the product of a re-articulation of the “old” arbitrary authorities. This is 
what one can conclude from Marx’s severe criticism of the Proudhon theory of value 
contained in Philosophy of Poverty. 
What the French socialist neglects in his attempt to reduce inequality in economic ex-
change is that the “naturalness of the other”, what stands out and can be legitimated as 
the “other’s necessity” within a context can only be constructed through a system of 
values inherited from the preceding arbitrary authority. According to Proudhon, the cen-
tral contradiction of the market economy is that, generally, «the use-value of a commod-
ity is inversely proportional to its exchange value», in the sense that «value decreases in 
proportion as production augments, and reciprocally this same value increases in pro-
portion as production diminishes»
180
. Such a contradiction leads to a struggle between 
the two kinds of values, which mirrors the attempts to make profit made by some indi-
viduals, on the one hand, by increasing the exchange value of their products through 
manufacturing and, on the other hand, through the process of large scale production 
which creates profit at the cost of inevitably lowering the exchange value of a commod-
ity: 
While, by industrial progress, demand varies and multiplies to an infinite extent, 
and while manufactures tend in consequence to increase the natural utility of 
things, and finally to convert all useful value into exchangeable value, produc-
tion, on the other hand, continually increasing the power of its instruments and 
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always reducing its expenses, tends to restore the venal value of things to their 
primitive utility
181
. 
   The effects of this struggle, Proudhon says, «are well-known: the wars of commerce 
and of the market; obstructions to business; stagnation; prohibition; the massacres of 
competition; monopoly; reductions of wages; laws fixing maximum prices; the crushing 
inequality of fortunes; misery»
182
. The central proposal of the French philosopher pivots 
on the attempt to reformulate the method in which the economic and social value of a 
product – and therefore of the labour behind it - should be calculated. Proudhon is a 
critic of private property, of «parasitic middlemen» and an advocate of worker coopera-
tives and credit unions
183
. These convictions are grounded on the commitment toward 
an idea of society in which what one obtains and how much one is remunerated by her 
social environment depends on no other but her “real” contribution to the society. The 
central issue is therefore, for Proudhon, to dismiss all the social and cultural structures 
which lead to an estimate of the economic value of an act of production which does not 
do justice to what is “naturally” perceivable as the real contribution of an individual to 
society – and, then, which does not do justice to what is “naturally” preferable to do and 
to receive for such individual. 
Social class division and capitalist competition make the value of a labour product be 
determined not by the genuine contribution of an individual to a society but, on the one 
hand, by a mechanism of exploitation of labour forces aimed at increasing private profit 
and, on the other hand, by the consequences of capitalist and government devices set up 
in order to deal with competition - such as, for instance, the establishment of trade bar-
riers and the implementation of new technologies and organization of labour whose 
purpose is to impose on the demand the convenience of certain products over others. 
These continuous processes cause relentless formations of discrepancy, throughout the 
global economy, between the creation of use-value and the exchange-value of the corre-
sponding products. 
We need, therefore, to overcome the contradiction between the two kinds of values by 
founding our criteria of evaluation and remuneration on a factor which allows us to fo-
cus purely on the contribution of any human being. We need to “isolate” and consider 
that factor apart from the antinomies of political economy and the practices it pro-
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pounds, which lead to «the affirmation of the incommensurability of values, and conse-
quently the inequality of fortunes, as an absolute law of commerce»
184
. We have to go 
beyond – as Derrida would say – such a restricted ethics or economy and concentrate on 
what the “spectres of the others” would demand and, consequently, formulate an eco-
nomic reform which, despite its being inevitably public and “general” – and, therefore, 
“abstract” – would do justice to a particular category of exploited people. 
 
The measure Proudhon proposes, nevertheless, can be defined as reflecting a “natural-
ness” of the other only if our awareness of what is “natural” involves the equality of 
quantitative, abstract work – typically performed within a factory by the proletarian. 
The measurement of what is naturally required by an individual as compensation, after 
we get rid of exploitation, does not take into account imbalances in efforts, equipment 
and capabilities because it is in function of a previous modality of measurement of la-
bour. It is a reaction whose “nature” is dependent, therefore, on a preceding perception 
of what natural necessities and desires are. 
According to the French author, in fact, the factor we need to focus on in order to con-
centrate on the other’s concrete need, contribution and nature is the time taken by a 
worker to produce something as measure of the value of the product itself: «What 
Proudhon is proposing, in practical terms is that one commodity which requires, for in-
stance, four hours to produce will exchange with any other commodity that requires 
four hours to produce. For Proudhon this would be a situation of equality: equal contri-
butions to society receiving equal rewards from society»
185
. 
Since any individual would be necessarily rewarded with a product which needs the 
same amount of time to be created, according to Proudhon, the devices to deal with 
competition which I quoted above would be impossible to be implemented. Any techno-
logical and organizational innovation would only serve an equivalent contribution to the 
creation of use-value within an economy and would be consequently adjusted to this 
aim. Reciprocal solidarity and «justice to the other’s needs» would arise, therefore, as a 
consequence of the fact that a discrepancy between use-value and exchange-value 
would be made impossible. The only value sprung up by labour would refer to human 
contribution: 
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Now, what change does the idea of value undergo when we rise from the contra-
dictory notions of useful value and exchangeable value to that of constituted 
value or absolute value? There is, so to speak, a joining together, a reciprocal 
penetration, in which the two elementary concepts, grasping each other[...]. A 
value really such — like money, first-class business paper, government annui-
ties, shares in a well-established enterprise — can neither be increased without 
reason nor lost in exchange: it is governed only by the natural law of the addition 
of special industries and the increase of products
186
. 
   This reform seems to be a “reduction” of all “external ethics” - as criteria to assess the 
economic value of the event of something - to the “singular” ethics of the other. It ap-
pears in fact as a recommendation to calculate any singular contribution of an individual 
to society and, therefore, what “would be preferable for her to do”, including what 
would be preferable to receive, within each singular event. It would be coherent to af-
firm that the radicalism of Proudhon’s proposal hides, as a fundamental motif, an open-
ness to the legitimacy of any singular “natural” demand and desire of the other. A de-
mand which would be “natural” not as a deduction from some abstract natural laws but 
as a consequence of a singular and contingent calculation of, in this case, each individ-
ual’s amount of effort within a context. This calculation would recall each individual’s 
demand to satisfy an amount of personal concrete effort with the product of another 
equivalent effort and would put the demand and the benefit of the other as having prior-
ity in respect of any other criteria for the re-adjustment of an economic general logic. 
But what Marx shows us, in his criticism, is that a reform and a calculation based on the 
singular response to the other’s “coming” can be misleading and disclose an arbitrari-
ness and partiality which are equivalent to or originated from the “old” system of arbi-
trary authorities. The singular authorities – which are not necessarily “individuals” - to 
which Proudhon wants to be loyal have a different perception of “naturalness” in re-
spect to the authorities implementing the products exchanges which Proudhon debates. 
These latter will manifest the perception of their natural needs once the imbalances due 
to a disparity of labour quality will have emerged. 
What Marx makes us consider is that, first of all, the criterion of evaluation of a product 
considering the time “taken to realize it” has been set as a feature of the typical capital-
ist way of production and exploitation: «It is important to emphasize the point that what 
determines value is not the time taken to produce a thing, but the minimum time it could 
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possibly be produced in, and this minimum is ascertained by competition»
187
. Marx in-
sists that the pragmatic custom whereby an individual’s work product is evaluated by 
the minimum amount of time taken to realize it is the very mechanism through which 
exploitation and inequality arise Through the device of only paying this abstract labour-
time – indifferently from technological progress and disparity in ability - in a manner 
which is sufficient to keep workers operative, the capitalists manage to enjoy surplus 
value. Abolishing this exploitation, while maintaining the use of remunerating abstract 
labour through a time criterion, does not contemplate the fact that «labour is unequal at 
an individual level»
188
. Marx points out that, by presuming Proudhon’s system, 
if there is an exchange of these two products, there is an exchange of equal quan-
tities of labour. In exchanging these equal quantities of labour time, one does not 
change the reciprocal position of the producers, any more than one changes any-
thing in the situation of the workers and manufacturers among themselves. To 
say that this exchange of products measured by labour time results in an equality 
of payment for all the producers is to suppose that equality of participation in the 
product existed before the exchange
189
. 
   The elements of the unevenness among workers’ capacities, of the technological in-
novations and of the variability of demand play a role - within a context which includes 
modern industries and means of communication - which cannot be harmonized and put 
into relation with the amount of time spent by a worker, if we want to construct a logic 
of the economic value based on this latter factor. Within a similar context, in fact, the 
authorities of the workers claiming an equitable retribution for their effort are inevitably 
interrelated – not only within a society supposed to be already divided into classes – 
with the authorities obtaining an advantage from a certain juncture which concerns the 
elements of worker capacities, technological innovations, and variability of demand, etc. 
Within a class-structured society, such as a “traditional” capitalist one, the advantage 
given by a particular behaviour of these factors to particular authorities is typical in the 
profit achieved by the owner. Profit achieved when a favourable demand, the workers 
capacity and a superior technological efficiency allow him to draw a surplus value from 
labour, not-perceived by the workers, once the labour «is measured as such by the la-
bour time needed to produce the labour-commodity. And what is needed to produce this 
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labour-commodity? Just enough labour time to produce the objects indispensable to the 
constant maintenance of labour, that is, to keep the worker alive and in a condition to 
propagate his race»
190
. 
In this case, according to Marx, unevenness among worker capacities, technological in-
novations and variability of demand – as well as private property of means of produc-
tions, as a condition of the same - “create” authorities capable of exploiting worker’s la-
bour. And this is for the very fact that the relative value of labour is defined by an arbi-
trary measure of «minimum labour-time to produce a product», a measure which can be 
perceived by some authorities as fairly calculating an effort and, therefore, a right to re-
ceive but which ignores that this logic is socially interrelated with and co-dependent on 
the former authorities logic and the social effects on the distribution this provokes. 
Proudhon’s attempt seems to be precisely to successfully accomplish such a fair calcu-
lus of the individual effort to contribute to society and of the right to receive from it, go-
ing beyond the toll paid to elitism characterizing the ownership of the means of produc-
tion. But in the case of the society envisaged by the French author, unevenness among 
worker capacities, technological innovations and variability of demand would bring 
about an equivalent inequality because they compromise, again, «equality of participa-
tion in the product»: 
Suppose for a moment that there is no more competition and consequently no 
longer any means to ascertain the minimum of labour necessary for the produc-
tion of a commodity; what will happen? It will suffice to spend six hours work 
on the production of an object, in order to have the right, according to M. Proud-
hon, to demand in exchange six times as much as he who has taken only one 
hour to produce the same object
191
. 
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   In a similar scenario what is determined as the economic value of something is in 
function of certain elements developed as contingent and arbitrary tools by “preceding” 
authorities. Such an economic value can only be constructed through a system of values 
inherited from the preceding arbitrary authority. In this case, in fact, Proudhon engaged 
himself in an examination of the “natural” needs and merits of a worker and tried to im-
prove the method to fulfil them. The problem is that such an improvement appears as an 
inevitable “reaction” to, and new articulation of, elements proper of the old system of 
authorities and of what has developed – within this system – such as the awareness of 
the needs and merits of a worker. Such an awareness and its new articulation, therefore, 
carry with themselves all the partiality and arbitrariness typical of any arbitrary system 
of authorities. The arbitrariness is expressed, in this case, by the circularity of the argu-
ment whereby the pure measure of labour-time of a worker – in function, at least within 
a capitalist system, of a calculus of what is needed to maintain her performing this 
amount of labour-time - represents the index of how much a worker contributes to and 
needs to receive from society because such a measure represents the “index” of the 
worker’s effort and, therefore, utility. 
Proudhon tried to fulfil the necessities which a certain image of the Other, of the prole-
tarian, appeared to recall by making that index as fair and equal as possible. Proudhon’s 
purpose was, in the end, to set a typology of calculus whereby the merits and the neces-
sities expressed by a certain image of the Other can be fulfilled. His primary proposal 
was, therefore, to impose a fair reward for what has been perceived as the contribution 
of a worker to society. But the intention of granting equal degrees of reward to equal 
times of labour to any worker – not merely in function of the minimum necessary to 
maintain the individual working the necessary time to realise a precise product – main-
tains the same circularity of argument. It rearticulates the same arbitrariness as certain 
conceptions of “contribution” and “effort” which do not take into account that a pure 
calculus of the time necessary to produce something is not coincident with a calculus of 
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the individual effort of each worker, nor with each individual contribution or need from 
society. To neglect the fundamental bearing of contingent factors such as different lev-
els of worker capabilities, different levels of technologies and variability of demand 
makes Proudhon’s proposal potentially contain the same kind of imperfections in the 
calculus of the economic value of an individual’s work which underlie situations of dis-
parity - typical of a class society - such as the ones which even Adam Smith explicitly 
recognizes: «Though the manufacturer has his wages advanced to him by his master, he, 
in reality, costs him no expense, the value of those wages being generally restored, to-
gether with a profit, in the improved value of the subject upon which his labour is be-
stowed»
192
. 
 
 
5 – Economy of the Other as a function of previous distribution of interests and po-
tentialities. The case of Venezuela 
 
 
A - The material dialectic of the formation of the Other 
 
The major purpose of the present chapter is to analyse how the effort to do justice to the 
“singular” naturalness of the other cannot be, in principle, ethically or ontologically dif-
ferent from the evolution of the authority of a dialectical thought. The manifestation of 
the other as a certain particular, arbitrary authority compels us, in fact, to face the aporia 
whereby any desiring authority composes its desires on the basis of a certain arbitrary 
context of dominance and economic opportunities which “appear” to it, but which are as 
contingent and “ideological” as a dialectical form of reason. Hence, the impossibility of 
deciding whether to give credit or not to the awareness of what would be preferable to 
do for such an individual authority. In the case of the authority hypothesised by Proud-
hon, for instance, within its “naturalness”, the perception of elements such as different 
demand and technologies are not involved. The awareness of the importance of these 
factors is brought by the “naturalness” of other numerous authorities – not necessarily 
different individuals in respect of the former. The question, nevertheless, is studied not 
from a point of view of involving “self-awareness” in a classic sense, but from the view 
of a purely pragmatic success of the relation of forces which an authority is. 
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What I am reformulating here is the concept of Marxist «class consciousness». In this 
new sense, an authority’s failure to “be conscious” of socio-economic mechanisms – as 
mechanisms of power - which make it suffer in a given situation is not the result of an 
incapability of grasping what “reality” is. It is, rather, the consequence of numerous au-
thorities – with their individual logic and naturalness – continuously overlapping each 
other and pragmatically interfering with each other’s “ideal” - to some extent “private” 
– naturalness. Seen from this point of view, the failure of an authority is just a prag-
matic failure, due to the fact that its singular, secret conception of what the world 
should be collides pragmatically with pragmatic instruments and visions of naturalness 
proper of other changing authorities. 
In the case I have been referring to, what would be “natural” to conceive for certain au-
thorities within the “secret” of their singularity is that, in order to obtain equal rewards 
for a production, it is sufficient to realize equal pure psychophysical times of effort– in-
dependently of the level of technology and ability used, as well as from the exact rate of 
demand for a product. This conception clearly assumes elements which are definitely 
arbitrary, the respect of which would lead Proudhon’s ideal scenario to represent a situa-
tion where society would distribute “from each according to his ability, to each accord-
ing to his need”. This would be the ideal result, in effect, if one presupposes that any 
worker goes through her entire work-time in a perfectly honest performance, fully ex-
ploiting her working capacities, as well as honestly and correctly following the available 
information about the typology and amount of her market demand. An authority of the 
other, such as the one acknowledged by Proudhon, needs to perceive as prevailing – 
within its own private, singular conception of naturalness, of what is preferable to do – 
these elements or elements of similar features in order to match the relevance of the dif-
ference in the respective capacities and technologies within the goal of a just society. 
The continuous clash of “this arbitrary other” with other arbitrary authorities and kinds 
of naturalness makes the economic weight of an act such as the «gift to the other with-
out calculation» recommended by Derrida as similar or equivalent to the one proper of a 
dialectical restricted economy decontextualizing itself. 
Derridean “phenomenology” of the authentic moment of gift seeks to outline an eco-
nomic decision which, even though it always has to carry out a type of calculus «related 
to the economy», also always interrupts the “public”, common restricted «economic cir-
cle» - supposing that, given Derrida’s premises, one can talk about one public system of 
exchange or reciprocity: 
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Now the gift, if there is any, would no doubt be related to economy. One cannot 
treat the gift, this goes without saying, without treating this relation to economy, 
even to the money economy. But is not the gift, if there is any, also that which 
interrupts economy? That which, in suspending economic calculation, no longer 
gives rise to exchange? That which opens the circle so as to defy reciprocity or 
symmetry, the common measure, and so as to turn aside the return in view of the 
no-return? If there is gift. the given of the gift (that which one gives, that which 
is given, the gift as given thing or as act of donation) must not come back to the 
giving (let us not already say to the subject, to the donor). It must not circulate, it 
must not be exchanged, it must not in any case be exhausted, as a gift, by the 
process of exchange, by the movement of circulation of the circle in the form of 
return to the point of departure
193
. 
   The problem we face is that any «interruption of an economy» already means to rely 
on an awareness of another arbitrary authority or of a conflict between authorities, each 
of them with its proper and arbitrary conception of what the economic value of labour 
or of a product is or should be. This value is “arbitrary” because it is always represented 
by a certain social feature which is seen as valuable per se in order to mirror what jus-
tice should be, despite the fact that it is already the product of certain imbalances of dis-
tribution of resources and instruments. In the case of Proudhon such a value – and social 
feature - is the amount of individual effort-time spent in doing a job. But it is already 
the result of different capabilities and technological opportunities, distributed in an arbi-
trary and contingent way. The predictable outcome of such an imbalance is, in fact, the 
pragmatic dissatisfaction of other authorities throughout time. 
The specific preference of a value comes from the particular and private constitution of 
an authority, from its “singular” environment and “nature”. The arbitrary perception of 
what would be valuable per se according to an authority is not the product of an “illu-
sion” compared to the “real” nature of things. It is what would be, “in general”, natural 
to be and to do if all the other events of authorities possessed the same naturalness as 
the former event of authority. This elucidation may appear redundant, but it is important 
in order to understand that scepticism towards Derrida’s aporetic calculus in function of 
the Other does not arise from the supposition of a possible “more competent” and scien-
tific authority than the contingent singular other. It is not coming from an attempt to 
overcome contingency but, rather, from an acknowledgment of the impossibility of off-
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setting contingency effects through a justification of an ethically preferable general atti-
tude, even though it be aporetic. 
The determination of the “singularity” of the Other is, moreover, problematic. Although 
any event-of-the-other is singular, any rupture which an event performs has to hold a 
justification of itself as a reaction to a transformation of a preceding arbitrary authority. 
The new event has to maintain signs of the preceding proper naturalness and arbitrari-
ness, since it arises by including and adjusting this latter. As with any dialectical event 
of improving an absolute Reason, an event of the other is a re-articulation of certain ar-
bitrary socio-economic criteria of assessment as intrinsically valuable into other criteria 
which are justified, in their features, by their being a reaction to the previous authority. 
Such dynamics of justification of an arbitrariness through another is what makes the act 
of confining a “singularity” difficult, not only in the sense that this latter’s contingent 
character is never just «its own», as Derrida would agree. It makes that confinement dif-
ficult also because a justification through preceding arbitrary characters is an arbitrary 
inter-referential justification. That is to say, again, a justification which assumes – in a 
reaction to a preceding submission to an arbitrary kind of dominance - certain socio-
economic needs and behaviours as less contingent and takes, therefore, a certain group 
of characters as intrinsically valuable in order to realise an improvement. This inter-
referentiality makes a logic-of-the-other likely to be justified “a priori”, indifferent of 
the possibility that a certain Other may already develop – or involve in its social rela-
tionships - other “naturalnesses”, through the manifestation of its spectres, instead of 
drawing a suitable outcome from the application of “its” arbitrary logic. An inter-
referential justification, once it imposes itself within an attitude of “openness to the 
other”, is always in danger of conferring its violent identity to any coming of the other. 
The problem of discerning “where” the gift unconditionally given to the other begins to 
turn to poison is the question of examining to what extent an event of the “other” can be 
treated as a singularity to be hosted under a certain logic without violating - with an ar-
bitrary preferability - the legitimacy of the changing authorities forming that event. 
 
 
The event of the Other is an expression of needs and interests which remain blind to cer-
tain contingent imbalances of power already intrinsic in the social structures revealing 
such needs and interests. This indifference is doomed to remain such until those imbal-
ances are practically perceived as an annoyance by other contingent coming “others”. A 
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situation of this sort is likely to occur when the perception of a greater popular eco-
nomic wellbeing is commonly associated with access to precise typologies of goods or 
instruments. 
It is useful, therefore, to have a look at one of the conceptions of the justice to the 
“other” in the state of Venezuela, in which the respect of ordinary and low class-citizen 
necessities has been coupled with the public exploitation of an economic device inter-
preted as the main and most productive national resource: oil industry. 
 
In effect, the prevalence of a situation in which a government supplies high gasoline 
subsidies in order to maintain its price low – with all the collateral imbalances which it 
produces – is often easily explained as a cultural attitude whereby the “awe” and respect 
of the singular, private necessity and sovereignty of the other is to be preferred to gen-
eral, common-sense economic rules: 
we identify potential reasons behind the persistence of this situation: the “Cara-
cazo” of 1989, a three‐day long set of riots, looting and fierce police and military 
repression, triggered by an unexpected increase in gasoline prices, remains in the 
psyche of politicians and citizens alike. There’s, then, a prevalent belief that 
given that Venezuela is a major oil producer its citizens have the right to access 
fuel at cheaper prices [...]The subsidy has been utilized to effectively appease the 
urban middle and upper classes as well as the transport sector; the latter being a 
highly organized and effective pressure group
194
. 
   Through a survey of the economic history of the country, one can ascertain how the 
conditions of possibility of such «prevalent belief» and «appeasement» also explain the 
origin of the arbitrariness of this conception of doing «justice to the other». 
Even though it is empirically “public”, the choice of Venezuelan governments would 
work well within the sphere of an ethics whereby the reason of a decision of responsi-
bility ought to remain “secret”, in the sense that it has to dismiss any general economic 
guideline and focus on the calculus of the singular, contingent preferability of a certain 
other. In this respect, the arbitrariness of the sacrifice to the other assumes the features 
of its being “arbitrary” because it is publicly contrasted with general, common-sense 
economic alternatives. These, in turn, are refused by the perpetrator of the decision be-
cause their justification appears to discriminate the singularity of the other, because they 
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appear to be arbitrary compared with the other. The character of undecidability, of apo-
ria in the problem of choosing between two arbitrary authorities concerning a similar 
scenario has nothing to do with rhetoric or with an exaggeration of hyper-philosophical 
languages: it reflects a head-on conflict between authorities whose justifications stem 
from the possible acceptance of values which are inter-referentially explained as eco-
nomically preferable. Such an economic conflict, is often not the product of two or more 
monolithic ideologies clashing with each other, nor simply the consequence of a com-
munication failure in the dialogue between different economic schools and experts; it is 
the manifestation, first of all, of different “naturalnesses”, different legitimacies – in the 
inter-referentiality of the justification of a value as preferable - which find their explana-
tion in historically functioning and “real” – not “false” or illusory – economic struc-
tures. 
 
Let us see, first of all, how the case of Venezuela can be described as an outcome of a 
widespread reliance on the natural potentialities of a technology, a reliance which is at 
the root of the later pledge to carry out, in order to do justice to the other, precise socio-
economic values within Venezuelan society.  
It is important to notice that several studies which attribute Venezuela’s economic de-
velopment, from the Thirties onwards, to the oil industry cannot separate the socio-
economic exploitation of this technology from a certain circularity in the rationality 
proper of the economic policies concerning it. In fact, the contribution of the oil indus-
try to the economy – and, in general, the growth of the overall economy of the country - 
has been handled and improved mostly through policies whose aims have been justified 
by criteria focused on the good functioning of the oil industry itself, rather than on an 
overall productive and growing society. Venezuela seems to have suffered what Aki-
yama, Mitchell and Varangis refer to as unsustainability of commodity booms: 
the economy of developing countries are heavily dependent on commodities [...] 
When revenues from commodities exports increase, governments are tempted to 
make long-term spending commitments based on what turn out to be short-term 
price rises[...] In the post-oil boom Nigeria of the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
shortfall of revenues was so severe that external borrowing had risen dramati-
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cally even before oil prices began to fall. It was much the same story in Vene-
zuela[...]
195
 
   The decision of the country’s governors to interpret the “natural”, pragmatically pref-
erable economic development of Venezuela in function of an efficacious functioning of 
the oil industry technology not only meant to imprudently rely on its revenues. This de-
cision engendered, above all, the material construction of economic tools and organiza-
tions in which natural skills, labour forces and technology really could only work – at 
least in their immediate “natural” appearance, operating as such within the perception of 
certain authorities - in function of petroleum exports and its behaviour. It coincided with 
the creation, among Venezuelan classes, of particular, material social and economic de-
sires and needs which those people perceived to be their “natural” one within Venezue-
lan society. 
To this corresponded, also, the limited creation of alternative export sectors and, there-
fore, the creation of highly specialized sources and ways of creating wealth and em-
ployment. The text I have just quoted refers to this as a process which undermined the 
national diversification effort – or, we could say, modified its natural-pragmatic capa-
bilities: «Another problem associated with commodity booms is a slowdown in diversi-
fication. Since producers often have few investment alternatives, windfall revenues are 
invested in the booming commodity subsectors – even when producers are aware that 
the boom is temporary. This can lead to overcapacity and much lower prices later and 
can have long term effects on a country’s diversification efforts»
196
. 
The growth of the oil sector and the utility it had in the transformation of Venezuela 
into an industrialized country, therefore, cannot be detached from the creation of pro-
ductive tools and habits which ended up as prevalently dependent on the performance of 
petroleum exports. What the development of that sector created was, in other words, 
what for Venezuela was “natural” to produce and exploit. 
In a study analysing the correlation between the economic expansion, and sudden col-
lapse, of the country and the preponderance of oil exports, Hausmann and Rodríguez 
highlight that factors which were consequent to the fall of oil export - such as the lack 
of alternative exports and fall in capital stock - triggered Venezuela’s economic decline 
at the end of the Seventies. These were not “side effects” of its economic context but in-
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trinsic failures of the type of organizations, technologies and growth – of the “nature” - 
Venezuela chose to achieve: 
Venezuela’s inability to develop an alternative export industry has to do with its 
starting pattern of specialization. Countries are able to enter new export markets 
only if the new goods are similar to those that it currently produces. It is only in 
that way that it can take advantage of its specialized inputs, technical knowledge, 
and institutional configuration in producing a good that it has not produced be-
fore. The existing patterns of specialization of countries will have an effect on 
the emergence of new export goods. Some countries will have the luck of pro-
ducing goods that are similar to many other high-value goods. They will thus 
have little trouble shifting production to those new goods. Other countries, in 
contrast, will occupy sparser regions of the product space, in which few goods 
are sufficiently similar to those that they currently produce. Venezuela – like 
most oil exporting countries – occupies such a region
197
 
   To say that the difficulty of shifting production when the oil revenues started declin-
ing is an “intrinsic” effect of the type of technological organization in Venezuela does 
not mean that the possibility of a different investment policy during its history could 
have been excluded as unattainable. It means that the pragmatic attitude pushing the 
economic actors of this country throughout a large part of the twentieth century re-
sponded to a certain convenient structure of development which supposed a certain ra-
tionality, part of which corresponded to the neglect of certain other kinds of technology. 
It means that the «contingent necessity» proper of certain “Venezuelan” authorities co-
incided with a structure which revealed itself as pragmatically fallacious only because 
other authorities – in this case, the ones which, in an international context, contributed 
to the fall of oil revenues – contingently intersected their naturalness with that “Vene-
zuelan” «contingent necessity». This intrinsicality does not even imply that the eco-
nomic authorities were conscious of such a lack “hidden” within Venezuelan society 
and decided to push toward the ‘ideal’ just described anyway. It entails that their actions 
constituted a certain, again, «contingent necessity», a structure in the organization of 
their context whereby, by then, it was inevitable to react to difficulties in a limited spec-
trum of ways, given its “naturalness”: 
                                                          
197
 Husmann and Rodriguez 2014, Pp. 28-29. 
108 
 
 
 
had there existed an alternative export sector in Venezuela in 1980, the growth of 
that sector would have played a stabilizing role in the country’s reaction to fal-
ling oil revenues. In its absence, the domestic economy had to react to adverse 
oil shocks by contractions in domestic production. Theory predicts that this 
process will continue until (i) the fall in oil revenues is halted (ii) the real ex-
change rate falls sufficiently to make the production of non-oil tradable competi-
tive
198
 
   Notice, again, that this is not the same as saying that an alternative was in general im-
possible to implement, either during an oil revenue shock or to prevent its effects. The 
restriction is not to be found in the overall spectrum of possibilities but, instead, in the 
awareness of the involved authorities, in their conception of the “material” necessities 
of the country. An awareness which is produced – but not strictly determined - by con-
tingent “daily” – Marx would say – material conditions and distribution of resources. 
 
 
B – Response to the Other as an (apparently) necessary dialectic 
 
Such “material conditions” of reaction have been structuring the arbitrary move identi-
fiable with a gift to the other in Venezuela. A “disappearance” of the possibility of any 
diversification effort within the industrial planning of Venezuela, in effect, settled an 
economic structure where an attempt to develop a modern, post-industrialization level 
of well-being among lower and middle classes could seemingly resort to two alterna-
tives. 
One of them has been to try to maintain, in any case, the benefits obtainable from the oil 
industry completely focused on directly supporting people’s “quality of life”, by means 
of subsidies and lower gasoline prices. The popular pressure which has been character-
izing these kinds of measures has been driven, we will soon see, by the fact that the 
other well-known significant alternative, in order to achieve similar social goals, turned 
out to be a resort to a certain arbitrary “authority”, as arbitrary as relying on a specific 
functioning of the oil trade. 
Let me remark, again, that the inability to create different products to sustain the econ-
omy was, by that time, fruit not only of a “mental” obstacle but, above all, of a material 
distribution of instruments which made it “harder” to conceive a Venezuelan natural 
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propensity as different from the established perception: «A first look at export perform-
ance since the 1980s seems to suggest that there has been some growth of non-oil ex-
ports during the period of collapse, as would be expected by the models discussed in the 
previous section. However, the growth has been unexceptional by just about any stan-
dard»
199
. The work by Hausmann and Rodríguez also provides a technical explanation 
of why Venezuela was unable to shift – in order to maintain a certain well-being among 
its people – to the production of new kinds of exports: 
why was Venezuela incapable of experiencing a similar productive transforma-
tion? Answering this question requires a theory of the evolution of comparative 
advantage. [...] Such a theory has been proposed recently by Hausmann and 
Klinger [...]Countries are more likely to develop a comparative advantage in 
goods that are “closer” to the goods that they currently produce. Theoretically, 
we would say that two goods are close to each other if the specialized inputs 
necessary to produce one can also be used to produce the other
200
 
   The study continues illustrating through two formulae the method Hausmann and 
Klinger propose in order to estimate what goods are exported together and with what 
frequency. According to the empirical criteria they use, «formally, product similarity is 
given by the minimum of the conditional probabilities of exporting one type of goods 
given that you are exporting the other one»
201
. This measure of proximity, consequently, 
«can be used to build an indicator of the value of unexploited opportunities for export 
that can be particularly useful in our study»
202
. Such a measure, which they call a coun-
try “open forest”, «thus captures the flexibility of an economy’s export basket, in that it 
measures the value of the goods that it could be producing with the inputs that it cur-
rently devotes to its export production. Open forest is particularly appropriate for think-
ing about an economy’s capacity to react to adverse export shocks context»
203
. Such an 
index is, for Venezuela as for most oil exporting countries, very low, as shown in a dia-
gram in the same text
204
. 
To sum up: the political decision – maintained throughout the middle part of the twenti-
eth century – to construct Venezuela’s economic development around the oil industry 
created certain material structures and social interests, functional to this context. These 
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acquired the feature of been the “natural” structure of the country’s economic system 
and this has appeared in the fact that its economic life, since then, has been managed in 
function of the allocation of interests, resources and capabilities arisen in this context. 
This was either because a change in the overall model was difficult to implement or, one 
may suppose, because of simpler questions such as seeming personal convenience by 
the actors. Such allocation of interests, resources and capabilities has been constituting 
the “daily” needs and desires of Venezuelan people and, probably, the awareness of 
what Venezuelan necessities and possibilities are in the minds of Venezuelan politicians 
– indifferently to the existence of a possibility of a structural change of the model. 
The second alternative in order to revitalize the country’s market and population well-
being has been to cling even more tightly the potentialities of Venezuela to a nature of 
typical one-commodity exporter country. That is to say, to openly acknowledge an in-
capacity of setting up other competitive typologies of production except by opening up 
national market and infrastructures to actors who own further instruments and whose 
authority involves investments in and utilisation of national human and natural re-
sources. In the face of «overcapacity of specialized production», in effect, «liberalizing 
and developing financial markets can provide alternative investments. Underdeveloped 
domestic financial and capital markets, however, may not be much of a problem if pro-
ducers can invest freely abroad»
205
. 
The character of necessity in such an economic development and the correlated deci-
sions – such as oil subsidies or «neo-liberal» policies – is the effect of the application of 
criteria which only consider interests and potentialities which are strictly in function of 
the “present” distribution of credit and resources. The most famous event representing a 
«neo-liberal» attempted policy and the perception of it by the population as an imposi-
tion of an arbitrary authority with its contingent preferable values was the 1989 presi-
dent of Venezuela Carlos Andrés Pérez’s choice to introduce elements of economic 
openness to foreign private investors – with the implied measures of austerity in order 
to assure such investors of the level of financial equilibrium and inflation of the country 
– and the well-known turmoil which followed in Caracas: 
in February 1989, president Carlos Andres Pérez, having just recently taken of-
fice for his second term, launched a neoliberal/free-market reform characterized 
as a “shock program” of economic austerity measures following the recommen-
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dations from the International Monetary Fund. Pérez’s Plan de Ajuste 
Economico lacked political support due to its sudden implementation. Most im-
portantly, the plan included the withdrawal of subsidies and price controls on a 
broad range of public services and consumer goods, including gasoline prices. 
The reform also initiated the apertura, or the opening of the economy to the 
world, once again allowing PDVSA [Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima, 
the nationalized oil and gas Venezuelan industry] to enter into joint ventures 
with foreign companies and allowing private investors back into the Venezuelan 
oil and gas industry. The government’s austerity measures, coupled with the 
sudden increase in consumer prices, and fuelled by the perception of the gov-
ernment continuously mismanaging funds contributed to mounting tensions 
among the new middle-class poor
206
. 
   The popular perception of the inadequacy of private enterprise business in playing an 
economically equitable role in the recovery of the national market can be reduced to a 
mere “ideological” issue – a nationalist-anti-neoliberal impetus – only if one abstracts 
ones reasoning from the “pragmatic structures” which constitute the singular natural-
ness of most Venezuelan people. Austerity, price control, liberalization of market and 
full or partial privatizations of companies could take on the role of reliable factors in or-
der to trigger a suitable improvement of productivity for Venezuelan people only if the 
values assumed as circularly preferable-per-se which they bring – the creation of private 
enterprises capitalising on pre-existing resources by means of new material-financial 
tools - could be applied to the “nature” of the Venezuelans purely in function of an 
achievement of what would be preferable to do for them. 
We would need to suppose, in a similar case, the certainty that the production and dis-
tribution of resources of these new activities – through a suitable choice of the alloca-
tion of the investments, equitable worker compensations, etc. – have as an end only a 
fulfilment of the Venezuelan’s needs and desires. An end which has to be the fruit of a 
“direct” calculation and not an assumed “necessary effect” or side-effect of the imple-
mentation of the value of «creation of private enterprises capitalising on pre-existing re-
sources by means of new material-financial tools» itself. In this latter case, in fact, these 
measures would reflect a situation which can be compared with what Derrida would re-
proach as a dialectical prejudice, a close economic circle, an ethic manifestation of the 
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metaphysics of presence in which a stable structure of reality is imagined as teleologi-
cally revealing itself. 
That supposition, in fact, was unlikely to be accepted by the Venezuelan population. A 
dialectical logic is the very interpretation of the neo-liberal policies in Venezuela which 
can be drawn both from popular perception and from economic data and actors taking 
part in them. On the one hand, people were aware of the imbalances created by resource 
oligopolies and by wage and welfare restrictions in order to achieve international and 
financial competitiveness. From an institutional and political point of view, on the other 
hand, macroeconomic measures of public spending management, liberalizations and 
privatizations were economic criteria and values which were set up – and perceived – in 
the country not as a consequence of an unbiased calculus for an improvement of produc-
tion quality, but as a reaction justified only by a historical or social “dialectic” among 
authorities. That is to say, a reaction whose economic models and values are formed and 
justified only by referring, as parameters, to the immediate and contingent needs pro-
duced by the established imbalances of the country, without any grasp of an underlying 
– so to say - “unbiased” calculus of potentially higher benefits to be constructed through 
alternative economic methods. In the case of Venezuela of the Eighties such a circular 
logic can be traced in at least two elements. 
First, the country’s macroeconomic contingencies which I have described – caused by 
arbitrary decisions in production and marketing policies – brought, as we have seen, an 
insufficiency and misallocation of productive forces. These coincided with, on the one 
hand, weakness and under-exploitation of the potentialities of the overall Venezuelan 
economy compared with other economic actors and, on the other hand, an under-
development of potentialities among certain – or most - Venezuelan people. Added to 
this was an inequality of income which, moreover, worsened in the last quarter of the 
century. As to the regional distribution of income, «growth, especially at first, was 
highly concentrated in Caracas and in the areas where petroleum operations were taking 
place»
207
. Moreover, «in terms of wage income, a decline of over 30 percent in the real 
minimum wage of urban workers between 1980 and 1989 was accompanied by an in-
crease in urban unemployment of nearly 50 percent during the same time period»
208
. 
Within this picture, the criteria of management of resources in a liberalized and privat-
ized system strictly depend on the distribution of resources and interests which the ac-
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tors of the system are already able to “express” in that circumscribed time. In this way, 
an attempt at reanimating industrial efficiency and diversification needs to be strictly in 
function of the financial and technological resources already “distributed” to the actors 
who have to invest in it and in function of the interests they hold in consequence of such 
distribution. But, above all, the choices of these latter over what to produce, how to pro-
duce, where to produce and how much retribution to give to workers
209
 also depend on 
what workers will be willing to accept and desire in such an arbitrary allocation of re-
sources and interests. 
“Arbitrary”, this time, is used in comparison with the concrete economic interests an in-
dividual would perform in the case she were able to pursue what would be – according 
to her awareness - preferable to do or to be for her. “Desires” and “interests”, in this 
discussion, are in fact referred to as a description of the actual, existing interests a par-
ticular economic scenario forces an economic agent to follow. But even though this lat-
ter is a very technical, contextualized meaning of “interests”, its difference with the 
meaning of interest as «what an individual would prefer to be» is not logical-ontological 
but rather pragmatic. Both of them, in fact, are expressions of economic desires and ne-
cessities shaped and justified by their being a reaction to other contingent-arbitrary eco-
nomic parameters and lean on the same circular and dialectical logic of an arbitrariness 
shaped through another arbitrariness. But the pragmatic structure and functioning of the 
latter sense of interest is more useful to figure out a contingent calculus of how a greater 
total happiness within a community can be achieved. To examine what an economic 
agent «would prefer to do or to be» should not mean to legitimate another “ideal” au-
thority but to estimate the agent’s potentialities in the matter of goods production and 
consumption in order to feed them and balance them with the benefits of other authori-
ties. It should mean elaborate decisions which are not simply justified and shaped by 
“daily” interests and economic values formed by a certain distribution of resources and 
interests, and whose outcome will not be strictly in function of this previous arbitrary 
distribution. But, rather, decisions which are in function of a production of resources as 
beneficial as possible, utilizing indications given by the values of what would be prefer-
able to be and to create for individuals only in order to elaborate a way to produce and 
distribute suitable contextualized resources. 
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Although Perez’s reforms «were only partially implemented»
210
, they reflected the trust 
given to economic values – such as liberalizations, privatizations and spending reviews. 
These can only operate once the investors are allowed to simply carry out their eco-
nomic interests and potentialities, by making use of the contingent possibilities and in-
terests created within Venezuelan people and producers as a result of disproportions in 
abilities and incomes and limited technological diversification. Effectively, throughout 
the continent, according to G. Albo 
the social impacts of neoliberalism have been dismal. The processes of social ex-
clusion and polarisation that sharpened in the 1980s across Latin America have 
continued with faltering per capita incomes and massive informal sector growth, 
in the order of an astonishing 70-80 percent of new employment, to the present. 
Here Venezuela records the same numbing neoliberal patterns of reproduction of 
social inequality as elsewhere: some 80 percent of the population lives in pov-
erty, while 20 percent enjoy the oligarchic wealth produced by rentier oil reve-
nues; the worst performance in per capita GDP in Latin American from the late 
1970s to the present, with peak income levels cut almost in half; a collapse of ru-
ral incomes leading to massive migration into the cities, with close to 90 per cent 
of the population now in urban areas, particularly Caracas, one of the world’s 
growing catalogue of slum cities; 3/4 of new job growth estimated to be in the 
informal sector, where half of the working population is now said to ‘work’; and 
recorded unemployment levels (which have quite unclear meaning given the ex-
tent of reserve armies of under-employed in the informal economy) hovering be-
tween 15 to 20 per cent for a decade
211
. 
   A social “acceptance” of these consequences - shaped or even justified by the previ-
ous contingent economic distribution of resources-interests - is the very dialectical logic 
which, we can assume, has been rejected by citizens during forms of strife such as «el 
Caracazo» in 1989. 
A second element, in which we can trace a dialectical move of an authority justified and 
shaped only by the previous arbitrary distribution of resources is the diplomatic-
institutional aspect of the introduction of Perez’s reforms. It is the second facet of the 
same element, as a matter of fact. In this case the way in which the choice and the rami-
fications of an economic model were circularly in function of the preceding imbalanced 
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distribution of resource-interests is displayed in a very clear way by the “necessity” of 
the signing of the «draconic International Monetary Fund programs»
212
 due, as well as 
to the factors I have already explained, to the need to borrow to compensate the ex-
penses of renewing the huge foreign debt: 
when Perez assumed the presidency, Venezuela had almost $35 billion in foreign 
debt. As a consequence, a significant portion of Venezuela’s revenues was spent 
in servicing the debt. The president Perez was, therefore, forced to borrow 
money from the International Monetary Fund, which mandated drastic economic 
and fiscal reforms, especially in the areas of economic restructuring and the re-
duction of public spending. The government was forced to allow the Bolivar to 
devalue significantly, decree or allow drastic prices increases, reduce state subsi-
dies for public transportations and increase the price of gasoline
213
. 
   Again, that which influenced measures such as price increases and the reduction of 
subsidies was not a well-planned selection of what products and technologies would be 
suitable to invest in and, above all, it was not a well-planned effort to balance the 
“ideal” interests and desires of consumption of the workers with an efficient industrial 
growth. The character of logic necessity which exudes from this model of relations 
among international institutions reflects the actual interest of a lender or of an investor 
which only works in function of what a borrower will be willing and available to accept 
and desire given an arbitrary allocation of resources and of forced, “daily” interests. 
The dialectical logic proper of such an economic rationality is really at odds with any 
kind of «justice to the other», this rationality being explainable as a developing, con-
tinuation of preceding economic imbalances, of a preceding “general” structure of ra-
tionality which revealed itself as being arbitrary – or even harmful – compared with the 
other-Venezuelan citizen’s naturalness. To prosecute with a focus on instruments such 
as fossil-fuel subsidies and low prices corresponds, from the people’s point of view, to 
an act of faith in the Other’s «secret» rationality, to rely on the fact that the awareness of 
what would be preferable to do for the other - which in this case is the figure of Vene-
zuelan worker – would not clash with other authorities forming within the same histori-
cal context. 
This is a faith in the fact that, given the distortions created by Twentieth century Vene-
zuelan policies on oil industry, it is more reliable to leave to Venezuelans, to the major-
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ity of the country people, the possibility of feeding their own perceived naturalness, 
their own singular awareness of what would be preferable to be in a similar context and 
trust the economic development which a relative low expense of families could bring 
through a certain consequent aggregate demand stability. This is the faith in the hope – 
or assumption – that a lower-class stability and a sufficient demand to trigger some 
convenient production are more likely to occur in this case than in a situation where the 
logic of some authorities is able to work by arbitrarily developing a previous misalloca-
tion of potentialities. 
 
The reason why this model of thinking historically shows equivalent fallacies to a clas-
sical dialectical rationality is that the character of «arbitrarily developing a previous 
misallocation of potentialities» is not proper only of “neo-liberal” contexts but, rather, 
of any dialectical rise of authorities whose values are in function of their “daily” eco-
nomic interests. The Venezuelan case of protracted government subsidies, in fact, can 
be ascribed to the attitude for which an authority awareness of «what would be prefer-
able to do» is not studied in order to figure out a contingent calculus of how a greater 
total happiness within a community can be achieved, but from the point of view of its 
“forced”, restricted daily-life economic interests. 
One of the studies in which one can locate an attempt to outline and improve the circu-
lar, “dialectical” effects of a restricted way to “subsidize the other” typical of the Vene-
zuelan economy is the work by D. Barrios and J. Morales. Even though it relies heavily 
on the possibility that the government already has suitable methods and instruments to 
decide occupationally balanced and socially productive reallocation of resources – as 
well as on the absence of corruption within the democratic tools of the country – their 
proposal to «rethink the taboo» of gasoline policy in Venezuela is precious because it is 
based on data which clearly indicates the existence of “dialectical” characters in the ap-
plication of the subsidies. The magnitude of gasoline subsidies as well as the practical 
utility they stand for cannot help but be entangled with the existing ill-distributed social 
opportunities, interests and instruments with the result of keeping these latter constant 
or making them worse. 
The amount of the subsidies in comparison with GDP and the major social programme 
expenditures has been estimated as being such a large size
214
 that the actual way to as-
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sure the success of the social purpose of the subsidies overall is make sure that their 
benefits are perceived in an equitable way by all those citizens who are supposed to en-
joy such social programmes, so that a decently distributed well-being and a support of a 
diversified demand are achieved. The “ideal” economic scenario of such a «justice to 
the other» would imply that the aggregate utilisation of the subsidy benefits reflects the 
economic naturalness of each citizen and, in this way, that the national production of 
goods and social services would be stimulated in this direction. The intrinsic failure of 
such a view is displayed by the fact that even in this ideal case what would concretely 
express itself as “natural” economic needs, desires and interests while exploiting fuel 
subsidy benefits corresponds to daily-life and compelled interests. Namely, it would be 
strictly determined by a previous distribution of income, jobs, possibilities of purchas-
ing private vehicles, types of transportation means needed, geographic region and so on. 
As Barrios and Morales refer, for instance, 
regarding the distribution by type of use we find that well over half of the con-
sumption goes to private vehicles whilst the majority of intermediate demand 
goes to the transport of passengers [...]the richest 10% of the population benefits 
from a share of the subsidy for private vehicles 27 times larger than that of the 
poorest 10%. This differential would have equated in 2010 to a household in the 
richest 10% receiving an annual transfer of 2,431.35$ whilst a household in the 
poorest 10% would have received one of 162$. [...]Meanwhile, we have that in 
the case of the transport of goods the richest 10% of the population accounts for 
a share of the subsidy that is 14.6 times that of the poorest 10%. [...]Regarding 
the approximate geographic distribution of the country’s private vehicles, and 
potentially the gasoline utilized by such vehicles, we find that over 54% of pri-
vate vehicles are concentrated in Miranda, Zulia and the Capital District. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Diesel Subsidy 0.30% 
Citizen Safety Expenditure 0.34% 
Transport and Communications Expenditure 0.52% 
Tertiary Education Expenditure** 1.54% 
Health Expenditure** 2.02% 
Valuation of All Social Mission Transfers* 2.30% 
Primary and Secondary Education Expenditure** 2.51% 
Gasoline Subsidy 3.16% 
Constitutional Transfers to the Regions 3.31% 
Total Fuel Subsidy 3.46% 
Sources: ONAPRE, PDVSA, MENPET, BCV, BLS and EIA 
* Latest available values are for 2009 when the overall fuel subsidy represented 2.52% of GDP 
** These expenditures also account for budgeted social missions expenditures in these areas» (Barrios 
and Morales 2012, P. 7). 
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[...]Furthermore, we find that in these areas, despite a higher vehicle penetration, 
the consumption of gasoline for private vehicles is even more concentrated in the 
richest income groups of the population
215
. 
   It is clear that a social exploitation of the greatest national resource is compromised at 
its roots by the arbitrary social structure originating the Other to which such a measure 
would be addressed. What is perceived as justice to the economic rights and needs of 
the other is, from the very start of its functioning, displaced from its economic meaning 
because any authority of the other able to be outlined within the Venezuelan context is 
based on an awareness of naturalness coinciding with partial, daily-life, compelled and 
restricted interests. These interests do not reflect a calculus of the total potentialities of 
individuals and of the total balanced benefits and happiness which can be achieved from 
those. 
For this reason, the final suggestion of Barrios’ and Morales’ work is a gradual increase 
in gasoline prices and the preparation of a revenue investment strategy, in which the 
main trade-off to be faced in managing revenues is that of long term impact vs. short-
term political stability
216
. It is a suggestion, in any case, which attempts to step back 
both from the arbitrariness of an explicit neoliberal approach and from a traditional sub-
sidy policy, this latter being the fruit of the perception of an arbitrary naturalness of the 
economy of a country, due to a particular distribution of material resources and oppor-
tunities. 
 
A responsibility toward the other in a Derridean sense, a secret relying on the other’s 
authority is always in danger of neglecting a rigorous economic calculus which tries to 
take into account all the socio-economic opportunities – and to make a balance among 
them – , which may be not-perceived by a simple focus on the coming singularity of the 
“other”. It is a historical fact that in Venezuela a tendency to support a certain natural-
ness of – and therefore a certain “gift” to – the other has precluded and is precluding 
any valid alternative to recover a decent capacity of production – not only a “neo-
liberal” dialectical one. The praise of a general attitude “only” because it displays a re-
sponsibility toward the coming “other” may fail – despite Derrida’s intentions – to con-
sider all invisible spectres of the others, that is to say the potential capacities or contin-
gently natural attitudes to produce and distribute economic resources in a way which is 
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not strictly in function of the interests rising from their existing distribution. What is 
needed is a production of resources and services the use of which does not closely de-
pend on the previous allocation of credit and abilities. Also a policy of production 
which, instead, continuously creates or re-creates credit and abilities, according to a 
transparent public survey of short-term and long-term preferences among citizens con-
cerning the production of goods and services. Training, education and technological re-
search need to be in function only of a similar survey, rather than of stimuli created by 
previous specific allocation of credit, daily-life interests and possibilities. We must ex-
amine practical methods which can function as the purpose of breaking – as much as 
possible – the “circle of misallocation of interests” compared with total potentialities.  
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         III 
Pragmatism as an analysis of the instrumental imbalances in intersubjective 
agreements. The importance of the concept of exchange economy 
 
 
In this chapter I specify how the prevalence of some authorities’ naturalness in social 
decisions compromises a really pragmatist attitude. Such a prevalence can be described 
by means of the dialectics of reciprocal agreement among individuals who have access 
to differently powerful and useful instruments and, in general, to instruments which are 
not optimized in their overall social usefulness. I then point out that the task of looking 
for a genuine pragmatic thought needs to privilege, in the first place at least, issues con-
cerning exchange economy. The concept of “instrumental maximization of reciprocal 
bargaining power” is, moreover, found to be consistent with the task of equality and 
with the idea of an ethical progress which optimizes the comprehension of what can be 
most satisfying for the economic actors, in contrast with the dangerous outcomes of 
Rorty’s privilege of the figure of the liberal-ironist and of Derrida’s reliance on the au-
thority of the Other. 
 
 
1 - The dialectical structure of the acceptance of an authority 
 
In this paragraph, I will give a first definition of a dialectical attitude in relation to 
Rorty’s neo-pragmatism and Derrida’s responsibility to the Other’s singularity. The aim 
is to explain how an understanding of dialectics can assist in the definition of economic 
relations of power. Here, dialectics means a transformation of rationality, thanks to an 
abstraction of a particular perception of necessity and desires, from the overall account 
of current and potential necessity and desires. After the manifestation of a contradiction, 
this consists in searching for what is a desirable relation of some authorities to their con-
text, according to their contingent “naturalness”. An authority in this sense is any social 
actor who is able to make a claim for a pragmatic transformation according to what it is 
“natural” for her to desire. For example, in a state where a group is unemployed and 
destitute, the group can constitute itself as an authority making the claim for a pragmatic 
change in the state of society such that the group’s desire for employment and suste-
nance be acknowledged. 
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Given this definition of dialectics, I have been arguing that Hegelian dialectics, and a 
neo-pragmatist and deconstructionist attitude, have difficulty in answering the following 
questions while remaining consistent with their purpose of doing justice to authorities: 
 
• How is “what is desirable for an authority” determined, and in what sense? 
• What gives an authority the right to decide and evaluate what are “desirable rela-
tions” for her and/or for the other? And, consequently, 
• How can the claims of all authorities be integrated without appeal to violence? 
• Finally, how can violence be avoided in relation to the demands of some coming 
authorities, that is to say, in Derrida’s terms, in relation to the spectres of some coming 
authorities? 
I have suggested an answer to the first question: the legitimacy of an authority is con-
structed through an awareness of a certain contextual “naturalness” or pragmatic prefer-
ability. This naturalness has to refer to the awareness of some contingent necessities and 
desires, arbitrarily determined by a random disposition of roles within a community. A 
random disposition of roles, in fact, provides any authority with a perception of – and 
with a certain possibility of claiming –what she currently needs and desires, which is a 
reaction to the particular condition of her social role. In this sense, such perception and 
claiming are an abstraction from other potential needs and desires which this authority 
would be able to perceive and claim while performing another social role. There is 
therefore a risk of violence to hidden or invisible potentialities, or to other authorities’ 
spectres that can never be dispelled, even when relying on a Derridean obsessive open-
ness to the Other’s coming. In fact, since this latter openness concerns nothing more 
than a continuous becoming conscious of the ongoing modification of some authorities, 
it cannot help but rely on a contingent arbitrary awareness of necessities and desires. 
The determination of desirability is therefore aporetic because the necessary attempt to 
be open is always bound to fail. 
 
I now want to focus on the practical, material and instrumental manifestations of such 
an aporetic way of determining that which is a desirable advancement within a commu-
nity. What has been argued throughout the text, moreover, needs to be further systema-
tized to make clear that a criticism of any dialectical prejudice inherent in the choice of 
a preferable value or attitude has, by “definition”, a socio-political and pragmatic aim. It 
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ultimately has the scope of identifying, beyond any arbitrary awareness, the individual’s 
highest potential desires which can be possibly fulfilled.  
 
In order to do that, I will have recourse to the concept of “dialectical equivalence” as 
formulated by Adorno in Negative Dialectic. This concept, in fact, can help to explain 
that the dialectical move of abstracting some desires from all the others potentially pre-
sent within a society can take the form of 
1) A pacific compromise and equilibrium among the “arbitrary” desires which each 
authority perceives in response to her particular role, or 
2) An act of an explicit submission of some authorities under the desires and claims 
of other ones. 
A conceptual identity is the submission of elements of different value – or, to be consis-
tent with the terminology of this text, of different pragmatic repercussions – under the 
same conceptual category or under an equivalent level of worthiness, either in a legal or 
in a moral context. Such an equivalence ensures that these elements can be economi-
cally exchanged or legally treated as equivalent. Some examples are: the equivalence of 
income for different times of labour or for jobs of different degrees of danger and effort; 
the legal or cultural equivalence of financial loans, independently of whether the bor-
rower is, say, a householder unfortunately excluded from the labour market or a bank 
performing a financial leverage; the legal equivalence of tax evasion, independently of 
the type of motive provoking it. A conceptual identity is simply, also, the equivalence 
between a certain amount of wage and the correspondent labour time needed to earn it, 
or the equivalence between an amount of charged loan interest with the “effort” of 
granting a loan. 
A critical reflection over a speculative identity is defined by Adorno as an «identifying 
act of judgment whether the concept does justice to what it covers».
217
 The lack of jus-
tice which Adorno contemplates here refers to the different levels of pragmatic satisfac-
tion which are “exchanged” through any of these conceptual identities. In a more com-
plex way, though, these equivalences are unjust because the economic desire which 
each of them satisfies consists in an abstraction from all the other desires which the im-
plicit naturalness of any involved actor could potentially conceive and claim, given a set 
of instruments which can offer her the opportunity of a “spontaneous” maximization of 
her satisfaction. In fact, if we define as “natural” the pragmatic situation which would 
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be most desirable for an individual, what is “natural” for her is what she would sponta-
neously prefer in respect to other things. Rigorously speaking, therefore, these equiva-
lences negate “justice” to the overall naturalness which is proper of each involved indi-
vidual. 
A dialectical identification is practically described by Adorno as the institution of a bar-
ter principle in an exchange between some individuals. The problem of the production 
of wealth and of its adequate compensation stands out: 
The barter principle, the reduction of human labour to the abstract universal con-
cept of average working hours, is fundamentally akin to the principle of identifi-
cation. Barter is the social model of the principle, and without the principle there 
would be no barter; it is through barter that non-identical individuals and per-
formances become commensurable and identical. The spread of the principle im-
poses on the whole world an obligation to become identical, to become total. [...] 
. From olden times, the main characteristic of the exchange of equivalents has 
been that unequal things would be exchanged in its name, that the surplus value 
of labour would be appropriated. 
218
 
   But how are the terms of any “barter” decided? And for what reason does the desire 
which each exchange satisfies end up consisting in an abstraction from all the other de-
sires which the implicit naturalness of any involved actor could potentially conceive and 
claim?  
The equivalence establishing the terms of the barter is set by the reciprocal bargaining 
power of the economic agents involved in the exchange. Such a bargaining power can 
have one of these two aspects, which reflect the two forms of dialectical move which I 
recalled above: 
 
1)  Purely political power. This consists in the political legitimacy obtained by an 
authority thanks to a community’s empathy in regard to certain necessities and desires 
determined by the contingent naturalness of the community. The legislative power 
which follows from that endows such an authority, by definition, with institutional in-
struments and power which are effective enough in order to have the upper hand in a 
social bargaining. This bargaining power can establish conceptual equivalences by law 
such as the amount of retirement fund an individual “deserves” to receive from society, 
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the minimum wage an employee has to receive, the “adequate” amount of unemploy-
ment benefit; 
2)  Economic power given by the possession of economic instruments which can 
offer a larger spectrum of modalities and situations for obtaining wealth with respect to 
other instruments. This is the field of, for instance, the power to increase the price of a 
possessed building during a property bubble or the power to obtain a surplus-value from 
her workers’ labour by an entrepreneur. Note that the function of the first kind of power 
is also, by definition, to legally legitimize the second one. 
219
 
 
In each of these cases a dialectical equivalence is determined by the prevalence of an 
authority’s bargaining power. Such a power stems from the act of accepting– by other 
authorities – the distribution of goods and services proposed by the first authority in re-
sponse to some perceived needs and desires. The reason why individuals accept a pro-
posed distribution of resources can be - in correspondence with the two categories of 
power above - : 
 
1)   I - The awareness that a political reform is going to satisfy the contextual – and 
arbitrary – needs which an economic actor perceives as a consequence of her role. An 
example is the public consensus which a privatization of public companies obtains. In 
this case, we have a need – presumably, the one to incentivize the management of a firm 
which aims at competing in the international markets so as to increase the quality of a 
product – which is apparently satisfied by making a modification in the distribution of 
economic instruments. The problem arises when this same distribution of instruments– 
because of its being arbitrary – causes imbalanced relations of power and consequent 
unexpected needs. These unbalanced relations can originate, for instance, in the forma-
tion of commercial cartels or the drop of wages. 
  II - The will to find a compromise among different powers-of-claiming in order to sat-
isfy respective needs which depend on the respective contingent resources and roles. An 
example can be the will to rely on many foreign investments to sustain the growth of 
national industry. This would respond to a need of liquidity in order to maintain the 
productive capacity of a firm. Such logic manifests, again, an abstraction of a certain 
contextual necessity from all the other necessities likely to occur because of the imbal-
anced disposition of economic instruments thus pursued. A typical occurrence is repre-
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sented, in times of recessions, by the investors’ power to maintain their profit unaltered 
by cutting workers’ remuneration and so, by worsening a country’s current account. 
2) The desire not to succumb and to negotiate an “agreement” with a greater power, 
as in the case of being compelled to accept usury rates. In general, however, each of the 
examples above can be included in this category if the involved economic actors per-
ceive the exchange as a “violence”. In this circumstance the desires abstracted from the 
overall potential desires are the ones proper of the elite as well as the contingent need to 
preserve oneself from a worse situation perceived by the submitted class. 
 
The fact that bargaining power can be achieved in the form of violent extortion or in the 
form of pacific compromise and equilibrium among different singular interests recalls 
what Hegel in Phenomenology of Spirit describes as mutual or non-mutual recognition 
of desires: 
Mutual recognition is a reciprocal relationship through which each person is 
committed to treat others as 'persons' or as self-conscious beings rather than ob-
jects [...] The Phenomenology as, a philosophical description of human history, 
deals with inequalities and non-mutual recognition. In this kind of interpersonal 
relationship, when the recognition is not mutual, the recognised-desire treats the 
recognising- desire as a mere object and puts itself in a position of a sadist who 
requires the victim to become an object and no longer the source of threat and 
challenge 
220
. 
   In this sense, the character of peaceful relationality and sharing which distinguishes a 
successful political experiment is a dialectical case which falls under what is, according 
to the Hegelian idea of Absolute, a universal commitment to reciprocal acknowledge-
ment. This latter is aimed at the “consciousness of the totality”, at a “happy compro-
mise” where every individual cedes part of her particular desires. The reason is that the 
individual becomes aware that it is more convenient, more desirable to live within an 
equilibrium of individual naturalnesses and within a context of full reciprocal relations: 
«As the agent receiving the command of the universal, the particular acts as the topos of 
the not yet of the universal. Basically this means that the command commands in and 
through the particular’s receiving» 
221
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2 - From a dialectical logic toward a logic of instrumental maximization: the con-
sequence for the concept of exchange economy 
 
The concept of conceptual identity and the barter principle give us a more precise crite-
rion to evaluate whether a socio-economic reform and organization set by a “prevailing” 
power coincides with a dialectical modality of development. What I am drawing now is 
an explicit border in order to discern two kinds of approaches. On the one hand, a po-
litical commitment which tends toward a maximization of any individual’s capacity to 
create a desirable situation for herself and, on the other hand, a political commitment 
founded on the implementation of some preferences coinciding with what is contin-
gently perceived as “natural” to prefer. 
Nevertheless, an apparent contradiction needs to be solved first. I define as a “dialecti-
cal structure” the one using as criteria of action the consciousness of certain contingent 
interests, needs and desires which stand out as a result of the arbitrary allocation of eco-
nomic instruments among individuals. A dialectical approach, in fact, relies on an au-
thority shaped by intersection of possibly common-sense and arbitrary values. In politi-
cal theory, a proposal following this model is Hegel’s idea of corporate State. It is a 
constitutional monarchy which is “justified”, in its disregarding a direct popular sover-
eignty, by the contingently perceived necessity of going beyond individualism and the 
insignificant play of atomistic opinions, typical of a civil society of the time and to 
which, according to Hegel, a parliamentary election can be reduced. Here, the point of 
my criticism is not whether «to go beyond individualism and the insignificant play of 
atomistic opinions» is per se right or wrong, but that the statement and application of 
this necessity represents an idealization, an abstraction from other contextual and poten-
tial needs and desires which should also be taken into account while structuring the 
government of a community. 
 
The possibility of a non-dialectical structure of political commitment seems to be com-
promised by the fact that the definition of “dialectics” I have given appears to describe 
the general logic of any political action. I would argue that this is the case when the 
logic of a philosophical position about a social advance assumes as necessary the re-
course to the rationality proper of some authorities – as in the case of Hegel. Or, also, 
the recourse to the figure of an authority depicted as more authentic or more careful of 
the (non)presence of hidden spectres and potentialities – as in the case of Rorty’s lib-
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eral-ironist or Derrida’s contingent coming of the Other. But even though it is impossi-
ble to escape dialectics to the extent that it is impossible not to rely on authorities con-
stituted by “idealised” values, needs and desires, I want to argue that a pragmatic pro-
gress can be made if one tries to instrumentally optimize every authority’s capacity to 
fulfil itself rather than searching for the wider compromise or agreement among the val-
ues of existent authorities. This would be a shift in the investigative focus which would 
bring a quantitative improvement in the openness of the analysis, which would be less 
constrained in the limits of existent widespread practical values. 
I intend to analyse a logic which aims at seeking the conditions of the possibility of a 
maximization of each authority’s potentiality to desire and to fulfil her desires. A 
maximization of reciprocal bargaining power which implies that the quantity of such a 
power owned by each individual is not to be considered as the result of a zero-sum 
game among all actors, but as a “measure” of reciprocal utility, or attractiveness which 
can also increase in aggregate. An equality of a similar maximization would ensure, 
among the other things, that each authority who acts within an economy of an exchange 
cannot develop the bargaining power needed to fulfil her desires by means of an instru-
mental advantage over the other authorities. An authority would be able to enhance her 
bargaining power, in fact, only by exploiting the instrumental potentialities with which 
–in an equivalent way to the other authorities - she would be endowed more than the 
other authorities. 
Within a similar economy, in effect, the concept of “barter” is founded on the scheme 
whereby an economic agent is able to offer goods or a service which gives her the 
power to claim, in exchange, the goods or service she desires. In order to be capable of 
maximizing every individual’s capacity to produce and claim, such a scheme has firstly 
to ensure that every economic agent owns all the economic instruments necessary to re-
alize the quantity or quality of product she needs to exchange. A “conceptual identifica-
tion” and the exchange associated with it would reflect a maximization of every indi-
vidual’s capacity to produce and claim only in the case in which every individual owns 
the potentialities which are necessary to maximize the quantity or quality of her produc-
tion and, therefore, of her claim. 
Previously, I defined as “natural” the pragmatic situation which would be most desir-
able for an individual and, therefore, what is “natural” for her as what she would spon-
taneously prefer in respect to other things. 
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Consequently, the very concept of an “economy based on exchange” supposes that, if an 
exchange has to reflect as much as possible the contingent naturalness of the actors, an 
institution should make certain that any involved actor utilises a certain amount – in 
quantity and quality - of instruments offering the highest possible potentiality to pro-
duce and to claim in an exchange. Otherwise, such an institution would be obstructing a 
“spontaneous” maximization of that contingent naturalness. It would accept, in other 
words, an “ideological” conception of such a naturalness. 
This does not mean that there is a “naturalness” which is not ideological, if this term re-
fers to a socially and culturally constructed system of preferences. This means that such 
an institution would accept an ideological naturalness – or a circumscribed set of ideo-
logical ones - ignoring the possibility that such a naturalness has to be potentially and 
pragmatically maximized. The following passage from Adorno well reflects his aware-
ness that any notion of “transcendental subject” supposes an abstraction of some con-
tingent arbitrary interests determining the terms of a barter and a structural “natural-
ness” of human subjectivity. He rightly defines such a common attitude as a «general-
ity», a generalization of a contingent arbitrary system of interests. Such an attitude turns 
into an ideology when it insists on deciding what is natural to pursue according to the 
“structure of the subject”: 
As the extreme borderline case of ideology, the transcendental subject comes 
close to truth. The transcendental generality is no mere narcissist self-exaltation 
of the I, not the hubris of an autonomy of the I. Its reality lies in the domination 
that prevails and perpetuates itself by means of the principle of equivalence. The 
process of abstraction—which philosophy transfigures, and which it ascribes to 
the knowing subject alone—is taking place in the factual barter society.
222
 
   Another element on which Adorno insists is that the equivalent value of the two terms 
of the exchange is, de facto, a social objectification. The singularities which correspond 
to specific productions are incommensurable to each other, but the pragmatic conven-
ience to perform the transaction which the involved actors have confers to such “subjec-
tive” singularities a social objectivity: the exchange value of a product. Adorno com-
pares this process to Kant’s model, where subjectively produced phenomena are inter-
subjectively considered as formed by commensurable and objective parts, according to 
the pragmatic convenience of scientific measurement: 
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The rigidly dualistic basic structure of Kant’s model for criticizing reason dupli-
cates the structure of a production process where the merchandise drops out of 
the machines as his phenomena drop out of the cognitive mechanism, and where 
the material and its own definition are matters of indifference vis-à-vis the profit, 
much as appearance is a matter of indifference to Kant, who had it stencilled. 
The final product with its exchange value is like the Kantian objects, which are 
made subjectively and are accepted as objectivities
223
 
   Put in these terms, the problem which I am facing concerns the “justice” of the appli-
cation of an exchange value to a use value. Or, better to say, the justice that a certain 
couple use-value – exchange-value does to an individual potential naturalness, beyond 
what is perceived as a spontaneous exchange within a social objectification. Such a jus-
tice, nevertheless, makes sense only if interpreted as the estimate of the degree of prag-
matic satisfaction of an economic actor with respect to the potential maximum of satis-
faction she could achieve within a “factual barter society”. Hence I define a product as 
carrying an “ideal” exchange value if this is determined within a transaction in which 
the involved actors have been able to benefit from the highest instrumental potentiality 
to create the goods or service they offer. A philosophical commitment which intends to 
escape as much as possible a dialectical way of thinking about human relations has to 
examine in depth what the instrumental conditions of the capacity of producing and of-
fering for an exchange are. It has to examine, then, whether these can be categorized 
and whether it is possible to make any individual own them at their highest degree or, at 
least, whether a society or a legislation can tend to do that. 
 
 
3 - The focus on the concept of exchange economy: a necessary step for the prag-
matic route of the analysis 
 
At this stage of my argumentation, it is opportune to face what may appear as a contrast 
between the ethical-ontological purpose which the overall work claims to carry out – 
above all in the analysis of neo-pragmatism and deconstructionism as well as in the re-
minder to dialectical authors – and the specifically economical set of examples and ap-
plications which clearly dominate the continuation of the text. 
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From the end of the previous chapter the discussion has been spontaneously set up un-
der the form of a debate about economic issues. In fact, it may seem that the same de-
terminations of naturalness, instrumental conditions of naturalness maximization and 
bargaining power just recalled have been inadvertently shaped by the typical bargaining 
and instrumental nature of the specific economic behaviour and have, therefore, less to 
do with general determinations of ethics and human nature. 
Since the examination of Derrida’s unconditioned justice to the Other, I have pictured 
human naturalness – or, also, an individual’s “preferability” toward some future choice 
– as constrained by the relative power which the available instruments allow their pos-
sessor to have over the environment and other individuals. But, one may argue, this is a 
determination of “what is spontaneous to choose” which, since its origin, has been 
rooted in an economic logic - more specifically in a market logic. It is, ultimately, a de-
termination of what “happiness” should be which draws its characters from the logic of 
market. 
Consequently, the entire discussion about the fallacy of relying on a neo-pragmatist lib-
eral ironist and on the Other’s request or about the dialectical impasse of any authority 
would only concern a regional determination of “ethics”, intentionally shaped from its 
beginning by macroeconomic preoccupations. What would be left out, in effect, are 
forms of human relationship in which moral behaviour, or calculus of what is suitable to 
do, escape a logic of reciprocal negotiation and are driven by communitarian and famil-
iar ethics or, also, by sentiments of compassion and generosity. 
In order to respond to this possible objection I am going to point out that, instead of 
running into a case of confusion between a regional logic and a universal one, the reader 
is encountering the recognition of a pragmatic prevalence of the weight of certain 
spheres of life. The particular attention put on economic issues follows the observation 
that, first of all, economic agreement can be taken as an explicative model of any human 
agreement as pragmatic calculus in view of reciprocal benefits. Secondly, such a “privi-
lege” ensues after noticing the greater “objective” value and universal recognisability of 
specific themes such as credit accessibility, market competition, suitability of wages and 
so on. 
In other words, the preference given to an economic commitment in the text is not cas-
ual but responds to the following reasons: 
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The first reason for the privilege of the economic language is that economic relation-
ships perfectly represent the basic structure of intersubjective agreements founded on 
what can be defined as an impulse toward reciprocal attraction - explained by the recog-
nition of reciprocal utility. Any human agreement, including the ones arising from hon-
est feelings such as love and protection, in effect, can be interpreted as a recognition of 
reciprocal instrumental utility – considered in its broader sense – and a consequent at-
tempt to obtain what is desired by giving in exchange something which is desired by the 
partner in order to build up the relationship. A love affair can be formally described as a 
mutual decision about what is reciprocally enjoyable to do according to the desires and 
the “naturalnesses” of both parts. Even an act of charity can be interpreted as a mutual 
agreement about what is reciprocally satisfying to do, once the benefactor’s motive is 
described as a desire to “feel good about herself”. In none of these cases the agreement 
is perfectly symmetrical but involves individuals who are unique with contingent and 
distinctive necessities and desires. 
As in the economic field, all these kinds of agreement require a process in which indi-
viduals recognize reciprocal desires and verify how much and at what cost such desires 
can be fulfilled by a certain type of relationship. This formal illustration of what is a 
bargain corresponds to a general pragmatic structure which - because of historical, cul-
tural, instrumental and stylistic junctures - is today almost spontaneously associated 
with the market organization of economic production. A mutual negotiation in order to 
obtain what the other can offer is “explicitly recognizable” – due to socio-historical and 
linguistic contingencies - in the regional issue of the economic exchange strictly consid-
ered. I do not look for a dialectical reason for such a privilege of the economic disci-
pline in revealing this pragmatic structure. In fact, the very premises which underpin my 
discussion – related to neo-pragmatism and dissemination –understand a similar exposi-
tive superiority of economics simply as the result of fortuitous historical and linguistic 
circumstances whereby a certain language-game is more effective in helping to ap-
proach a solution to a perceived problem. This first reason for the “preference” of the 
economic discipline in the application of philosophical issues is, therefore, a reason 
which has to do with practical expositive necessities. 
The privilege assigned to reciprocity and agreement as “fundamental” pragmatic struc-
ture may be criticized as an example of partial analysis of the practical human nature 
and, therefore, as a non-complete account of that which makes an individual happy. In 
fact, it would leave aside cases in which an individual does not need any inter-
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subjective agreement in order to act in a pragmatically self-satisfying way, as in the case 
of a person being happy by taking a solitary walk or by cultivating something in her 
own vegetable garden. Given the purpose of this text, nevertheless, this is a false prob-
lem. In effect, I am examining the ethical duty to “do justice to the other’s naturalness”, 
as underpinning any neo-pragmatist, deconstructive or dialectical commitment, in order 
to articulate the best way to carry out such a task. If personal and solitary actions are not 
taken into specific account it is because, if one assumes that they reflect an individual’s 
will and therefore naturalness, such a “carelessness” coincides with a not-interfering 
policy and, in effect, with doing justice to them. If one assumes, instead, that even those 
actions are the product of social agreements as influenced or determined by past or con-
temporary human relationships – always in a broad sense, which includes knowledge, 
affection, culture, expectations, etc. - , then solitary actions are a particular manner in 
which reciprocity manifests itself. 
Even if they appear empirically very different from the nature of an economic exchange, 
in fact, these actions would share the same structure of being “a recognition of recipro-
cal instrumental utility in a broad sense and a consequent attempt to obtain what is de-
sired by giving in exchange something which is desired by the partner in order to build 
up the relationship”. As hinted before, in effect, the “exchange” can also consist in re-
ciprocity of affection or feeling, as in the case of a father teaching his son to draw in or-
der to enjoy spending time with him and of his son willingly accepting this training for 
the same reason, as well as because he perceives that such a skill will be useful in his 
future. Obviously, the case may occur whereby a person does not appreciate receiving a 
training which will reveal itself to be useful in the future or instead whereby that person 
accepts it only because such a training is accompanied by another element which is per-
ceived as useful in that moment. As cases like these show, it is clear that the effective 
usefulness of an agreement is determined by contingent and arbitrary configurations of 
forces and escapes any capacity to consciously “bargain” for a more useful “exchange”. 
All this is associated with the fundamental problem which concerns the inevitable ne-
cessity of a contingent authority also in order to decide what the instruments useful to 
maximize one’s happiness are. I will discuss this problem in one of the next paragraphs, 
explaining why the “instrumental” logic would be able to express a less rigid and less 
harmful trend in respect to the “dialectical” ones anyway. 
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If the first reason for the privilege of the economic sphere has to do with expositive 
preferences, the second reason contemplates the character of the language of market in-
struments and economic examples as “universally recognizable” in a deeper and prag-
matist sense. The spontaneous recourse to this topic, in fact, has been driven by the 
higher “objectivity”, universality and identifiability - within a human community - of 
the concern about the functioning of specific economic instruments in respect to other 
concerns. Such a universality can also be only “potential” in the sense that, for instance, 
the concern for an adequate level of income or for accessibility to credit may not be al-
ways perceived, but there is a diffuse agreement on their consisting in a crucial issue 
when the question about their stability is raised. 
But what does such an objectivity mean from a pragmatist’s point of view? It means 
that there is a certain cultural “conversation”, a certain set of tool arrangements which 
seem to be particularly beneficial for human “nature” and that most human being would 
agree upon this. The initial tendency and the definitive turn of the text toward economic 
problems would be, in this sense, a logical route to be followed in order to fulfil its ini-
tial pragmatist and anti-metaphysical task. 
Nevertheless, the greater pragmatic weight of certain economic mechanisms for human 
life just hinted at has now to be specified. When I assert that the economic mechanisms 
recalled throughout the text have a greater objective or “universal” impact on human 
well-being – and that most human beings would recognize that – I do not refer – or not 
only – to “concern about one’s personal wealth” in general. I allude to specific elements 
forming the structure of a market which are, or can be perceived as, particularly impor-
tant for human welfare and which have been confirmed in the pragmatic suitability of 
such a perception by documented evidence. 
Stiglitz, for instance, strongly remarks the importance of technological innovation and 
learning capacities for the historical account of the increase in the quality of life, point-
ing out the necessity of a deep and equal spread of such capacities in industrial produc-
tion throughout market and human communities. They are important for a pragmatic 
purpose also because they appear to explain empirical growth in productivity better than 
other factors – making clear, therefore, where the largest part of “Solow residual ”
224
 
comes from: 
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Both econometric and historical studies highlight the importance of learning and 
innovation. Maddison’s research, for instance documents that from the origins of 
civilization to the early 1800s, there was essentially no increase in incomes per 
capita. The economy was close to static. The subsequent two centuries have been 
highly dynamic, leading to unprecedented improvements in standards of living. 
Since the work of Solow (1957), we have understood that most increases in per 
capita income—some 70%-- cannot be explained by capital deepening; for the 
advanced developed countries most of the “Solow residual” arises from advances 
in technology. At least for the past quarter century, we have understood that a 
substantial part of the growth in developing countries arises from closing the 
“knowledge” gap between themselves and those at the frontier. Within any coun-
try, there is enormous scope for productivity improvement simply by closing the 
gap between best practices and average practices.
225
 
   Stiglitz’s reports are precious because they lead us to locate, in the very possession of 
some basic economic instruments, one of the most embraceable – if not the most em-
braceable – element to work on in view of a pragmatist social purpose as I have been 
describing it. As Stiglitz goes on in his paper, in fact, the close connection between the 
element of improvement of income per capita and standards of living due to technologi-
cal advances on one side and the element of reduction of ownership discrepancy of cer-
tain economic instruments among different individuals on the other side is revealed. 
This discrepancy corresponds primarily to the kind of market imperfections whereby a 
lot of agents are not able, or willing, to invest in innovation, renouncing to the attempt 
to exploit spillover learning: 
A […] source of inefficiency which industrial policies may address arises from 
capital market imperfections (themselves endogenous, arising from information 
asymmetries). But capital market imperfections can be particularly adverse to 
learning: Because R & D investments (or “learning investments”) typically can-
not be collateralized, unlike investments in buildings, machines, or inventories, it 
is more likely that there will be credit and equity rationing, leading to underin-
vestment in these areas, compared to others […]Still another market failure 
arises from imperfections in risk markets. Innovation is highly risky—research is 
an exploration into the unknown. But firms cannot purchase insurance against 
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these risks (because of well-known problems of moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion). But because of imperfections in capital markets, firms act in a risk-averse 
manner, particularly in the presence of bankruptcy costs (Greenwald-Stiglitz, 
1993), and this discourages investment in riskier innovation.
226
 
   There is therefore a first evidence of coincidence between the market imperfections 
which Stiglitz associates with a lower spread of technological benefits and the imbal-
ance of economic instruments possession. It consists in a clear deficiency of trust by the 
community – or by the institutions designated by the community to grant credit – in the 
aspiring producer’s capacity to supply a suitable product in the future. That is to say that 
an entrepreneur experiences the lack of a direct connection with economic actors who 
are explicitly willing to purchase the commodity to be produced in the future and to fur-
nish the producer with the “credit” necessary to complete the production - I synthesize 
this economic instrument with the name of “confidence link” between a potential sup-
plier and a potential demander of a commodity. 
From this example credit – or funding in general – can be identified as a first fundamen-
tal economic instrument. Its necessity originates from the temporal discrepancy between 
the possession of instruments adequate to create something to exchange by a potential 
producer on the one hand and the formation of a demand which such a potential pro-
ducer may fulfil on the other hand. Similarly, credit can also compensate for the dis-
crepancy between the formation of a demand by an economic agent on the one hand and 
the possession, by the same agent, of instruments adequate to produce a bargaining 
power sufficient to support such a demand on the other hand. 
 
A lot of economic actors experience a deficiency in the accessibility to funding due to 
the imperfection which exists in reciprocal information. The consequent underinvest-
ment corresponds to a situation whereby a lot of potential applications and further im-
provements of technological and learning progress are prevented, as are the potential 
participation of more individuals to the benefits of creating and exchanging such im-
provements. In this way, the very pragmatic task of an exchange economy based on the 
creation of a maximized utility in order to enhance the attractiveness of an agreement is 
prevented. 
The occurrence of a cycle of recession would amount to an even worse situation, in 
which exchanges cannot be performed because of a lack of basic instrumental condi-
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tions. Within a classic Keynesian scenario, for instance, we hypothesize several entre-
preneurs who reduce investment because of a bad feeling about the future caused by a 
poor income realized – due to a preceding mistaken allocation of resources, which is 
likely to happen within a context with imperfect information. In this way employment, 
income and therefore aggregate demand start declining, provoking a self-referential vi-
cious circle. The next thing to consider is the situation whereby, as Skidelsky observes, 
the downturn is strengthened by the fact that «although wages and prices have some ad-
justments they do not adjust fast enough, because nobody knows what the new equilib-
rium prices are. So, output falls more quickly than wages and prices».
227
 The intensely 
pro-cyclical mechanism whereby wages and prices do adjust fast, but because of this 
very adjustment the lack of aggregate demand and the further drop in wages and prices 
is exacerbated can be also considered. 
In both situations, a mechanism whereby a fallacy in the functioning of the “confidence 
link” is set off bringing about a reduction in the aggregate utilization of other two eco-
nomic instruments – labour force and means of productions. Such an under-utilization 
corresponds to a decrease in the availability of wealth to be exchanged and, therefore, in 
the fundamental motive and condition for setting up an enterprise in order to improve 
one’s exchange power: expectation of profit. Seen in this way, in fact, this disposition to 
under-utilize instruments spreads within a community due to the reciprocal entangle-
ment of all economic agents. In the former situation this mechanism is incarnated in the 
fact that entrepreneurs do not find enough wealth offered in exchange to convince them 
to hire more workers, while in the latter for the same reason they do not have the possi-
bility to reward their employers – and themselves – more. 
In any case, all this can be illustrated as a deficiency of means of production by unem-
ployed people caused by the initial insufficient confidence link by firms. The former de-
ficiency then brings about a further lack of confidence links in the category of entrepre-
neurs, confirming the strong inter-dependence between different individuals’ instrumen-
tal possession and efficacy, which is implied in the logic of a community based on ex-
change. 
The betrayal of the pragmatic progress inherent to the mechanism of market which such 
a scenario conveys is reflected, moreover, in a further kind of loss of economic instru-
ment possession, namely the obsolescence of machineries and labour skills due to a lack 
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of incentives to utilize and renew them. Both obsolescence and under-utilization of eco-
nomic instruments are at the centre of Stiglitz’s concern for failures of market as dimin-
ishing the degree of knowledge and, therefore, the quality of life: 
One of the things that is pretty clear from a lot of researches is that stability is 
important to learning and there are several reasons for this. Since much of the 
knowledge resides within institutions and firms, when you go through a deep 
economic recession it destroys firms and, in doing that, it destroys embedded 
knowledge. In effect, there is “negative learning”. […] Moreover, the knowledge 
that is lost when a company goes bankrupt is very hard to recreate. It is also the 
case that recessions impede learning because attention gets focused just on sur-
vival and firms are not going to be spending their resources on long-term re-
searches. And, finally, recessions impede the most important aspect of human 
capital accumulation which is on-the-job learning, with long-term consequences 
on growth and standard of living
228
 
   An instrumentally balanced and well-functioning market is therefore the condition for 
a widespread high standard of living. In fact it is structurally coincident with the im-
provement in the efficacy and utilization of a set of tools – such as reciprocal confi-
dence, labour force and means of production - permitting the enjoyment of the potential 
fruits of reciprocal-benefit agreement as much as possible. In this sense equal and effi-
cient functioning of economic instruments represents “a set of tool arrangements which 
seem to be universally beneficial for human ‘nature’”. 
 
4 - The connection of the task of instrumental maximization of reciprocal bargain-
ing power to the problem of the trade-off between equality and liberty 
 
The interpretation of Stiglitz’s recommendations in a pragmatic and anti-dialectical 
sense paves the way for opening the discussion about whether the goal of “equality” is 
universally preferable in respect to the goal of “greater liberty” in order to maximize so-
cial well-being. 
The conflict between equality and liberty has always represented a central battle field in 
the comparison between different interpretations of utilitarianism and ethics of econom-
ics. As Lukes says, 
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libertarians typically claim that more equality means less liberty, but this thought 
is widespread, as it is apparent corollary that they must be traded off or weighed 
against one another. Thus Sir Isaiah Berlin observed that ‘the extent of a man’s, 
or of a people’s liberty to choose to live as they desire must be weighed against 
the claims of many other values, of which equality, or justice, or security, or 
public order are perhaps the most obvious examples’
229
 
   One of the most pregnant dilemmas at the basis of the difficulty of deciding between 
equality and liberty is whether a preference can be selected between a situation where a 
certain level of satisfaction is not equally distributed and a situation in which the same 
level is equally distributed. A similar decision, in fact, would concern the degree of lib-
erty individuals, including the “luckiest ones”, are allowed to have available in order to 
fulfil their desires – or, at least, this would be the superficial interpretation of the above 
dilemma, as we will see soon. 
Even if pursuing equality appears intuitively preferable, it is not easy to define the rea-
son why a pragmatist point of view should differentiate the rank of two scenarios which 
may bring the same total level of “happiness” and provoke the same level of harm 
within a community. If we suppose that such perceived harm possesses, on average, the 
same intensity, a pragmatic or utilitarian stance fails to provide an answer. Moreover, as 
Sen shows us, 
an important part of the new welfare economics used only one criterion of social 
improvement, namely the Pareto criterion, which relied on taking note of utilities 
of each person separately without any interpersonal comparison. According to 
this criterion, social state x is better than social state y if at least one person has 
more utility in x than in y and everyone has at least as much utility in x as in y. A 
state is described as ‘Pareto optimal’ if and only if there is no other feasible state 
that is superior to it in terms of the Pareto criterion
230
 
   Sen continues by manifesting the discomforts of accepting a point of view which ex-
plicitly neglects the question of equality: 
It is hard to accept Pareto optimality as an adequate condition for a good society 
[…] A society in which some people lead lives of great luxury while others live 
in acute misery can still be Pareto optimal if the agony of the deprived cannot be 
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reduced without cutting into the ecstasy of the affluent […] It has become, for 
this reason, more common to argue that Pareto optimality is a necessary condi-
tion for social optimality even though not sufficient 
231
 
Given the impasse whereby an utilitarian stance would not differentiate between differ-
ent distributions of an equivalent total level of happiness, a reasonable way of justifying 
the objective of equality may be to shift the focus toward the concept of equality of po-
tentialities – as has already been done in general in this text, on the other hand. The apo-
ria produced by Pareto’s indifference toward distribution would be outflanked, since the 
point in this case would be the possibility of producing new net wealth, in such a way 
that the system reveals itself not to be necessarily already Pareto efficient. In fact, as 
Stiglitz’s research suggests, the majority of instruments necessary to equalize potentiali-
ties is not to be re-distributed among economic agents but coincides, rather, with the 
opportunity of taking advantage of unused resources which were so because of a lack of 
“reciprocal confidence”. Among the most evident cases there are lack of credit due to 
imperfect information or risk aversion, which compromises the formation of new ideas 
and enterprises. These would have a collective positive social impact since they would 
invigorate mutual exchange between new entrepreneurs and already existing ones who 
do business with the formers by utilizing otherwise inactive materials. The same picture 
can be associated with the discrepancies causing market recession or stagnation quoted 
earlier. 
Nevertheless, even admitting that the majority of instruments necessary to equalize po-
tentialities do not need to cause a re-distribution of wealth and bargaining power but a 
reciprocal increase of this latter,
232
 the fact that such an argument cannot be extended to 
the 100% of instruments makes it insufficient in terms of scientific rigor. It can be 
rightly objected, in fact, that it is inevitable in some cases to produce a certain transfer 
of bargaining power and therefore a certain transfer of capacity to obtain benefit among 
different individuals. For instance, it may be found that to achieve or to pursue equality 
of potentialities one needs to equalize the bargaining power of actors involved in pro-
duction, by blurring the distinction between possessors of means of production and of 
pure labour skills. Or, as Stiglitz also affirms
233
, it may be found necessary to favour 
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technological investments which have as side effects the production of learning spill-
overs in order to equalize skill throughout society. Both these initiatives may keep the 
total level of social benefits stable, but at the cost of diminishing the bargaining power 
of former owners of means of production or, in the second example, of some innovators. 
This means that one cannot rigorously know - from a theoretical point of view - the de-
gree of total advantage which the attempt to equalize the possession of economic in-
struments brings about: depending on the specific contingent distribution and relation of 
forces in a certain moment it may result as positive, neutral or even negative. Without 
diminishing the value of the previous point, it would seem that the only complete and 
coherent approach to justify the preference for an equal distribution of bargaining power 
is the unambitious one, of referring to empirical studies rather than to making deduction 
from a supposed general functioning of economic instruments. In certain studies, for in-
stance, particular attention is put on the higher degree of subjective well-being which 
societies with less income inequality produce. 
234
 In comparison with individuals living 
in an unequal environment, in fact, the ones living in an equal society tend to perceive 
more trust and satisfaction in the reciprocal utility and adequacy they experience in rela-
tion to their community. A cross-country study realized in 2004 by Ball and Chernova, 
based on the World Value Survey «finds that the effects of relative income on happiness 
are up to four times as great as those of absolute incomes, although the effects of abso-
lute income are still positive and significant».
235
 Clark and Oishi claim that, respec-
tively, British and American people perceive a minor life satisfaction in less equal social 
contexts. Oishi, in particular, demonstrates that «this inverse relation between income 
inequality and happiness is explained by perceived fairness and general trust».
236
 
An explanation of the prevalence of the factor of equality over the one of absolute 
wealth in determining a community happiness can be hypothesized by taking into ac-
count one of the characters of the dialectical tendency which mostly drives the forma-
tion of human needs and desires. I defined such a tendency as a transformation of ra-
tionality thanks to an abstraction of a particular perception of necessity from the current 
overall account of necessity. A similar abstracted perception can consist in any desire 
and need which do not account for all pragmatic repercussions and all potentialities an 
individual can aspire to. This is caused by the lack of instrumental maximization which 
an actor experiences, which causes the actor to have a certain consciousness of what she 
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can claim from society given her utility and the potential utility of society itself. The de-
termination of practical needs and desires is, in effect, due to the instrumental environ-
ment. An individual tends to construct both her aspirations and her willingness to 
achieve a compromise by looking at the pragmatic opportunities which the power com-
ing from instruments she possesses or she may “realistically” obtain can offer her. 
This latter specific attitude expresses the dominant feature of the general dialectical ten-
dency: that the capacity to aspire to already existent forms of powers is much easier to 
develop than the capacity to envisage something which not-yet existing forms of power 
may offer. This intuitive disposition to give privilege to the “present” or to the “semi-
present” seems to triumph spontaneously within the dialectical attitude in general, 
which mostly determines human desires. What explains the higher degree of happiness 
felt by equal communities would be, therefore, the smaller gap present between per-
ceived desires and the instrumental possibility to fulfil them. 
A similar explanation of why equality is preferable is consistent with the interpretation 
of the debate about the liberty-equality conflict as an issue concerning the distribution 
of determined liberties and opportunities. Lukes underlines this point developing his 
discussion about whether equality and liberty “must be traded off or weighed against 
one another”: 
Are equality and liberty related in this way? […] How plausible is this picture? 
The answer depends on how one answers Amartya Sen's famous question: 
'Equality of What?'. The simplest, and most naïve answer, is welfare or utility, 
whether conceived as happiness or the satisfaction of desire, but this answer 
fails, as Rawls and other have shown, above all in the face of the objection that it 
would unjustly compensate those with expensive tastes for which they could be 
held responsible. All the other, more plausible accounts of what is fundamental 
to equality--of what those who seek more equality seek to equalize--include 
various liberties as an essential, constitutive part of the equalizandum. Surveying 
recent discussions, this is true of Rawls's primary goods, Dworkin's resources, 
Sen's basic capabilities, Arneson's opportunity for welfare, and Cohen's access to 
advantage. In short, all plausible answers to Sen's question include as central 
components those aspects of the circumstances of persons that maintain or ex-
pand their range of significant choices, and almost all focus explicitly on the no-
tion of opportunity. Indeed, Sen himself describes his favoured notion of a per-
son's 'capabilities'--'the various alternative functioning bundles he or she can 
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achieve through choice'--as 'the natural candidate for reflecting the idea of free-
dom to do'. His central concern is with those human interests he calls 'advantage', 
as opposed to "well-being'. 'Advantage', he writes, is a notion which deals with 'a 
person's real opportunities compared with others' and is a "freedom" type notion'. 
All these accounts--and, I submit, all plausible accounts--of what is to be equal-
ized see freedom, meaning the availability of significant options of choice, as in-
tegral to equality. In short, egalitarians largely seek to equalize liberties […]I 
conclude that the alleged conflict, and trade-off, between equality and liberty 
also turns out to be other than it seems--a conflict between alternatives that this 
formula fails to capture. The choice in question is rather between particular dis-
tributions of various goods, including various liberties […]
237
 
   Finally, to assert the global pragmatic importance for individuals to take part in the 
social and technological fruits of exchange economy does not mean to undervalue the 
role of other factors which are not reducible to the effects of market. Sen reminds us 
very efficaciously that 
income is, of course, a crucially important means, but its importance lies in the 
fact that it helps the person to do things that she values doing and to achieve 
states of being that she has reasons to desire. The worth of incomes cannot stand 
separated from these deeper concerns, and a society that respects individual well-
being and freedom must take note of these concerns in making interpersonal 
comparisons as well as social evaluations
238
 
   He then enumerates the sources from which the major problems of disparity which are 
not immediately solvable through income equality come: 
Personal heterogeneities: People have disparate physical characteristics con-
nected with disability, illness, age, or gender, making their needs diverse 
[…]Environmental diversities: Variations in environmental conditions, such as 
climatic circumstances […]Variations in social climate, including public health 
care and epidemiology, public educational arrangements, and the prevalence or 
absence of crime and violence in the particular location […]Differences in rela-
tional perspectives: The commodity requirements of established patterns of be-
haviour may vary between communities, depending on conventions and customs 
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[…]Distribution within the family: Incomes earned by one or more members of a 
family are shared by all, non-earners as well as earners. The family is, thus, the 
basic unit for consideration of incomes from the point of view of their use
239
 
   My intention is not to ignore the importance of the elements listed here but, as already 
declared, to concentrate on the most widespread material components which influence 
human well-being. 
 
5 - Remarking the practical difference between an “instrumental authority” and 
the authority proposed by Rorty. An illustrative example 
 
   It may be objected here that the reliance on certain evidence showing the prevalence 
of economic relations in influencing pragmatic results can be analogized to the reliance 
on contingent authorities which I blamed as an inevitable outcome of Rorty’s position. 
Even though a certain form of reliance on contingent pictures of the world is insur-
mountable in any pragmatist stance, I would like to better underline the different tech-
nique of pragmatic survey I am trying to introduce in this text. 
Rorty’s methodological approach, in fact, does not specify any route useful to identify 
the best instrumental scenario which can be reached within this or that specific context. 
Consistently, in a certain sense, with his continuous recall to contingency and to the 
metaphysical fallacies of any theorization of a social “naturalness”, Rorty avoids pick-
ing up specific political or economic contexts and recommending “objective” solutions 
to their problems. What he recommends is, fairly, to act as what he baptizes as the fig-
ure of the “liberal ironist”, that is somebody who does not take seriously any theoretical 
framework and tries to propound a point of view merely by making a “conversation” 
accepted and shared within a community. 
Unfortunately, such an attitude forces the neo-pragmatist to count on the ability of cer-
tain political authorities to persuade most people that a specific kind of “language” is 
preferable, while this latter may comply only with desires and necessities which do not 
account for all pragmatic repercussions and potentialities. Rather than giving the green 
light to the persuasive appearance of dialectical authorities, I have preferred to outline 
the general dynamics of pragmatic social agreement, in which concepts such as contex-
tual “dialectical” desires, reciprocal bargaining power and maximization of individuals’ 
power and instruments are involved. Hence, the necessity arose to choose the prevalent 
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example of pragmatic agreement in our historical context, from which to individuate the 
instruments which may be useful in order to maximize the potential pragmatic power of 
an individual. All this means that I do not rely on the naturalness of a certain authority 
in order to decide what is preferable to do. At worst, I rely on contingent authorities in 
order to decide what is “the prevalent form of social agreement in our historical con-
text” and whether there is any. Imagining the worst scenario, therefore, a possible parti-
ality of such authorities may reduce my investigation to a “regional” one, to be a prag-
matist’s reflection on the dialectical flaws of the economy rather than on general prag-
matic proposals. 
One may reasonably continue to object by noticing that, actually, I do need to rely on 
contingent authorities in order to decide what the contextual instruments to optimize 
are. In fact, the pragmatic benefit which a set of instruments brings about within a social 
environment always needs to be attested by the contingent naturalness of an authority. 
Why should not such an authority represent, in this case, an arbitrary awareness of what 
is preferable to do, an awareness which does not take into account all and everybody’s 
pragmatic repercussions and potentialities? Why would not such an authority choose an 
instrument only in order to respond to necessities and desires provoked by an arbitrary 
disposition of other instruments and would not, therefore, possibly incarnate a “private” 
or partial reaction in comparison with a maximization of everybody’s bargaining 
power? Not even an explicit instrumental stance, in this sense, would prevent the mani-
festation of what I called “dialectical fallacy”. In fact, any response to a contingent con-
figuration of instruments – which forms arbitrary and contingent “languages games” – 
may “do justice” to desires which are individualistic or, in any way, extraneous to that 
which would be an actual pragmatic advancement for the community. 
 
In order to clarify this point, I close this chapter by quoting an example of a political re-
form which can be apparently carried out both by a “Rortyan” authority and by an au-
thority who takes the allocation of instruments in order to maximize reciprocal useful-
ness seriously. While at first sight the two kinds of authority may be supposed to con-
verge in their behaviour, their different theoretical presuppositions make it necessary to 
hypothesize different reactions to one of the side effects of such a reform. This digres-
sion also undertakes the task to put together the elements discussed so far and better de-
fine the “instrumental” logic I propose in relation to the concept of market economy. 
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Take the case of some country’s households or politicians who perceive that, in order to 
achieve a more equal and intense participation in economic development, it would be 
convenient to favour a very easy credit granting by banks. The underling logic would be 
to prevent the manifestation of risk-averse behaviour toward borrowers who are difficult 
to evaluate but likely to produce innovation and greater equality. Lowest interest rates 
and a public bail-out of banks in case of losses may be proposed, together with the em-
ployment of public supervisors to avoid cases of clear moral hazards by banks. The 
overall aim would be to reduce lending to a “communitarian” investment, in the sense 
that credit would be an instrument available to a much larger share of population – en-
suring the equal possession of such an essential instrument – but the public would take 
responsibility for possible bad investments. An authority could claim that, in such a 
way, an individualistic logic – risk-aversion – would be replaced by a communitarian 
and “democratic” realization of the concept of “credit”. The universal possession of 
such an instrument would be brought about by the fact that the entire community, by 
hedging a lender’s investment, in effect invests or bets on its own future. It ensures that 
financing promising enterprises occurs as often as possible and makes possible loses 
negligible to the individual. 
A first analysis would conclude that a similar political decision matches both the “in-
strumental” conception I have illustrated and a Rortyan neo-pragmatist’s conception of 
solidarity. 
It can be read as the achievement of the awareness that, in order to maximize and equal-
ize reciprocal social usefulness, the totality of the society should grant confidence to 
each and anybody who potentially deserves it and that nobody who is likely to contrib-
ute to progress should be deprived of the instrument of ‘confidence link’ because of in-
dividualistic criteria used by the lender. These latter would be external to the “absolute 
pragmatic logic” which can be synthesized from the statements and the examples I have 
made throughout the text. According to this logic, the purpose of a community should 
be to provide each individual with adequate instruments – including the ones capable of 
dealing with temporal discrepancy, such as credit – in order to maximize reciprocal “at-
traction” or “utility” within every human relationship – that is within every economic, 
or market, relationship. Risk aversion, in fact, is determined by assessments of distinctly 
private risk. It represents a different pragmatic scenario in respect to the collective risk-
benefit ratio which should be taken as the parameter for evaluating whether reciprocal 
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usefulness of every economic relationship would be improved in the case that the in-
strument of credit is granted in a certain specific case. 
Public involvement in the mechanism of credit granting can also be read as a creation of 
a “conversation” of the kinds fostered by Rorty, according to whom an authority should 
not promote a certain language because it represents the traditionally accepted “objec-
tivity” or “nature” of a phenomenon, but only if such a language incentivizes beneficial 
behaviours and solidarity. To provide a public subsidy to lenders’ losses would betray 
the objective nature and “natural laws” of free market, whereby any sort of asset – in-
cluding credit – is personally deserved by its owner and invested by this latter, who 
pays the consequences, or enjoys the effects, of any of her decisions. Instead, the de-
scribed political measure would create a new socially accepted language and culture 
thanks to which a greater public pragmatic benefit is perceived. Such a language would 
replace a scientific, objective concept of ‘worthy economic agent in free market’ with 
the social value of public responsibility in the allocation of credit, combined with a pri-
vate reward to bankers –interest rates - for performing the job of evaluating borrowers 
and of dealing with the logistics. 
The righteousness of a similar political choice would appear to be “objective” not be-
cause it does justice to a concept of naturalness which is already decided as the “real” 
one, in this case the one at the basis of worthiness and unworthiness within a pure free 
market. That objectivity would come from the simple circumstance that an agreement 
has been created within a society on the common convenience of a determinate value. 
The task of a neo-pragmatist is simply to create an agreement on the values which she 
perceives as bringing the highest possible common convenience or solidarity. In fact, 
«those who wish to ground solidarity in objectivity – call them “realist” – have to con-
strue truth as correspondence to reality […] So they must construct an epistemology 
which has room for a kind of justification which is not merely social but natural, spring-
ing from human nature itself, and made possible by a link between that part of nature 
and the rest of nature […] By contrast, those who wish to reduce objectivity to solidar-
ity – call them “pragmatists” – do not require either a metaphysics or an epistemology. 
They view truth as, in Williams James’ phrase, what is good for us to believe».
240
 
Consider now the possible following side effect of the quoted reform. It has to do with 
the well-known fact that – even assuming that the hypothesized supervisors manage to 
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avoid cases of moral hazards – financial market spontaneous logic does not necessarily 
favour “long term projects” but, rather, the formation of speculative schemes. 
In fact, as Keynes underlines, to base her evaluation on factors which will govern the 
yield of an investment some years hence – productivity improvement, employment im-
pact of a business and consequent contextual economic growth – would be unreasonable 
for an investor. She definitely prefers to base her assumptions on facts which may be ir-
relevant to economic growth but “about which she feels somewhat confident”. As Bag-
nai remarks, 
markets do not follow the logic of diminishing returns in deciding when to stop 
investing money, but the logic of speculative bubbles. If an initial capital inflow 
pushes financial assets and real-estate prices upward, next inflows are encour-
aged by the perspective of making money out of further price increases – more 
than out of long-term returns, such as dividends and interests. A self-realizing 
expectations mechanism is therefore set up – I buy because I expect price to go 
up and, in doing that, I make prices go up. The mechanism works until investors 
perceive that the game has gone too far.
241
 
 
   What I would like to highlight now is that the theoretical ground on which the figure 
of the liberal-ironist pragmatist is built is definitely consistent with the possibility that a 
similar authority would accept the development of a speculative bubble until the fragil-
ity of the system is perceived. Since a Rortyan authority does not have any univocal 
method or rigorous definition of “preferable society” to fulfil, any form of social agree-
ment may be evaluated as preferable as long as there is the contingent common percep-
tion that it would make most people better-off. That is not to say that such an authority 
would necessarily remain unaware of the pragmatic shortcomings which may originate 
from the volatility of the fragile system of reciprocal expectations on which a specula-
tive bubble is founded. It is structural, however, that such an awareness may not be 
achieved. There is no theoretical philosophical criterion which would necessarily per-
suade a neo-pragmatist that a cycle of over-lending for speculative purposes – favoured 
by investors and excessively incentivized by the described reform – is a “bad” thing, 
once its “model of rationality” is contingently accepted by the majority of people and 
intellectual authorities. 
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The beginning of a financial bubble is a prime example of an environment in which the 
majority of authorities – of “individuals” – perceive that the system is improving its 
“doing justice” to people’s naturalness. The continuous increase of credit to the private 
sector and of the prices of the assets may be accepted and welcome by the neo-
pragmatist authority – as usually has been done by European and American authorities 
before the explosion of financial crises – as a reasonable expression of how a determi-
nate contingent language game is being “likable” for a community.
242
 The considered 
language game may coincide, for instance, with the “pleasure” and willingness per-
ceived by actors who invest in an asset in order to sell it to future buyers who buy it for 
the same reason. The logic of the Rortyan pragmatist can easily be: “if a similar game is 
enjoyable to be played by both parts, why should the authority intervene to impose an 
extraneous model of rationality?”. The considered language game may also coincide 
with the willingness of the creditors to grant more and more credit to households with 
the expectation that they will soon benefit from the growth brought by the financial 
euphoria. 
In effect, the increase in output, employment and prices which usually occur during this 
stage of the bubble
243
 can make the rationality of financial euphoria look consistent with 
long-term goals. It may push toward the neoclassical interpretation of a possible conse-
quent crisis – that such a possibility is not intrinsic to the structure of the financial sec-
tor: 
This is in fact how most neoclassical modellers have reacted: by retrospectively 
treating the crisis as being due, not merely to unprecedentedly large exogenous 
shocks, but shocks which varied in magnitude over time— while still remaining 
negative rather than positive: “the Great Recession began in late 2007 and early 
2008 with a series of adverse preference and technology shocks in roughly the 
same mix and of roughly the same magnitude as those that hit the United States 
at the onset of the previous two recessions”. […] The fact that these shocks came 
from the financial sector has been treated as largely irrelevant by leading neo-
classical authors: “The crisis has shown that large adverse shocks can and do 
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happen. In this crisis, they came from the financial sector, but they could come 
from elsewhere in the future” […] 
244
 
   Hence, the narrative accepted by the neo-pragmatists in a similar context is likely to 
be that a huge amount of credit used to purchase assets in order to resell them is pass-
able or even desirable. Firstly because the pleasure of taking part in this game is self-
justified and, secondly, because this incentivizes the producers of those assets – such as 
buildings – to enlarge their activity and to circularly stimulate the overall economy by 
employing resources. The perceived narrative, which outlines an improvement of eve-
rybody’s enjoyment, is completed by the public influence of experts’ authorities who 
claim that the factors which would be able to destabilize such a mechanism are not at all 
different from the ones which would destabilize a capitalist economic cycle in general: 
asymmetry in information and in technological advancement, which possibly cause 
some economic agents to be unreliable. This would activate a gradual contagion and de-
cline in confidence among the other sectors of the economy, but a financial euphoria 
would not make a substantial difference in the likelihood of their occurrence. 
The point is that as long as a similar coherent narrative of the features of financial 
euphoria and the reciprocal good expectations and pleasure of economic actors last, a 
neo-pragmatist does not necessarily see the danger it represents. Philosophically – and 
“epistemologically” – speaking, a liberal-ironist would have everything she needs to 
approve such a “conversation” and to appease her political contentiousness: a public 
perception of social improvement and of good expectation for the future also backed up 
by a specialist community’s agreement on specific pragmatic outcomes of the situation. 
 
I want now to illustrate the reaction of an authority using an “instrumental logic” to 
such a consequence of the reform of credit I imagined. Notice, first of all, that an “in-
strumental” approach is in contrast with a liberal-ironist authority because it is able to 
express a definition of “what to pursue a pragmatic improvement of a community” for-
mally means. Or, better, such an approach is able to put the very question whereby we 
need to express what “to pursue a pragmatic improvement of a community” formally 
means. 
Consider the statement I made earlier: the purpose of a community should be to provide 
each individual with adequate instruments in order to equalize and maximize reciprocal 
“attraction” or “utility” within every human relationship, including the instruments ca-
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pable of dealing with temporal discrepancies in the reciprocity of these relationships. 
Moreover, since the specific economic context has been taken into account due to 
pragmatic reasons, in cases like this it would be better to replace “human relationship” 
with “every economic, or market, relationship” and “instruments capable of dealing 
with temporal discrepancies” with “credit”. 
These statements can be developed in the following inference: since within a society 
based on market there are often temporal discrepancies between the possession of in-
struments adequate to create something to exchange by a potential producer and the 
formation of a demand which such a potential producer may fulfil, the purpose of a 
community should be to use credit to ensure that these potential transactions will be re-
alized. Also, since the same “purpose of a community” imposes a maximization of re-
ciprocal utility, the potential production endorsed by credit should reflect the highest 
possible satisfaction which can be reached in the potential demanders. In the wake of 
this latest affirmation, it is useful to remind ourselves that another side of the role of 
credit is to compensate for the discrepancy between the formation of a demand by an 
economic agent on the one hand and the possession, by the same agent, of instruments 
adequate to produce a bargaining power sufficient to support such a demand on the 
other hand. 
The prescriptive nature of what I am claiming in these paragraphs implies that the act of 
using credit by a community comprehends the duty to make sure, in any possible sense, 
that the borrower has or will have the instruments to carry out the expected transaction. 
All these statements can be summarized in the following prescription: credit should be 
one of the forms of investment on its own future made by a community, the only reason 
of its appearance should be to provide each economic agent with adequate instruments 
in order to equalize and maximize their reciprocal utility and bargaining power, in this 
case considered within the scenario of an exchange economy. According to the point of 
view which I have been promoting in this text, this is the only pragmatic language game 
in which the concept of “credit” should be inscribed. Any political action concerning 
credit which we would be able to be described as a formal language game which is dif-
ferent from that, would necessarily represent an alienation from the proper ethical pur-
pose of a community. It would represent, in fact, a relation of forces which develops ac-
cording to laws which are different from the ones which guarantee that all instruments 
necessary for all individuals’ equal maximization of utility-satisfaction are rightly allo-
cated. 
151 
 
 
 
The question which an “instrumental” authority necessarily asks herself is, therefore: 
does credit issuing respect the language game of equalizing and maximizing reciprocal 
“attraction” or utility within every human relationship, in the case of a financial specula-
tive bubble? 
In order to unfold some of the practical details which are implied in such a language 
game one can observe that, according to the “principle” I enounced, 
- Credit should be distributed in function of an evaluation which takes explicitly 
into account how much, given the existence of other already circulating kinds of pro-
duction, a certain new typology of goods suits the contextual potential necessities and 
desires and how much it would create imbalances due to externalities. Credit granting 
has to be evaluated, in other words, by explicitly assessing to what degree a service or a 
material commodity will be required by a community. 
- Once such an assessment has been correctly carried out, short-term expectations 
on the product profitability should only depend on the entrepreneur’s ability to realize a 
good price-quality ratio. 
The answer which an “instrumental” authority strictly following the principles I illus-
trated would give to whether a speculative bubble respects such a language game is, in-
evitably, “no”. The reason is that the assessment of the suitability of lending made in 
order to proceed with a speculative behaviour does not take into account the first point 
above. The logic, or language game, according to which the appropriateness of a loan 
would be accepted would not fit “an account of how much, given the existence of other 
already circulating kinds of production, a certain new typology of goods suits the con-
textual potential necessities and desires and how much it would create imbalances due 
to externalities”. 
In fact, if we consider the game according to which the very mechanism of speculation 
is played, this latter coincides with making the value of and the desire for some or a few 
economic elements (real estates, shares, etc..) increase regardless of whether such ele-
ments may be desired to be consumed or not. Whether she is persuaded that this is pro-
voked by a deliberate attempt by the speculator or she believes that this is just a market 
collateral effect, the credit lender had to approve a financing which makes the demand 
for – and, therefore, the value of – some elements grossly grow in respect to other ones, 
irrespective of the level of the desire to consume them. The objection whereby a stance 
aiming at satisfying individuals’ desires should favour any manifestation of these de-
sires – even not connected to “consuming” – misses the point. 
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In fact, such a scenario is incompatible with the “principle” which should serve as a cri-
terion for evaluating a credit allocation aimed at equalizing and maximizing reciprocal 
utility and bargaining power – whereby one should investigate the potential utility of a 
kind of economic element within a community, taking into account its impact on the 
economic actors and already existent elements. The logic according to which credit al-
located in order to fuel a bubble is used does not satisfy this criterion and the aim illus-
trated above for the following reason. The exaggerated bargaining power of the actors 
trading the assets on which a speculation has been carried out – as well as the corre-
spondent exaggerated power of the creditors who keep financing such a game – is ex-
clusively based on diverting those assets from possibly representing an element to be 
consumed to only or prevalently representing goods-purchased-for-resale. The trans-
formation of the role of a “product” from being traded in order to be consumed to being 
traded in order to be re-traded is at the root of the exponential growth of the demand of 
it and therefore of its value. The same result would be impossible to be achieved 
through goods purchased in order to be almost immediately consumed: while the de-
mand of a consumer reaches a limit, the demand of a trader is potentially infinite. The 
consequence of this is that, in order to provide each individual with the adequate in-
struments in order to potentially maximize reciprocal “attraction” or “utility” within 
every human relationship – as “pragmatic logic” prescribes – , a political authority who 
runs a society where financial speculation is admitted should supply each economic 
agent with adequate instruments – whether monetary, cultural or cognitive – to imitate a 
financial speculator, with the concrete risk of restricting the kinds of goods present 
within the market to only or prevalently goods-purchased-for-resale. 
This would represent a non-preferable environment to live in, being clearly at odds with 
the duty to select suitable credit granting according to how much a product enhances so-
cial usefulness within a context while also maximizing reciprocal usefulness. What an 
“instrumental” authority would understand by following this reasoning is that the social 
structure of a financial bubble is pragmatically unsustainable despite all positive percep-
tions it may convey, at least at first. Such a structure would either make a society create 
a strong discrepancy of bargaining power in favour of creditors and speculators who 
take part in the bubble, or it would lead a community to materially collapse in the at-
tempt to equalize individuals’ potential bargaining power. By following specific practi-
cal criteria, an authority focusing on the optimization of reciprocal utility is able to “cal-
culate” when a certain allocation of instruments shapes forms of power which impede 
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equal potentialities among economic actors and/or which prevent a reasonable contex-
tual evaluation of what would be potentially the most reciprocally useful production. 
There is no need to give an a priori, metaphysical explanation of why the scheme of a 
financial bubble does not respect what would be the most preferable scenario for the 
“naturalness” of a community – such as the reason whereby “human being’s natural 
goal is to exchange goods to consume and utilize them rather than to set up a Ponzi 
scheme”. We are nevertheless able to claim that a similar framework comprehends a 
form of contingent power which for contingent reasons due to, say, the possible size of 
a bubble and the context in which it is inscribed, would damage the rate of social satis-
faction. Because of the structure of unbalanced reciprocal power set up by these contin-
gent reasons, the dynamic of the economic relations of a society would advance in a 
way which will never tend to reciprocal maximization of usefulness but which will ex-
acerbate or confirm power discrepancies. 
In other words, one can affirm that if the language game presented by an economic phe-
nomenon does not coincide with a language game whereby economic actors’ reciprocal 
utility is equalized and maximized through an investigation on long-term utility of the 
goods to select, the countless ways in which such a phenomenon may present instru-
mental discrepancies or inadequacies can give rise to various forms of social distress, 
even unpredictable ones, according to the precise logic according to which such dis-
crepancies are disseminated. The consequences of the factors which make financial 
speculation inadequate are an excellent example of how unbalanced relations of power 
can exacerbate. 
Consider the detailed description of the mechanism of the bubble given by Keen, who 
reports Minsky’s account of debt-driven boom-and-bust cycle. 
The cycle begins with the general decline of risk aversion and the start of the so called 
“euphoric moment”, 
where both lenders and borrowers believe that the future is assured, and therefore 
that most investments will succeed. Asset prices are revalued upward and finan-
cial institutions now accept liability structures for both themselves and their cus-
tomers that, in a more sober expectational climate, they would have rejected. The 
liquidity of firms is simultaneously reduced by the rise in debt to equity ratios, 
making firms more susceptible to increased interest rates. The general decrease 
in liquidity and the rise in interest paid on highly liquid instruments triggers a 
market-based increase in the interest rate, even without any attempt by monetary 
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authorities to control the boom. However, the increased cost of credit does little 
to temper the boom, since anticipated yields from speculative investments nor-
mally far exceed prevailing interest rates, leading to a decline in the elasticity of 
demand for credit with respect to interest rates. The condition of euphoria also 
permits the development of an important actor in Minsky's drama, the Ponzi fin-
ancier. These capitalists profit by trading assets on a rising market, and incur 
significant debt in the process. The servicing costs for Ponzi debtors exceed the 
cash flows of the businesses they own, but the capital appreciation they antici-
pate far exceeds the interest bill. They therefore play an important role in push-
ing up the market interest rate, and an equally important role in increasing the 
fragility of the system to a reversal in the growth of asset values. Rising interest 
rates and increasing debt to equity ratios eventually affect the viability of many 
business activities, reducing the interest rate cover, turning projects that were 
originally conservatively funded into speculative ones, and making ones that 
were speculative "Ponzi." Such businesses will find themselves having to sell as-
sets to finance their debt servicing—and this entry of new sellers into the market 
for assets pricks the exponential growth of asset prices. With the price boom 
checked, Ponzi financiers now find themselves with assets that can no longer be 
traded at a profit, and levels of debt that cannot be serviced from the cash flows 
of the businesses they now control. Banks that financed these assets purchases 
now find that their leading customers can no longer pay their debts—and this re-
alization leads initially to a further bank-driven increase in interest rates. Liquid-
ity is suddenly much more highly prized; holders of illiquid assets attempt to sell 
them in return for liquidity. The asset market becomes flooded and the euphoria 
becomes a panic, the boom becomes a slump
245
 
   In Keen’s paper one can see the details and the consequences of the very high bargain-
ing power which, thanks to the mechanism of the bubble, speculators and creditors ac-
quire in comparison with investors in goods different from goods-purchased-for-resale. 
A power discrepancy impossible to mitigate by means of equalizing potentialities, if not 
at the cost of the risk of dismantling the social pattern of productive investments. Such 
an aporia ensures that value created with speculation privileges possessors of certain 
material or cognitive instruments, which only differ in character from the others. 
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The rise of interest rates for other borrowers and investors is the manifestation of this 
power discrepancy. According to Minsky’s illustration, then, the contingent dissemina-
tion of power unbalances and the expectational nature of the economic fabric combine 
to produce the following process: minor bargaining power of “real economy” investors 
weakens their economic position - their “utility” in comparison with creditors and Ponzi 
sellers - so that they are forced to “invade another territory” and assume the same role as 
Ponzi sellers. Such an unbalanced over-supply of a kind of asset makes the utility and 
bargaining power of this latter figure drop. The consequence is the concatenate decrease 
of economic trust in any agent who is in some way connected with the success of the 
Ponzi sellers – such as institutions of credit – and the spread of general panic. 
The occurrence of a slump as a consequence of a financial bubble is an example of how 
the absence of a continuous maximization of reciprocal utility and bargaining power – 
which should be the task of a society government, by means of its tools such as credit – 
causes a potentially unpredictable dissemination of lack of reciprocal utility and confi-
dence with more or less dangerous outcomes. This is because any language game – 
played by institutions of credit or any authority running the allocation of capacities and 
instruments in a society – which does not respect that “pragmatic principle” represents a 
more or less dangerous departure from an optimized level of reciprocal satisfaction. 
Rorty’s flaw is that he implicitly assumes that the creation of a conversational agree-
ment or of a perception of satisfaction implies that the consciousnesses taking part in 
these coincide with pragmatically maximized consciousnesses. Any authority who takes 
the goal of maximization of concretely possessed instrument seriously in order to 
maximize reciprocal utility, instead, tends to be more sceptical about any configuration 
of forces which appears to overlook elements such as equality in instrumental im-
provement and distribution of credit in function of socially useful products. Any deci-
sion about what current social desires are and what the adequate instruments to fulfil 
them are is always inscribed within a contingent knowledge of a context, and this can-
not be escaped. But the difference between a Rortyan authority and an “instrumental” 
one is, in plain words, that the former is more likely to limit her evaluation to what 
stands out in a certain moment as the conversationally agreed solution to a problem, 
without investigating whether there may be an even “better” allocation of instruments 
and potentialities – without analysing in depth the pragmatic “principles” which have 
been described. 
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In the following chapters I will apply the general attitude I recommended here to ap-
pease the macroeconomic troubles and discrepancies which are usually correlated with 
uncertainty and risk aversion in credit allocation. I will firstly consider the causal link 
whereby uncertainty in credit issuing is the consequence of social economic unbalances. 
I will deal with the opposite causal link of the correlation in a later chapter. 
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         IV 
Power discrepancy between different roles in economic production 
 
 
In this chapter I recall the three “basic economic instruments” previously hinted at: la-
bour force, means of production and credit. By means of a discussion about the distribu-
tion of their ownership-availability to individuals, I hypothesize two scenarios whose 
realization may help to assure a maximization of everybody’s utility in an exchange 
economy. The particular problem of this chapter is the distribution of the first two in-
struments: how to deal with the power discrepancy which can manifest itself among dif-
ferent entrepreneurs, between the “class” of entrepreneurs and workers or among differ-
ent workers. In the first hypothesized scenario, it is initially claimed that a model of 
pragmatically maximized social relationships can be constructed in which the difference 
between employers and employees is maintained. I show how such a scenario cannot 
structurally eliminate imbalances of bargaining power. I go on to show how such an in-
capacity burdens on the functioning of the instrument of credit, through the possible al-
teration of its cost from the classical scheme - according to which this cost should be 
based on the law of supply and demand. In fact, a diversion from this law would denote 
the possibility of uncertainty in lender’s decisions – that is to say the possibility of one 
or more of these elements: an imbalanced competitiveness among entrepreneurs and/or 
of an imbalanced bargaining power between workers and entrepreneurs. The second hy-
pothesis, according to which there should be a coincidence of the roles of entrepreneur 
and employee, is then assessed as the most suitable for the scope of the chapter. 
 
The chapter opens with a brief re-introduction of the meaning of the instrument of credit 
and goes on with a discussion about it which temporarily obliterates the concepts and 
the conclusions achieved in the previous chapter. This is because a discourse is set up 
about the meaning of the functioning of today’s three major economic instruments in 
the manifestation of power discrepancy. This chapter prevalently treats the problem of 
uncertainty in credit granting as just a reaction to other social discrepancies. In the next 
chapter, I will start talking in depth again about the active function of credit in respect 
of distribution of potentialities and maximization of reciprocal utility - as in the previ-
ous chapter. Consequently, I will propose a reformulation of the very institution of 
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credit whose features will be in deep contrast with the ones plainly accepted in this sec-
tion. 
 
 
1 - The necessity of credit between physiological temporal discrepancies and in-
strumental bargaining power imbalances. How the conditions of the existence of a 
credit system can shed light on these latter 
 
Earlier in this work I used the concept of “barter” to connect the discussion about 
agreements between authorities to the economy of exchange. In the following para-
graph, nevertheless, I reported the instrument of “confidence link” as a crucial element 
for the functioning of an equal and beneficial market. The analogy of a “barter econ-
omy” is clearly inadequate in order to highlight the essential instrumental conditions 
which an economic actor has to fulfil to maximize her capacity to produce and claim 
within an economy of exchange. The concept of “credit” is necessary because an eco-
nomic agreement is often temporally or instrumentally asymmetric. In this paragraph I 
start analysing the different meaning of these two kinds of asymmetry, arguing that the 
only ethically acceptable asymmetry is the temporal one, the other being one way not to 
do justice to the naturalness optimization of the Other. 
 
What I have analysed as a “dialectical equivalence” so far comprehends not so much di-
rect exchanges of goods for goods or goods for money between two or more individu-
als, but exchanges of non-final instruments for other non-final instruments. Since the 
“barter” occurring within such an economy mostly includes exchanges of labour skill 
for wage and credit – in all its forms – for interests, the structure which I have been de-
scribing appears as the very contrary of a barter one. It appears not as a set of singulari-
ties exchanging goods but as a holistic system of non-interchangeable roles – employ-
ers, employees and institutions of credit - which creates the optimal condition for pro-
ducing because of the specificity of each role. And while the difference between “em-
ployers” and “employees” can be made at least conceptually consistent – even if not 
“necessary” - with the mechanism of commodity production by recalling the variety of 
predispositions and abilities, the role of the institution of credit within the picture of a 
competitive system of production is not necessarily intuitive to explain. 
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Graziani justifies the existence of the bank in modern economy by having recourse to 
the essential characteristics which the concept of “money” has to satisfy. It has to be a 
token currency, it has to be accepted as a means of final settlement for a payment and it 
must not grant privileges of seigniorage to any agent making a payment. The only way 
to satisfy those three conditions, he states, «is to have payments made by means of 
promises of a third agent, the typical third agent being nowadays a bank».
246
 Graziani 
specifies that these requirements have to do with the very logic through which money 
comes into existence: 
In principle, in a perfectly competitive credit market, no one would borrow 
money from a bank before a payment comes due. This is the simple consequence 
of assuming rational behaviour, since there would be no point in borrowing 
money and paying interests on it while keeping it idle. Money, therefore, only 
comes into existence the moment a payment is made. In that moment, in one and 
the same act, the borrower becomes a debtor to that bank and the agent receiving 
a payment becomes the creditor of the same bank
247
 
   The endogenous nature of money-credit which Graziani depicts is not “strictly neces-
sary” in order to admit the necessity of a third agent for conferring an exchange token to 
an agent who requires it. The existence of deposits of accumulated money would be suf-
ficient, together with the existence of a temporary non-coincidence between demanders 
of a commodity and owners of sufficient liquidity, from which the necessity of borrow-
ing arises. In order to endorse the existence of a third actor other than commodity sup-
pliers and demanders, in effect, a society has to experience a temporary non-coincidence 
between these two agents, which goes beyond the elementary asymmetry traditionally 
recalled in order to justify the passage from an actual barter market to a money econ-
omy. Such a non-coincidence does not concern only the necessity of a token to be used 
to exchange goods between producers who are not reciprocally interested in the respec-
tive products. It concerns, also, the necessity of providing some economic actors with 
such a token before they are able to contribute to production so as to offer any suitable 
use value to a community. The concept of “credit” appears to be essential within a 
community in which an individuals’ capacity to offer and claim in exchange are not 
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symmetric or coordinated. It even seems historically to precede the idea of a pure barter 
classically conceived, as Graeber indicates.
248
 
The insight of the endogenous creation of money-credit, nevertheless, makes it possible 
to better understand the function of credit not only as compensatory for a non-
coincidence between present demanders of goods and possessors of sufficient liquidity 
but, also, as offsetting a diachronic asymmetry between potential suppliers and potential 
demanders of goods. While the former function cannot make nominal aggregate demand 
increase beyond a determinate limit, the latter involves a continuous creation “out of 
thin air” of new purchasing power corresponding to the creation of new wealth. The in-
crease of the overall nominal amount of purchasing power within a community, in cor-
respondence with the undertaking of new projects, can easily convey the idea that the 
asymmetry a credit system deals with is also about the absence of a current connection 
between an agent’s willingness to produce new goods and another agent’s willingness 
to demand them. In this case credit serves as a device in order to increase aggregate 
nominal demand, giving liquidity to borrowers who want to set up new projects and 
consume before being able to produce something to offer in exchange. This insight is 
not a recent conception, since it had already been exposed by Wicksell at the end of 
Nineteenth century, as Turner suggests: 
The essential point Wicksell makes at the core of “Interest and Prices” is that 
[…] banks do not, as too many textbooks still suggest, take deposits of existing 
money from savers and lend it out to borrowers: they create credit and money ex 
nihilo– extending a loan to the borrower and simultaneously crediting the bor-
rower’s money account. That creates, for the borrower and thus for real economy 
agents in total, a matching liability and asset, producing, at least initially, no in-
crease in real net worth. But because the tenor of the loan is longer than the tenor 
of the deposit – because there is maturity transformation –an effective increase in 
nominal spending power has been created
249
 
   One can recap these typologies of asymmetry by saying that the act of granting a 
credit responds to the issue whereby, within a modern exchange economy, it is struc-
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tural that not all agents possess, at one and the same time, the economic instruments of 
the perceived “social utility” which would be necessary in order to complete the com-
modity exchange which is desired. These instruments have to be taken from the three 
main categories which I listed in the previous chapter, that is to say labour power, mate-
rial means of production and the very confidence link which let the element of “credit” 
function. 
What we should observe now, though, is that the lack of instrument possession can con-
stitute an asymmetry which is not simply “temporal”, but also about the possibility of 
utilizing all instruments at an equivalent efficacy, regardless of any temporal discrep-
ancy. This factor makes the analysis of credit reasons and conditions very useful in un-
derstanding how to maximize reciprocal instrumental usefulness, as the pragmatic scope 
of the present enquiry requires. 
 
Notice, firstly, that such a “non-possession” can effectively manifest itself in the form 
of what I have been referring to as a discrepancy of bargaining power due to an instru-
mental disadvantage by some agents. It can be embodied in a non-possession of the 
right to benefit from the product created by the utilized economic instruments and, 
therefore, from the entire exchange value obtained as result of the offered goods. But it 
can be also understood as a non-possessing, by means of one’s economic instruments, a 
degree of attractiveness which is sufficient to decently intercept social desires so as to 
claim the desired value in exchange. 
Cases of non-possession of the first of the two elements just quoted coincide, for in-
stance, with the necessity proper of an underpaid worker of borrowing money to main-
tain her preceding level of consumption. In this case, the worker is subservient to the 
bargaining power of the means of production owned by her employer and she is unable 
to fully benefit from the exchange value incorporated in the use value she produces, as 
in the traditional Marxist argument. A case presenting a lack of the second quoted ele-
ment is the need of a manager of a low-profit small enterprise - who had decided to 
submit a mortgage application – to declare bankruptcy, with the impossibility of fulfill-
ing her mortgage obligations. The reason may be that her machineries were out of date, 
or that she did not have a sufficiently high organizational knowledge. 
While in the first case the worker lacked the bargaining power proper to the machinery, 
in this example the manager has a deficiency in the bargaining power proper of her own 
specific machineries, as well as in the power of her organizational-labour skills. 
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The conditions of the existence of a credit system seem to suggest that such an existence 
is strictly related not only to temporal asymmetries but also to simple instrumental defi-
ciencies which pertain to the economic agents. We have a set of empirical asymmetries 
whereby certain actors are not able to take full advantage of the power intrinsic to the 
major economic instruments. 
Nevertheless, the social meaning of these asymmetries remains ambiguous. I have 
drafted an explanation of the role of “credit” within an exchange society in terms of a 
consequence of a lack of possession of the economic instruments which would be nec-
essary in order to complete the commodity exchange which is desired. This lack of pos-
session coincides with the impossibility of offering to society a full product in order to 
claim something in exchange, the consequence of which is a lack of bargaining power. 
But from a superficial reading of my examples, it is not clear what kind of relation con-
nects this asymmetric power - which does not allow the worker and the aspiring entre-
preneur to fully satisfy their needs - to the necessity of the intervention of a creditor as a 
third agent beyond the ones who perform the exchange. More precisely, it is not clear 
whether such a lack of maximization of bargaining power is to be interpreted  
 
a) only as a deficiency in the social utility and, so, bargaining power of the singular 
economic instruments possessed by an individual each time (for instance as a back-
wardness of labour skill of a worker or of technological tools of an entrepreneur and so 
on) or, also 
b) as a discrepancy in the power of the kind of instrument possessed by an individ-
ual in comparison to the other kind. That is to say as a discrepancy which cannot be 
eliminated unless every individual possesses all kinds of instruments. 
 
Since both labour power and material means are essential instruments to production, an 
intuitive logic would suggest that bargaining power discrepancy can be solved by inter-
preting the problem in either way. In the following paragraphs I will test the correctness 
of such an insight. 
 
I will deal firstly with the hypothesis including supposition a) and secondly with the 
other supposition. In the first place, I will study the logical admissibility of either hy-
pothesis by assuming an appropriate but imaginary scenario in order to verify if the so-
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lution to the imbalances of power which either of them implicitly suggests is logically 
acceptable. After reaching the conclusions, I will face the possibility of the concrete 
construction of the system which I will have judged as adequate to achieve the purpose 
of this chapter. 
 
2 - A first hypothesis to solve instrumental discrepancy: optimization of productive 
instruments which maintains difference of roles 
 
According to a first interpretation, a lack of maximization of potential reciprocal bar-
gaining power is only a deficiency in the efficacy of the singular economic instruments 
possessed by an individual each time. We can put aside the problem of the distribution 
of the kinds of instruments and focus on the contingent improvement of the owned in-
struments in order to achieve an optimization of their efficacy. We can interpret the 
problem of the worker with low wage and of the low-profit small entrepreneur as re-
solvable through a maximization of the power of their specific instruments, in the fol-
lowing way. 
 
Let us assume incentives for a perfectly equitable participation in technological and or-
ganizational advance in order to maximize the instruments of the entrepreneurs.
250
 Sup-
pose, for instance, the establishment of public institutions of engineering and manage-
ment research where the creation of a technological or organizational device is sup-
ported with adequate rewards – according to the effort needed to realize it - and shared 
among private entrepreneurs, together with learning of advances in labour skill shared 
among workers. Similar models which have been recently proposed can be built around 
the idea of the so-called “sharing economy”, in which «people, organizations and com-
munities as active participants produce or co-produce goods and services collaboratively 
or collectively or co-operatively and production is open and accessible to those who 
wish to produce».
251
 
Let us also assume a perfect organization of trade unions in order to maximize every 
worker’s instrument power in an equivalent way. Its objective is a context in which the 
cost of disagreeing with trade unions for the entrepreneurs is equal to the cost of dis-
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agreeing with entrepreneurs for trade unions. This would be consistent with the fact that 
the separation of a category of “labour power possessors” and “means of production 
possessors” allocates to each group an instrument which is fundamental for the func-
tioning of the overall economy. 
The presence of similar institutions - which would ensure the absence of a big profit 
discrepancy among companies making them agents who receive the “same endowment” 
- and the earlier recall to different temporal preferences may push the reader to think of 
a situation similar to the one assumed by Krugman and Eggertsson. They reduce the 
credit system to an agency with the job of matching the deposits of “patient agents” who 
accumulate money with the willingness of borrowing of “impatient agents” who wish to 
renew their activity: 
Suppose that while individuals all receive the same endowments, they differ in 
their rates of time preference. In that case, “impatient” individuals will borrow 
from “patient” individuals. We will assume, however, that there is a limit on the 
amount of debt any individual can run up. Implicitly, we think of this limit as be-
ing the result of some kind of incentive constraint [...]we should think of this 
limit as a proxy for general views about what level of leverage on the part of bor-
rowers is “safe”, posing an acceptable risk either of unintentional default or of 
creating some kind of moral hazard
252
 
   The scope of the present text, nevertheless, is not to take the side of a description of 
money as exogenously created, as Krugman’s overall work seems to assume.
253
 The 
scope of the text is to analyse the material conditions whereby, within an exchange 
economy, each economic agent enjoys an optimization of her capacity to produce in or-
der to obtain something in exchange and, therefore, of her potential bargaining power. 
In this section I am examining the idea whereby a maximization of the potential power 
of each economic role plus a credit system run by a third agent can fulfil those condi-
tions. 
The picture hypothesized by Krugman and Eggertsson can represent, at best, one of the 
possible intuitive suppositions of this kind of society. A society in which there are some 
agents who act as “third agent” between potential producers and potential consumers – 
endowed with the same power - by providing them credit, indifferently to whether the 
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available amount of such a credit is decided by a political authority to have a certain 
limit
254
 or whether it is potentially infinite and endogenously created. 
 
According to the premises I laid out earlier, such a third agent has to compensate for a 
temporal asymmetry between agents who correspond to potential suppliers and deman-
ders of commodities. It must not make up for asymmetries of power coming from a de-
ficiency proper of owned production instruments. Each time this latter case occurs, in 
fact, the appearance of what can be considered as inevitable and necessary elements on 
which an agent needs to depend – interest on loans, for instance, dependence on a pri-
vate lender’s evaluation and convenience to start a business up, etc.. – would not be jus-
tified as ethically necessary. They would be read as an unjustified and avoidable devia-
tion from the way in which individuals should be able to obtain wealth within an ex-
change economy, namely by producing a commodity to exchange due to the potential 
access to maximally useful instruments. Interest, for example, would be only a shift of 
bargaining power from an individual who should be able to obtain exchange power 
through maximally productive instruments to an individual who has a bargaining advan-
tage due to a contingent imbalanced allocation of instruments. 
 
 
The system which I have described consists in an established amount of financial re-
sources which are available to the entrepreneurs who wish to update or expand their ac-
tivity and who work within a context of temporary and negligible differences of com-
petitiveness and solid aggregate demand, due to the institutions I have hypothesized. In 
effect, even if this last statement does not arise from a neo-classical assumption on a 
long-run self-balancing of market, what has been envisaged is supposed to promote a 
minimization of both the firms and the banks risk aversion. This would lead to a situa-
tion in which the opportunity to finance and improve one’s activity and, consequently, 
to maintain a well-distributed income among the members of the different firms are two 
stages of the same circular and self-fulfilling process. 
The minimization of the firms and the banks risk aversion would come from the percep-
tion of a good sustainability of the firms debts due to the stability of consumers demand 
and to high and solid wages, as well as to an advanced circulation of innovation which 
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would balance competition. The relative stability of productivity and capital asset yields 
would make investment expectations relatively steady. 
The macroeconomic tendency here hypothesized can be interpreted through the so-
called “convention theory” of asset pricing which, as Wray and Tymoigne underline, is 
typically attributed to Keynes and Minsky. According to this theory, 
there are no a priori fundamentals toward which asset prices will tend inexora-
bly. Individuals are ignorant, not because they do not know how to behave ra-
tionally, but because the future is not written in stone; it is fundamentally uncer-
tain. In order to reduce ignorance about an unknowable future, fundamentals are 
created through social interactions in order to provide a vision of the future that 
justifies current decisions
255
 
   Even if the contingency of market and economic actor’s behaviour make it impossible 
to establish perfectly sharable information among investors and producers, the aware-
ness of a relative stability of competitiveness in the firms and aggregate demand would 
serve as device to maintain reciprocal bargaining power as steady as possible. It would 
create a system of expectations whereby there would be no relevant reason to fear an 
abrupt change in asset prices and aggregate demand. This would assure a steady level of 
financing for firms which would circularly fulfil the expected equilibrium among pro-
ducers. A system in which the workers’ and the entrepreneurs’ respective instruments 
are maximized would, in other words, set an environment of solid reciprocal expecta-
tions. These would be coincident with a balanced bargaining power of all firm mem-
bers, in their equitable capacity of obtaining financing in case they become “impatient 
agents”. 
According to the convention theory we do not need to assume the possibility of perfect 
information among economic agents in order to presuppose the awareness of a recipro-
cal stable bargaining power. We just need to assume the self-fulfilling perception of a 
durable continuity. Crotty describes such a system of perceptions as the allegiance of 
the agents to a form of social convention: 
a stable set of conventions provides one of the two major sources of conditional 
stability in a Keynesian model.(A stable set of institutions is the other.) The fol-
lowing quotation about conventional expectations from The General Theory 
helps clarify this point: “the facts of the existing situation enter, in a sense dis-
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proportionately, into the formation of our long-term expectations; our usual prac-
tice being to take the existing situation and to project it into the future, modified 
only to the extent that we have more of less definite reasons for expecting a 
change”. As long as conventions such as these maintain the allegiance of the ma-
jority of agents, they will help provide continuity and predictability to economic 
life. To assume that the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely and to 
project the existing situation into the future is to adopt extrapolation as a mode of 
forecasting. Conventions thus help generate an illusion of continuity that can 
contribute to the creation of stability when conditions are right.
256
 
   The convention approach differs both from the rational and the irrational view. Within 
the rational perspective market unbalances are caused by decisions made exceptionally 
through imperfect information, which alter the prices which are “natural” within a con-
text: 
the expected returns on holding any asset are determined by “rational” individu-
als who use the guidance of a priori fundamentals. This theory is closely associ-
ated with the efficient market theory and requires that informational problems 
exist (asymmetric information, lack of computational power, or other problems) 
in order to explain the emergence of bubbles and over-investment. Otherwise, 
according to the rational view, information is optimally used, so asset prices are 
always at their fundamental value and the level of investment is always at its op-
timal value
257
 
   The irrational approach, similarly, assumes the theoretical knowability of the “natu-
ral” value of the assets within a certain context, but its exponents argue that asset pric-
ing is mostly done by individuals who normally show little concern for the existing a 
priori fundamentals. In fact, «for some of the followers of this approach (the behav-
ioural finance camp), this is a behavioural anomaly, but for others it is a normal behav-
iour (albeit irrational). In any case, irrational behaviours are believed to generate waves 
of panics and bubbles, which lead to periods of over- and underinvestment».
258
 
Even if the theorized mechanism does not suppose perfect information and knowledge 
of “natural” prices, it is based on the idea of an equilibrium in investors’ confidence due 
to the awareness of a continuous possibility of competitiveness redevelopment and a 
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relatively stable aggregate demand, due to the power of trade unions. These are the ele-
ments which, in order to validate the functioning of this proposed solution, have to pre-
vent any flaw which can undermine an impatient agent’s reliability in her demanding 
financial resources. 
 
 
3 - A credit system run by private lenders which only compensates for temporal 
discrepancies should price its product exclusively according to supply-demand 
laws 
 
A system where workers and entrepreneurs enjoy an optimization of their potential bar-
gaining power, in order to remain stable, needs to incorporate a self-feeding mechanism 
of expectations which maintain equilibrium in investors’ confidence. The system I have 
assumed must not experience the fragility which current market economy produces 
breaking such a confidence equilibrium. 
This fragility is well underlined by Keen while talking about Keynes’ idea of “uncer-
tainty”: «We project the present into the future, we comfort ourselves that our collective 
hunches have got the future right, we follow the herd. Expectations formed in this way 
are bound to be fragile, since future circumstances almost inevitably turn out to be dif-
ferent to what we expected. Expectations will therefore be volatile, resulting in sudden 
shifts in investor (and speculator) sentiment».
259
 
The non-fulfilment of an expectation brings about uncertainty, an uncertainty which re-
flects the awareness that an economic structure may cause some economic actors to ex-
perience a flaw in the effectiveness of their economic instruments, whether labour skills 
or machinery. For instance, the case in which a certain number of capitalists become un-
reliable because of a crisis of overproduction can be interpreted, by the capitalists, as a 
miscalculation of the demand – or utility – which their means of production create. The 
same sorts of cases are interpreted, by the potential consumers whose demand has pos-
sibly lowered, as their deficiency in the first two kinds of instruments – an interpretation 
which is also more socially just. 
The possibility that investors and creditors face uncertainty in their choice of whether to 
invest liquidity in some actor’s project mirrors the weakness that such an actor may ex-
perience in obtaining something in exchange by means of what she offers. It can mirror, 
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in particular, the possibility that some agents within the economic system may not be 
able to produce enough to exchange in order to cover the credit which such an actor had 
required - whether those agents coincide with potential buyers or with the same pro-
ducer on whom investors relied. 
 
The possibility of uncertainty - as the mark that “some agents within the economic sys-
tem may not be able to produce enough to be exchanged in order to cover the credit 
which they had required - can be observed, within the context of the credit system, in 
the specific determination of the price of credit granting. 
Within the economic framework I am discussing, the credit system has been set as a 
management of financial resources owned by certain individuals who sell to other indi-
viduals the capacity to purchase material and human resources, capacity which can be 
read as an anticipation of a reward for their future contribution to community well-
being. Such a capacity can be considered as an asset, a commodity which the creditors 
have created as required by their role and/or which they had “gained” – depending on 
the kind of banking system one assumes. The laws determining the terms of a commod-
ity transaction in general within an exchange economy are supposed to follow relatively 
simple criteria: the cost of “raw materials” and the ratio between available amount of 
such a commodity and demanded amount, which in turn influences the bargain between 
the supplier’s willingness to sell and the demander’s willingness to buy. 
The factor of quality, in particular, marks the difference between the significance of the 
concept of commodity in an ordinary sense and the commodity of “credit” for a discus-
sion about the maximization of reciprocal bargaining powers. Contrary to the other 
kinds of commodity transactions, in fact, credit granting is the only case in which the 
factor of quality can pertain to the demander of the product, as well as to the supplier’s 
product. “Quality” in this case can be the reliability of the borrower, seen as the level of 
certainty given by the product achieving the predicted “success” and “functioning”. Its 
reduction would cause, in the described system, the supplier (lender) to increase the 
price (interest rate) in order to compensate for the higher chance of not being repaid. 
In ordinary transactions the relevance of quality for an exchange economy can be sub-
sumed under a model dealing with supplied and demanded quantity. Lower quality af-
fects the price of the product in the sense of a decreased willingness to pay – or charge - 
a certain amount of money for a low-quality commodity. In the case of credit transac-
tion, instead, the element of “quality for the supplier” assumes a further social meaning, 
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which cannot be incorporated within a simple market logic concerning supply and de-
mand. Such a meaning is linked to an allocation of the economic instruments which is 
not balanced, since the anticipation of confidence link which coincides with credit 
granting may remain unfulfilled. 
According to the self-feeding mechanism of expectations pictured above, the interfer-
ence of the factor of quality for the supplier in the “sale” of credit – which corresponds 
to the possibility of uncertainty – would denote the presence of one or more of these 
elements: the institution of an imbalanced competitiveness among entrepreneurs and/or 
of an imbalanced bargaining power between workers and entrepreneurs.
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This means that the possibility of the interference of lower quality on credit price indi-
cates that the function of these economic instruments is not structurally maximised for 
everybody – such a function being the “maximization of one’s own capacity to claim in 
exchange within an exchange economy”. To say that this function is not structurally 
maximized for everybody is equivalent to saying that - when quality plays a role in de-
termining credit price – the possibility of achieving a maximization of capacity to claim 
in exchange or a maximization of matching a future product to a future demand would 
be at the mercy of contingency. 
This is a central point, since the major purpose of this chapter is to theorize a social 
model which prevents the formation of pictures like this. I am attempting to hypothesize 
a distribution of socio-economic instruments in which the pragmatist purpose of creat-
ing a maximally enjoyable “sharing of conversations” and the Derridean purpose of 
achieving a genuine openness to the Other are authentically realized. If we interpret an 
“enjoyable sharing of conversations” as “an agreement between two or more individuals 
about what is reciprocally satisfying within the constraint of intersubjective life”, we 
can identify such a sharing with the fruit of the reciprocal bargain typical of the ex-
change of goods and services. So, in order to maximize the enjoyability which this 
agreement conveys we need to maximize the preferability – or “utility” – of what every 
agent can offer and also, therefore, bargain in exchange. A similar operative conclusion 
can be reached if we read the total openness to the Other as the task to maximize the 
Other’s potentiality to desire – to “claim in exchange”. I intend to outline a similar 
model in contrast with Rorty’s and Derrida’s actual proposals, since these latter assume 
the reliance on authorities whose decisions about what is desirable can be dependent on 
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necessities and desires – or “agreements” - produced by a contingent distribution of re-
sources among individuals. One of the contexts to which the latter situation would cor-
respond is the one in which the maximization for everybody of the function of the de-
scribed economic instruments is only contingently reached – if reached. 
Hence the necessity of verifying whether this first model which I am testing allows the 
possibility that the factor of uncertainty might condition the price of credit, given its 
significance for such a check. 
 
 
In the case that lower quality – namely a certain level of uncertainty – does not interfere 
with the determination of supply and demand, we can abstract for simplicity from the 
cost of “raw materials” and state that, within a market of commodity-credit, interest rate 
and demand for credit are purely and circularly determined by each other. There is not 
the possibility that, in other words, interest rate may be determined by elements directly 
or indirectly produced by a lower level of expectation. 
These elements are synthesized by Keen in the continuation of his introduction to 
Keynes’ concept of uncertainty in his recall of the phenomenon of liquidity preference: 
a shift in expectations can suddenly change the values placed on assets, to the 
detriment of anyone whose assets are held in non-liquid form. As a consequence, 
money plays an essential role in a market economy because of its instant liquid-
ity[...] This ‘liquidity preference’, Keynes argued, determines the rate of interest: 
the less we trust our fragile expectations of the future, the higher the rate of in-
terest has to be to entice us to sacrifice unprofitable but safe cash for potentially 
profitable but volatile assets
261
 
   Liquidity preference is therefore the attitude – of investors – to demand a greater re-
ward in order to invest in less liquid and more risky assets. The idea of liquidity prefer-
ence implies the apparent paradox whereby a decrease in investment can even make in-
terest rates increase, since it would strengthen the perception of distrust within an econ-
omy. It prevents the market of credit from functioning according to a simple logic of 
supply and demand. According to Keynes, liquidity preference acts as «a barometer of 
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the degree of our distrust of our own calculations and conventions concerning the fu-
ture».
262
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 Keynes 1937, P. 216. Keen goes on by quoting what is perhaps the most famous systematization of 
Keynes’ insights into the scheme of classical economics, namely Hicks’ model. He presents such a model 
as an example of how the Keynesian concept of uncertainty has been concealed in the development of 
mainstream economics and of its political outcomes. In this framework, demand for money is directly in 
relation with the rate of interest without this relation being influenced by any liquidity preference. That is 
to say that an increase in the rate of interest reduces demand for liquidity made through loans, while a fall 
in the interest rate leads to an expansion of investment. Hicks does put it in contrast with the “typical” 
classic equation whereby «the amount of money determined total output (output was some constant times 
the money stock)» (Keen 2011a, P. 126). However, the resulting diagram ends up distorting Keynes’ view 
and representing what the relation between interest rate and real output would be in absence of liquidity 
preference and in the absence of cases of uncertainty in expectations which are causes or effects of liquid-
ity preference. The model can therefore be interpreted as a macroeconomic system in which interest rate 
and demand for money are circularly determined by each other. According to Hicks synthesis, «income 
and the rate of interest are determined together at P, the point of intersection of the curve LM representing 
the combinations of income and interest rate whereby the demand for money is constant, equal to a cer-
tain money supply and the curve IS representing the variation of income-expenditure correspondent to a 
certain level of interest rate. They are determined together; just as price and output are determined to-
gether in the modern theory of demand and supply» (Hicks 1937, P. 153). For this model, an increase in 
the interest rate makes the demand for money drop, while an increase in income makes it increase. Higher 
incomes, in fact, increase demand for money because, by definition, what is income for somebody is an 
expenditure for somebody else: higher incomes correspond to an increase in transactions and, therefore, 
to a higher demand for cash, in comparison with a situation of recession or stagnation in which money is 
prevalently hoarded rather than used and engaged in circulation. Higher incomes increase demand for 
money also because a positive economic trend favours profit expectations and willingness in firms to fi-
nance new projects. A further amount of liquidity – through bonds, for instance – is therefore demanded. 
Nevertheless, the consequence of this is to make interest rates increase. The meaning of the LM curve is, 
in fact, that in order to maintain demand for money constant income has to increase together with interest 
rate. This can also be interpreted by saying that suppliers of money perceive it convenient to raise the 
price during periods of demand increase. On the other hand, when interest rate increases investment drops 
and so do income and demand for money. The cycle ideally “begins” again with low demand for money 
and low interest rate. The diagram can be therefore interpreted as the graphical representation of all the 
points “covered” by a dynamic cycle in which price of and demand for credit determine each other with-
out the interference of uncertainty. This scenario is evident and intuitive if one imagines – as in the pic-
ture assumed by Krugman - that the creation of money is not endogenous and that, therefore, money can 
be considered as finite, at least within an environment abstracted from government intervention. Within a 
similar environment, in fact, the difference between a situation in which a calculable share of liquidity is 
temporarily “unused” and a situation – higher incomes - in which a greater share is actively used, making 
its cost increase, is clearer. In effect, in Hick’s model «the money supply was treated as exogenous – de-
termined external to the model itself, independent of any forces in it, and completely under the control of 
the monetary authorities» (Keen 2011a, P. 126). Should the monetary authorities decide to decrease 
money supply, it is generally accepted that the model shows an increase in interest rate, according to the 
supply and demand laws: «Holding constant the amount of income and thus the demand curve for real 
money balances, we see that a reduction in the supply of real money balances raises the interest rate that 
equilibrates the money market. Hence, a decrease in the money supply shifts the LM curve upward» 
(Mankiw 2010, P. 305). Also, the level of prices is imagined as constant within IS-LM model and so I 
treat it in this paragraph, for the sake of simplicity. Considering money creation as endogenous – namely 
as the result of the creation of deposits each time private banks grant a loan – makes a graphical represen-
tation of the model more complex. In the first place, in such a situation an increase in money supply can-
not simply lead to a decrease in interest rate since it implies, in theory, a coincident increase in demand 
for money. In order to univocally figure out how supply-demand laws work in this case we would need to 
closely examine the respective bargaining power of lenders and borrowers, which depends on their will-
ingness, desire and necessity to carry out the dealing. Moreover, it is problematic to presuppose an en-
dogenous creation of money which is “pure” since, in this case, even in the macroeconomic situation 
which I am analysing, private banks may have to deal with the constraint of the cost of loan “raw mate-
rial”, liquidity reserves. In the current banking system, for instance, the amount of assets (loans, deposits) 
a bank holds is usually much broader than the amount of reserves (“base money”) it possesses, through 
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4 - Main issues to be solved to defuse uncertainty. Recall of the very pragmatist 
meaning of such issues 
 
In order to conclude that all economic actors enjoy equally maximized instruments of 
production, the cost of credit issuing in the scenario I have assumed has to be deter-
mined only by supply-demand laws. We have to ask whether the first hypothesis I de-
veloped, in which suppliers of work and of means of production have their respective 
instruments maximised but keep their roles separated, manages to structurally maintain 
such a characteristic. 
According to the premises I have laid down, in order for this criterion to be fulfilled the 
third agent, who acts as a supplier of “confidence link” (credit), must not have the pos-
sibility to perceive a change in the conventional expectations of its customers’ economic 
product profitability. More precisely, it must not have the possibility to perceive that the 
expected profit of its customers may turn out to be so low as to not cover the sum of 
money she needs to pay back. For us, in fact, it is essential that in the structure of the 
economic scenario I illustrated there is no possibility that creditors perceive such an un-
certainty. This very possibility would manifest the fact that the recalled structure makes 
it not necessary – but, rather, contingent - that the price of credit responds to pure sup-
ply and demand criteria. This would mean, in fact, that it is not necessary that in such an 
economic system all actors have economic instruments which are equally efficacious 
and maximized in their function, where “function” means their capacity to be economi-
cally useful and demanded by a community so as to make their possessors acquire a cer-
tain bargaining power. 
But in what way can the hypothesized system fail to equalize and maximize for every-
body the social utility of its instruments and create a relevance of “liquidity preference” 
                                                                                                                                                                          
which it fulfils withdrawals and settles payments with other banks. It is therefore a normal juncture in the 
everyday transfer of reserves among banks that a bank may reduce its liquidity. In order not to risk run-
ning out of liquidity, therefore, it has to “purchase” more reserves from the central bank or it has to obtain 
additional reserves by attracting other customers’ deposits, coming from other banks. In practice, banks 
attempt to do that by raising the interest rate through which they reward these new deposits, which can be 
seen as the practice of competing with other buyers in order to purchase the “commodity” which is, in this 
case, the raw material of loans – liquidity (See McLeay et al. 2014). Each time a similar situation appears, 
a bank has to calculate at what price the loan it grants would be profitable. All this prevents a situation of 
endogenous creation of money from representing a parallel increase or decrease in demand and supply for 
money. It also precludes the existence of a fixed cost for a certain amount of “loan raw material”. What is 
essential for us at this point, in any case, is to underline the necessity that the process of credit granting 
necessarily responds to pure supply and demand laws, even in the case that they are not as simple and in-
tuitive to represent as in Hicks’ model. This necessity is in effect fulfilled also by the endogenous money 
system I have just illustrated, in which interest rate is set by a social bargaining between suppliers and 
demanders and by the cost of “raw materials”, without any role attributable to uncertainty. 
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in the price of credit? I pointed out earlier that such an occurrence has to correspond to 
the formation of a discrepancy between the bargaining power given by the instruments 
of labour power or of means of production. A discrepancy meaning that the product of 
the work of some of these instruments becomes less “useful” or less “important” to so-
ciety, so as to confer lower power of negotiation in the exchange with its producer. 
Such a conclusion comes from the assumptions which the constructed system has re-
quired. In fact, the existence of an institution whereby possessors of means of produc-
tion – except in the very short run – enjoy, within their “category”, an equivalent in-
strumental utility and power of negotiation has been assumed. A similar situation has 
been imagined for the possessors of labour power, thanks to the protection of the or-
ganization of trade unions. These assumptions need to be verified in their actual empiri-
cal feasibility
263
, but at a first logical assessment seem to be coherent: the first one sim-
ply states that by giving each individual of one “category” the same economic utility, all 
members of that category enjoy the same bargaining power. The second one is even tau-
tological, stating that by reducing all workers to one virtual negotiator, they can enjoy 
the same bargaining power. The next assumption which has been made is more nebu-
lous; it asserts that the task of such an organization of trade unions is also to create a 
context in which the cost of disagreeing with trade unions for the entrepreneurs is equal 
to the cost of disagreeing with entrepreneurs for trade unions. The pragmatic basis of 
that has not been explicated yet in terms of reciprocal bargaining power founded on re-
spective contribution and utility to the community. That is to say that it is not clear why 
and how the two categories of agents should achieve the same level of utility or capacity 
to negotiate, while owning two instruments which are different and non-commensurable 
in the historical weight of their social utility. 
All this suggests that, in order to clarify whether the proposed system lets all agents 
have economic instruments which are equally efficacious in their economic weight, we 
have to concentrate our energy on the determination of the reciprocal force of what I 
synthesized as the group of labour power owners and the group of the owners of means 
of production. 
As terminology gradually becomes more complex, however, it is important not to forget 
the pragmatist goal which the maximization of economic utility of both labour power 
and means of production fundamentally carry. With this goal I indicate the necessity 
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that, on the one hand, the technological and organizational advances utilized by entre-
preneurs and useful to make the product of labour as satisfying as possible are enhanced 
among work unities as much as possible. This is clearly a pragmatic purpose, aimed at 
improving “indiscriminately” what in the first two chapters I referred to as the prefer-
ability of a situation as it is perceived by the naturalnesses of the involved individuals. 
On the other hand, this same maximization of advances has to be accompanied by a 
pragmatic optimization of the concept of exchange economy in which they are installed, 
based on reciprocal bargaining powers aimed at claiming something in exchange. Ac-
cording to the conclusions reached in the course of the third chapter, it needs to ensure a 
potentially equivalent reciprocal utility of all economic agents, in order to do justice to 
the desires and naturalness of as many individuals as possible. This is reached among 
the entrepreneurs by means of the equal maximization of advances mentioned earlier, 
and among the workers by means of the organization of perfectly cohesive trade unions. 
The problematic equivalence of the bargaining power of these two groups, instead, is 
what I am going to examine now. 
A maximization of the quality of the products combined with an equivalence of the po-
tential reciprocal powers of negotiation among those who produce them would be the 
highest pragmatic realization of the very structure of exchange economy, analysed as a 
set of agreements among individuals about what is reciprocally advantageous within the 
constraints of intersubjective life . 
 
 
5 - The inquiry on the possibility of an equivalent reciprocal power of means of 
production and labour: cultural and theoretical reasons 
 
There are two interconnected reasons why I first interpreted the problem of the maximi-
zation of reciprocal economic utility as resolvable through the maximization of the util-
ity – and, consequently, bargaining power – of the specific instrument possessed by an 
agent, whatever typology it is. 
Firstly it is because the vagueness of what I named as the “nebulous” assumption of the 
potential equivalent bargaining power of workers and “work demanders” may be never-
theless dispelled by something which is apparently logically coherent. This is the 
equivalent necessity of the two involved instruments, labour power and means of pro-
duction, for human society in order to implement an exchange economy. We have there-
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fore the need to verify whether a similar argument can be seriously applied in order to 
legitimise the focus on the balance of bargaining power of different separated roles. 
But such a hypothesis also deserves our attention because it presents a division of roles 
which, historically, seems to constitute a sort of inescapable condition for the good 
functioning of a modern exchange economy according to the majority of the analysts of 
macroeconomic unbalances. The overwhelming agreement on – or placid assumption of 
– the convenience of such a separation has made it even possible to univocally associate 
it with the capitalist organization of production in a very broad sense, which goes be-
yond the distinction between “free market economy” and “state planned” or “state su-
pervised” economy, as Wolff underlines: 
[In the definition of capitalism] I highlight the internal organization of produc-
tion and distribution: how the social sites where goods and services are produced 
and distributed organize those processes. A capitalist system is, then, one in 
which a mass of people – productive workers – interact with nature to fashion 
both means of production (tools, equipment and raw materials) and final prod-
ucts for human consumptions [...] the capitalist agrees to buy worker’s labour 
time [...] Finally, the worker agrees that the total output emerging from her or his 
labour is immediately and totally the private property of the capitalist
264
 
   Wolff insists on how the necessity of a distinction between labour demanders and la-
bour suppliers has gained the status of a self-evident truth to the extent that, within the 
debates about the issue of wealth distribution, any disapproval of such a basic structure 
has appeared as a taboo: «[...] it was possible to target capitalist enterprises’ monopolis-
tic activities, racial and gender discrimination and environmental degradation – even the 
corruption of political institutions. However, critics learned to focus only on the specific 
misbehaviours – not on the economic system that induced, rewarded and reproduce 
them».
265
 
The persuasion that a similar distinction of roles is the natural or suitable framework for 
a capitalist system has even characterized the theses of economists who have tried to go 
beyond the current aspect of market economy. Most authors who recently took position 
against the current model of the financial and labour market and the inevitable imbal-
ance of bargaining power it brings, in fact, incarnate attempts to promote more or less 
radical reforms to the relationship between the powers held by workers and possessors 
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of means of production. The fundamental message which seems to pass through their 
texts is that, in order to mitigate or cancel the supremacy of one class – usually the 
“capitalists” – over the other – usually the “workers” – we are right to rely on the capac-
ity to negotiate which can be potentially acquired by the lower class. Keen, for instance, 
after having demonstrated that the reward received by workers does not depend on their 
marginal contribution to output but on the relative bargaining power of employers and 
employees, in order to equalize this situation suggests the institution of a minimum 
wage and the existence of trade unions: 
Without trade unions, the labour supply will be competitive and will therefore be 
‘exploited’, because the wage will be less than the price for which the marginal 
worker’s output can be sold […]With a monopoly seller of labour confronting 
non-competitive purchasers of labour, the wage is indeterminate. It will lie be-
tween the minimum set by the marginal revenue product of labour (which means 
that firms are exploiting workers), and the maximum set by the rising marginal 
cost of workers (which means that workers are exploiting firms). The final posi-
tion will be determined by the relative bargaining power of the two groups, 
which cannot be determined by the market
266
 
   The confidence here is on the fact that a construction of a monopoly of the instrument 
of labour power makes its possessor able to compete with the bargaining power of the 
possessors of the other kind of instrument. Keen’s stress on the measure of minimum 
wage
267
 also presupposes, in the end, that the “lower” class owns a power of negotiation 
which is sufficient to politically compete with the one of “employers”, even if this signi-
fies simply to acquire the necessary consciousness to support or set up a similar political 
proposal. But the overall logic is based on the implied argument that, since the workers’ 
power can theoretically be made equivalent to the employers’, we do not need to deal 
with any issue concerning the legal control of means of production by suppliers of la-
bour. 
Another paradigmatic example is Piketty who, instead, neglects the problem that «in-
come and wealth distribution are co-determined by technological, cultural, and social 
forces that become entwined with the legal and institutional structure of the econ-
omy».
268
 As Colander points out, Piketty glosses over the overall discussion about the 
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oligopoly of technological progress combined with the legal and property rights frame-
work such as ownership of assets, patents and machineries as influencing income distri-
bution. He just concentrates his attention on how the means of production decide mar-
ginal product and, consequently, wealth inequality and how to best patch up the imbal-
ance of wealth coming from this system. What he recommends is a progressive income 
tax: 
The problem with Piketty’s discussion is that it is based in a Ricardian frame-
work in thinking about the income distribution problem. Let me explain. David 
Ricardo framed the income distribution question as a technical production issue. 
In Ricardo’s model technology determines marginal products and marginal 
products determine income distribution. This means the policy to affect income 
distribution is a redistribution policy; it accepts marginal productivities, but is 
designed to modify the resulting pre-tax income distribution through some type 
of equality preferring tax policy such as a progressive income or wealth tax
269
 
   Positions such as Keens’ and Piketty’s reflect the predominant attitude of a cultural 
environment and represent two different branches of the attitude whereby the dualism 
employer-employee can be accepted as the structural form of market economy. Accord-
ing to the first, the separation of ownership between the instrument of labour power and 
of the means of production is not necessarily unbalancing since you can take action to 
equalize reciprocal bargaining power. According to the latter, a social organization 
other than such a separation is not even worthy of being taken into consideration within 
a “capitalist” economy. Consequently, what I intend to do is to verify whether the first 
statement is correct. In case it is not, I intend to demonstrate that a reform of the tradi-
tional separation of roles existing within production is worthy of being taken into con-
sideration, as more likely to carry the logical and material prerequisites in order to cre-
ate a community of individuals with equivalent instrumental reciprocal bargaining 
power. 
 
 
6 – The dialectical fallacy of the practices of trades unions. The arbitrary rational-
ity of this solution 
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The logic which drives the attempt to build such a community while maintaining the 
role separation is based on two axioms. The first one, as already stated, is that by giving 
each individual of one “category” the same economic utility, all of its members enjoy 
the same bargaining power. This is realized, within the category of the “entrepreneurs”, 
by the sharing of innovation I recalled and, within the category of “workers”, by their 
perfect coordination through trades unions in which each supplier of labour power is 
safeguarded to the same degree. 
Notice that, contrary to the case of entrepreneurs, the typical characteristics of the in-
strument of “labour power” lead to the fact that the degree of utility within this category 
cannot only be enhanced and equalized only through an improvement of the “quality” of 
the instrument (of labour skill). The essential difference between the category of em-
ployers and employees is that, if in a scenario of maximization of instruments there is 
an excessive “supply” of entrepreneurs in respect to the number which would be neces-
sary to fulfil the demand of a specific commodity, this only results in a decline of in-
come for the entrepreneurs. But in the case that there are too many employees in respect 
to the minimum number necessary to produce a commodity, the most likely result, in 
the absence of trade unions, is not an equal profit sharing – preferably accompanied by a 
lightening of respective workload. The result is a fall in the number of employees: quan-
tity of labour can be manipulated according to necessity, contrary to employers who do 
not “depend” on anybody. But this reduces the concept of labour power to a merely 
quantitative one and this is the reason why I did not give a central position to the ques-
tion of workers’ equivalent training. 
One can assume - as I have done - that any feature linked to quality and efficiency of a 
worker’s job is optimized by an equal training among individuals or as the product of 
the entrepreneur’s commitment, organization or capacity to provide incentives and in-
novation. But the social utility of labour power in situations such as the one just imag-
ined is merely measured by the amount of willingness to provide such a power by its 
suppliers, such as in a logic of supply and demand. That is to say, in plain words, that in 
the absence of an efficacious trade union, workers may engage a downward trade war, 
in which the continuous presence of somebody’s willingness to provide a larger amount 
of work at the same price alters all members’ utility. A coordination between workers 
would essentially make, instead, the overall level of willingness to work homogeneous 
and adequate for every worker, as though they were one single person negotiating with 
the members of the other “category”. 
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The second axiom which holds up the solution of the equivalent maximization of each 
agent’s specific instrumental economic power has been identified in the recognition 
that, within an exchange economy, the two groups of individuals conceptually separated 
and ranged within the sets of “possessors of labour force” and of “means of production” 
are, taken in their entirety, useful for the functioning of the overall economy in an 
equivalent way. To recall the pragmatic purpose of this text we can state that such a so-
lution envisages an optimization of the quality-utility of every enterprise, combined 
with an equal sharing between the class of employers and employees of the fruit gener-
ated by the enterprise exchange power. 
At first sight the potential “equal usefulness” and power of the two entire groups may 
seem even obvious, given that the very structure of an exchange economy supposes the 
presence of both means of production and labour power as its condition of possibility. 
The empirical evidence of the historical discrepancy between the bargaining power of 
the two categories, though, makes this remark less obvious. What can be said, therefore, 
is that the logic of the second axiom is founded on the auspice that the very structure of 
production makes it possible, by means of adequate improvements, to maintain the 
specificity of the roles called, for simplicity, “workers” and “entrepreneurs” while mak-
ing the reciprocal social utility – and bargaining power – of their owners equivalent. 
But what occurrence ensures an achievement and recognition of both groups of agents 
as being necessary in an equivalent way for the functioning of an exchange economy? 
As the case of workers self-coordinating within trade unions can convey, such an occur-
rence coincides with the very element of recognition of oneself as being essential to the 
process of production. Once both the utility and the bargaining power of an economic 
instrument are recognized as being determined by the suppliers’ willingness to provide 
it, and the kind of instrument is recognized as essential for the functioning of the econ-
omy, each authority’s pragmatic impulse to the maximization of its benefits would lead 
to the formation of a monopoly, in which all singular instruments of that kind are essen-
tially transformed into one instrument managed by one supplier, in order to perfectly 
control the level of price and the level of “willingness”. 
The recognition that “utility and bargaining power of one’s instrument is determined by 
the suppliers’ willingness to provide it, and that such a kind of instrument is essential 
for the functioning of the economy”, is likely to be developed even among the posses-
sors of means of production or, at least, among the possessors of certain types of these 
latter. 
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All this would not be strictly at odds with any laws concerning supply and demand. It 
would simply represent a certain choice made by a group of individuals about how 
much it is convenient for them to offer, given a certain effort and reward, as any agent 
would do in an exchange economy. In this sense we can read such a choice as a strategy 
to “compete” for an advantageous outcome in the exchange, as several authors also ac-
knowledge when talking about the concept of “cartel”: 
cartels do not abolish competition, but regulate it. […] Economic analysis works 
with a stark dichotomy of markets (cartels as distortions) or hierarchies (cartels 
as incomplete, inefficient internalization). This conceptual straitjacket leads to 
one of the largest misconceptions about cartels that they halt competition and in-
novation. Instead they reshape the rules of the game on which competition rests. 
[…] If one takes the perspective that joining cartels is a form of competitive 
strategy, or at least a cooperative way station on the road towards future competi-
tion, one can explain why cartels have not damaged economic growth as much as 
some might expect
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   But even if the recognition that the bargaining power of an instrument is also defined 
by the suppliers’ willingness to provide it is not at odds with the law of supply and de-
mand, such a perspective is nevertheless helpful in order to clarify the nature of the 
hesitation I have already expressed over the risk of relying on a separation of different 
instrument ownership. 
In this scenario a potential equivalence of the power and usefulness of two instruments 
which are usually non commensurable in their historical weight of their social utility is, 
in fact, supposed. The modification toward symmetry of the social weight of these eco-
nomic instruments implicit in this passage is realized through a mechanism which is es-
sential within Hegelian dialectic: the act of self-recognition. More precisely, the recog-
nition of oneself as being in a certain instrumental context – or as being a certain in-
strumental context – which makes certain relative power and desires arise. 
The consciousness of being a certain context refers, thus, to the precise context describ-
able as “possessing a tool whose absence would undermine the entire process of produc-
tion”. The equivalence of bargaining power between owners of labour power and own-
ers of means of production corresponds to the recognition of the precise, circumscribed 
and restricted context – which in an empirical terminology can be considered to be both 
                                                          
270
 Fear 2006, P. 4. 
182 
 
 
 
“material” and “psychological” – given by the expectation of a possible absence of ei-
ther instrument. But this is not the overall potential context, because it is not an account 
of all possible instrumental situations which may occur and determine reciprocal bar-
gaining power in contrast with the equality assumed by such a scenario. 
This scenario, in fact, takes the threat of either instrument absence as given. It does not 
consider or explore the possibility that not all members of the category of employers or 
employees may find it profitable to enrol in an official union of individuals in order to 
act “as one”. In fact, there is no given structural justification whereby an individual’s 
naturalness should necessarily perceive that way as the most convenient to follow 
within an environment made up of different contingent possibilities. Some individuals 
belonging to the category of workers may, for instance, decide that it is more convenient 
for them to leave the trade union and ‘ally’ with the other category, becoming inde-
pendent workers who choose to be employed by some firms. 
Such a choice would appear perfectly rational and suitable with the contingent natural-
ness of these workers in the case in which a company board of directors has to opt for 
one of the following alternatives. On the one hand, to hire a reduced number of workers 
– as new technological-organizational advances would allow them to do – so as to ob-
tain a revenue which is the same or higher than before, but a personal profit which is 
much larger. On the other hand, to humour trade union pretension to divide the same 
amount of work and revenue among more workers, obtaining the same revenue but a 
smaller personal profit. If some workers choose to help a company realize the first op-
tion, they are possibly rewarded with a wage which is little higher than the one they 
would get by contributing to make the union win its battle. 
Without taking into account possible collateral repercussions, such as a drop in aggre-
gate demand which would make profits lower, in the short run a similar decision can be 
reckoned as perfectly rational by several workers, given the associated economic expec-
tations. It would appear as a rationality which is equivalent to the one driving the forma-
tion of trade unions: the difference would only be the purely arbitrary preference of the 
kind of rationality to embrace – whether a “selfish” rationality or a rationality coinci-
dent with reciprocal esteem and empathy with fellow members of the workers commu-
nity. 
This case would manifest a potential prevalence of the bargaining power of means of 
production over labour power. This is essentially due to the fact that the tendency to 
technological progress intrinsic to the means of production permits the possibility that 
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possessors of these latter may require a number of employees which is smaller than the 
available amount. 
The possibility whereby a trade union fails to persuade all the workers to join together is 
not the only case which may occur and demonstrates that the “expectation of a possible 
absence of one of the two fundamental instruments” is not the overall potential context. 
Assume that within a community all workers have chosen the “non-selfish” rationality 
and the risk of an actual discrepancy of bargaining power due to the structural advan-
tage given to entrepreneurs by tendency to technological progress has been dispelled. 
Despite this, other structural differences in the behaviour and role of the two economic 
kinds of instrument may still alter the equality of reciprocal bargaining power. Consider 
the following example: 
The presence of workers’ power is transparent when strong labour unions call a 
strike or negotiate collective agreements. But workers have power in other con-
texts too. As an example, consider a labour discipline model. The model assumes 
an adversarial relationship between self‐interested rational agents; employers 
want high work effort, workers want low effort. But workers’ behaviour cannot 
be monitored perfectly and instantaneously by their employer, and for workers 
this is a source of power: it gives them an ability to affect outcomes for the em-
ployer
271
 
   Exactly as in the previous example, here we have a structural possibility that the two 
categories’ reciprocal power is arbitrarily dependent on the ‘rational’ and material in-
struments which have been contextually used. In this case, the discrepancy consists in 
an informative asymmetry in the reciprocal “confidence link” in favour of the employ-
ees – whether combined with a monopoly in the supply of labour power or not. 
Since the occurrences just hypothesized are structurally possible, the rationality ex-
pressed by the recognition of an equivalence of bargaining power and social utility of 
the two kinds of instruments would correspond to what throughout this text I have been 
blaming as a “dialectical” form of rationality. 
I defined as a dialectical attitude, in fact, “a transformation of rationality caused by an 
abstraction of a particular perception of necessity and desires from the overall account 
of current or potential necessities and desires”. Such an abstraction of restricted necessi-
ties and desires ensures that the overall pragmatic meaning which a situation would 
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have for all individuals is not considered. In effect, the pragmatic weight of a situation 
in relation to the overall “being” of an individual can only be considered by accounting 
for all the contextual repercussions a situation is likely to provoke and in contrast with 
all the pragmatic potentialities any particular individual can hope for – the pursuit of 
which is excluded by the abstraction. Whether such a lack of consideration is forced and 
deliberate or inadvertently carried out it leads to the fact that, while deciding for an 
agreement, all contradictions and desires likely to arise from the non-considered “part” 
are neglected. 
The alternative attitude would be that all individuals are endowed with the instrumental 
potentiality to pursue the same and highest possible utility for themselves whether 
through direct satisfaction or through claiming something in exchange. In this way, the 
only limitations to a possible pragmatic improvement of a single’s existence would be 
the constraints which derive from living in a community where the “other individuals” 
can claim the same in exchange. 
 
For these reasons, a dialectical stance tends to gather under a practical equivalence 
pragmatic values which are not equivalent. The phrase “practical equivalence” repre-
sents the formal translation of what occurs within a social agreement. It describes the 
conceptual unity a situation acquires once two or more economic agents make an 
agreement over a certain exchange. 
For example, the job and the poor working and environmental conditions which a native 
Philippine faces on behalf of a Western mining company is seen as exchangeable with 
and, therefore, practically equivalent to the low wage the company grants her. These 
elements together constitute the socially and legally accepted conceptual unity of a 
“miner working for a certain payment”. Such a conceptual unity serves to overcome 
some perceived contradictions, as in the traditional Hegelian scenario. These can be the 
need, perceived by the company, of inexpensive labour force or raw materials and the 
need, perceived by the local community, to sell some assets in the attempt to lighten the 
burden of its foreign debt, combined with the desperate need to work of the native Phil-
ippine. 
It does not matter, to the mechanism of a dialectical transformation of rationality, that 
the needs of the company can only be concretely claimed and fulfilled once a situation 
where inherited technological and organizational backwardness is established. A situa-
tion which leaves the local government and the citizens no other choices than the desire 
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that cheap natural assets and cheap labour force be bought by some richer entity. All 
these factors hide many individuals’ pragmatic potentialities. It does not matter to a dia-
lectical mechanism, also, that the achieved social arrangement is fragile since it may 
happen that the company leaves that place, attracted by still cheaper labour force else-
where – confirming a tendency toward a strong bargaining disadvantage of workers’ 
category. A dialectical development of the economy ignores the effective or possible 
presence of these elements, focusing on pragmatic needs which are partial and ab-
stracted because they conceal the actual pragmatic meaning which a context represents 
for an individual. From the point of view of an ethical-pragmatist commitment such a 
dialectical abstractness precludes, above all, any putting into practice what would be 
maximally reciprocally satisfying to do within the constraints of intersubjective life. 
In the light of all this, the political proposal of optimizing-equalizing entrepreneurs bar-
gaining power on one side and optimizing trade unions’ bargaining power on the other 
side is a dialectical move. In fact, it accounts for the perception of necessity of a contin-
gent authority-rationality rather than optimizing every economic agent’s instrumental 
potentiality and aiming at a maximization of reciprocal utility. Such a move only takes 
into account, in fact, the consciousness of an authority which presumes that certain dy-
namics of forces will not happen – dynamics such as some employees preferring an “al-
liance” with entrepreneurs rather than an environment of reciprocal benevolence and 
solidarity with other workers, as well as the firms technological advance which would 
make this alternative possible. A similar authority utilizes a restricted conception of 
human potentialities and naturalness in order to realize an improvement of social bene-
fits. 
 
7 - The dissemination of reciprocal distrust after singular episodes of power dis-
crepancy as expression of conventional rationality 
 
In the last paragraph I have established that the hope to equalize and maximize recipro-
cal utility by means of a maximization of the instrument usefulness of the different roles 
of the productive chain – means of production for the employers and labour power for 
the employees – is based on dialectical presuppositions. But I have not taken into ac-
count that such a scenario had been inscribed within the more comprehensive hypothe-
sis whereby each potential entrepreneur and worker is endowed with suitable tools and 
skills in order to optimize her potential utility. This contextualization transforms the de-
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scribed scenario into an environment which may in fact supply, in its overall function-
ing, adequate instruments to achieve the ethical aim above. In theory, each dismissed 
employee would have, in the medium and long term, the possibility to maintain her in-
come and the overall aggregate demand stable by setting up a new competitive activity 
and by hiring employees who would organize through a powerful trade union as out-
lined earlier. Thanks to the anticipation of such a development, uncertainty and informa-
tional asymmetry would not influence the supply of credit which would finance the 
workers who have been excluded from the profit of the previous firms and a self-
fulfilling cycle of expectations would go on. 
Unfortunately, this simplistic picture of what is supposed to happen is founded on a dia-
lectical conception of the notion of expectation by creditors and, also, by potential en-
trepreneurs. Such a notion, that is to say, overlooks the contingency which characterizes 
particular rationalities and the level of reciprocal information, which ensues from the 
concept of dissemination of the individuals’ arbitrary rationality and awareness on 
which this overall text is based. This character ensures that the instrument of reciprocal 
expectation – or “confidence”, “information” – needs to be actively maximized, as do 
the other instruments, each time a temporal or instrumental discrepancy occurs within 
the community of producers and cannot be left at the mercy of singular individual con-
sciousnesses. In recalling this point, I will quote studies which show the arbitrary and 
contingent conceptions of expectation which potential creditors and entrepreneurs 
would necessarily assume as a reaction to the discrepancy concerning trade unions 
which I described above. Such an arbitrariness has to be intended to be in contrast with 
the conception which would be “pragmatically suitable” to maximize reciprocal utility, 
that is an expectational attitude toward the future whose goal is – as I stated earlier talk-
ing about the practical function of credit – the language game of recognizing the highest 
productive potentiality of any individual. 
The point I intend to make here is not that it is possible to create an institution which is 
completely immune to arbitrariness in its informative tools and expectational attitude. 
The point is that it is possible to have an institution which, at least, focuses on that 
pragmatically suitable language game – a similar institution will be described in the 
next chapter. The typologies of current institutions of credit – which are mostly, in turn, 
kinds of private entrepreneurs - on which the discussion of this text has been necessarily 
based so far simply do not focus on that language game but, as will be clarified, on dif-
ferent ones which privilege, for instance, non-collaborative, myopic or short-term lo-
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gics. Even more so, this discussion applies to the kind of expectation manifested in po-
tential new entrepreneurs. I will talk now about these arbitrary language games concern-
ing the instrument of reciprocal confidence-expectation, the conclusion of the discus-
sion being that the traditional separation of roles within the productive chain is inade-
quate to achieve maximization and equalization of reciprocal utility. 
 
The high likelihood of an arbitrary reaction of the various economic agents’ expectation 
and confidence facing a context of power discrepancy such as the one involving trade 
unions can also be drawn from the application of the Keynesian philosophy of knowl-
edge and rationality to the “phenomenological” analysis of reciprocal attraction pre-
sented in this text. According to this latter, as we have seen, any human agreement can 
be interpreted as a recognition of reciprocal instrumental utility – considered in its broad 
sense – and a consequent attempt to obtain what is desired by giving in exchange some-
thing which is desired by the partner in order to build up the relationship. Interpreted in 
the framework of an economy of exchange, this means that confidence in the future and, 
in general, the push which makes an economy grow, coincide with some economic 
agents’ desire to support “the other’s” desire in order to be supported in turn. The un-
derlying determinant of this is, obviously, the awareness of future reciprocal utility. 
Such an awareness would be justified – or “pragmatically self-fulfilled” - in the case 
that any agent’s expectational attitude respected the pragmatically optimal language 
game according to which the goal is always to recognize each other’s potentialities for a 
reciprocal benefit. But the arbitrary material and logical framework in which these 
agents are embedded – and with which, in a sense, they coincide – ensures the predomi-
nance of the contingent abstract perceptions depicted in Keynes’ thinking. 
The gnoseological conception of Keynes can be placed near what has been explained in 
the second chapter of this text about the relentless de-contextualization of any author-
ity’s naturalness formed as a reaction to a preceding authority’s (arbitrary) impositions. 
In the wake of Derrida’s philosophy of radical contingency in the appearance of the 
Other within a supposed “identity”, the “legitimacy” of an authority had been located in 
its responding to certain needs provoked by a previous system of authorities. Since 
these needs are contingent and arbitrary, that is to say proper of a rationality which does 
not account for the continuous becoming and for all pragmatic potentialities, the very 
reaction to them inevitably maintains such an arbitrariness. Translated into Keynes’ 
concepts, the idea of contingent and unpredictable coming of the “other” can be seen as 
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corresponding to the consideration of the absolute uncertainty in respect of the trans-
formation of a holistic environment, while the arbitrariness of any need-desire corre-
sponds, in effect, to the mere conventional nature of agents’ expectations. At the basis 
of Keynes’ macroeconomic convictions there is the holistic - or “organic” - conception 
of the world, a world whose development cannot therefore be predicted by looking at 
the behaviour of its single parts because the sum of these parts taken together corre-
sponds to another, different “object” whose behaviour is not commensurable with the 
logic manifested by any of its “abstracted” particular aspect. As Dow puts it: 
The source of this inconclusivity or uncertainty was the nature of the real world, 
which Keynes understood to be organic rather than atomistic. As he put it in dis-
cussing the application of mathematics to economics: “We are faced at every 
turn with the problems of an organic unity, of discreteness, of discontinuity – the 
whole is not equal to the sum of the parts, comparisons of quantity fail us, small 
changes produce large effects, the assumptions of a uniform and homogeneous 
continuum are not satisfied”. Keynes notably applied one feature of an organic 
system, the fallacy of composition, in his macroeconomics. For example the 
paradox of thrift arises when individual intentions to increase saving are 
thwarted by their macroeconomic consequences, something of concern in current 
circumstances. Similarly there is a paradox of liquidity, whereby the attempt to 
make portfolios more liquid reduces the liquidity in the system, as we experi-
enced during the banking crisis. Individuals cannot be sure of their expectations 
being met, creating uncertainty
272
 
   Facing such a contingent development which structures reality, Keynes argues, eco-
nomic agents resort to a “conventional rationality” in order to shape their own expecta-
tions: 
Keynes argued that, in an open organic system, reason and evidence alone are 
not sufficient for judgment, to yield theoretical conclusions or to justify decision 
making. Yet agents normally do manage to form a view when uncertainty is pre-
sent, but not prohibitive. Keynes argued that this was made possible by recourse 
to conventional judgment as an input to individual judgment: “We do not know 
what the future holds. Nevertheless, as living and moving beings, we are forced 
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to act. Peace and comfort of mind require that we should hide from ourselves 
how little we foresee. Yet we must be guided by some hypothesis. We tend, 
therefore, to substitute for the knowledge which is unattainable certain conven-
tions, the chief of which is to assume, contrary to all likelihood, that the future 
will resemble the past”
273
 
   We can now define such a conventionality of a rationality as the character of being le-
gitimated or justified thanks to its being suitable to fulfil certain particular, arbitrary 
needs and desires felt by certain authorities. The concept of “conventional”, in this way, 
ends up coinciding with the concept of “dialectical” as I have been defining it. The de-
sires targeted by these kinds of decisions result as being pragmatically inadequate be-
cause they have been shaped by an awareness which only perceives what in a certain 
moment is the “present” identity to enhance, failing to account for the possibility of an 
overall maximization of benefits. This is the fallacy of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism and 
Derrida absolutization of the Other’s authority, as we have seen. It is also the fallacy of 
Hegel’s dialectic, in which each stage synthesis, in absence of criteria other than the 
consciousness contingent sentiment of advance and completion, is likely to be a contin-
gent modification of random identities. In general, a “conventional” awareness of ne-
cessities-desires forms itself either as a consequence of a random disposition of socio-
economic instruments or as a reaction to (or influence from) an economic attitude which 
is the result of that disposition. In either case, the outcome is a language game which 
structurally does not arise from a logic of “maximizing-equalizing reciprocal expecta-
tion and bargaining power”. 
It is worth noticing that, as has already been hinted at in the paragraph about financial 
bubbles, the rational logic according to which human beings set up economic relation-
ships ensures that an imbalance of individual’s bargaining powers may set off a spiral of 
relentless self-feeding imbalances. Since economic agents’ desire to support “the 
other’s” desire is correlated to the desire to be supported in turn, the underlying deter-
minant of this being the awareness of future reciprocal utility, aggregate social recipro-
cal bargaining power – or reciprocal “attraction” – cannot be considered a zero-sum 
game but can grow or decrease in dependence on complex entangled mutual expecta-
tions and potentialities. In fact, a language game which enhances inequality of power, 
oppression and weakening of certain social groups can cause the phenomena of spread 
of impoverishment, “sawing off the branch on which one is sitting” or lack of reciprocal 
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confidence to explode. For instance, a reduction of a part of working class’s income due 
to employers’ increase of technological bargaining power may have risky side effects. 
First of all, to divert the utilization of that liquidity from consumption and from pur-
chasing goods and services offered by small-medium enterprises to allocation in less 
liquid assets such as stocks, future and forward contracts, partnership shares in hedge 
funds, in simple accumulation or in purchases of luxury goods. This would denote a 
concentration of employers’ money within a much smaller circuit of – powerful – 
agents and a sharp decline of the exchanges among owners of small-medium enter-
prises, worker and, in general, middle class’ actors. A serious decrease in these latest’s 
reciprocal confidence would follow and will exacerbate itself as in a vicious cycle. The 
consequent weakening of middle class’ productivity, employment and income may turn 
against the business – and therefore the bargaining power - of the first employers: the 
side effects of the decision to reduce their employees’ wage are much larger than what 
would be explained by a reduction of “real” potential reciprocal utility among existing 
actors. In general, we can say that there are as many different “unethical” language 
games as there are combinations of imbalanced reciprocal bargaining powers and mu-
tual conventional expectations in a society. Each of these games of forces develops and 
disseminates itself as a more or less serious diversion from a scenario of reciprocally 
maximized attraction, according to the particular configuration of inequalities and eco-
nomic connections it represents. The structurally possible dissemination of bargaining 
power reductions and the fact that it is not a zero-sum game can be interpreted as an-
other pretty pragmatic reason to privilege equality and equilibrium of powers in the face 
of an equivalent in aggregate but unequal level of power-benefits. 
 
8 – A concrete outline of the risk 
 
I have generalized the concept of “conventional judgment” reported by Keynes as any 
reaction to the inevitable contingency of human economic relations of power-
expectations which assumes as criteria of action a contextual preferability which is not 
the pragmatic focus on maximizing reciprocal power and expectations, maintaining in 
this way disseminations and gaps of powers. The conventional character of the deci-
sions about credit distribution is structurally possible within the material framework and 
the specific imbalances of power which constitute the scenario of the category of work-
ers with a different bargaining power to the employers. This is because – given the ab-
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sence of institutions which actively put into action the “pragmatic principle” in all in-
strumental fronts – the arbitrary dissemination of the alteration of reciprocal bargaining 
power and perception of reciprocal utility ensures the possibility of bringing about an 
arbitrary level of reciprocal expectation. This can be done by potential creditors and, 
also, by potential borrowers, who may lack adequate tools and reciprocal information to 
perceive a loan as convenient. This lack would be the result of the unequal dissemina-
tion of bargaining power (including information) between employers and dismissed 
workers. The latter, as opposed to the formers, do not have confident enough connec-
tions with potential customers as to justify an investment to start their own enterprise 
and would rather tend to accept a lower paid job in other firms – even because the mar-
ket would appear to be already almost saturated in terms of offered products, given the 
diminishing of demand (or “available bargaining power” and reciprocal expectation) 
due to the very firing of such workers. 
Leaving economic relations at the mercy of a discrepant distribution of powers coin-
cides - it may be said “by definition” – with leaving the decisions under authorities 
which are “legitimated or justified thanks to their being suitable to fulfil certain particu-
lar, arbitrary needs and desires felt by certain individuals” and not justified by our 
pragmatic focus. The absolute contingency of the development of power disparities 
triggered by the exchange economy structure of reciprocal trust seen above, then, exac-
erbates the recourse to such a conventionality. 
Let us describe now the precise dynamics according to which this conventionality-
“dialecticity” is likely to work within the hypothesized framework. It shows the possi-
bility of uncertainty of some individuals’ capacity to pay back a loan, that is that cost of 
credit depends not only on offer-demand mechanisms but also on uncertainty in the dis-
crepancy of power. The necessity of a structure of production ownership which does not 
separate the role of employee and employer will be concretely evident. In the next chap-
ter, instead, it the “unethical” logic in which credit allocation consists through the deci-
sion of a “private entrepreneur” will be concretely evident, and how it would remain 
unethical per se even assuming an absence of power discrepancy between the two 
groups of producers. In fact, the precise criteria of such an allocation will be able to be 
described through “language games which are different from maximizing the recogni-
tion of reciprocal potential utility and expectations”. 
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The most likely case in which disparity of instrument possession can intensify social 
inequality can be considered as beginning with a period of increase in layoffs due to a 
technological shock. As explained, most technologically competitive firms may be able 
to persuade some workers to infringe their “fraternity” pact with their fellows and con-
tinue working for them – at a relatively higher wage – even if the other workers have 
been fired, instead of forcing the employers to split the remaining tasks among the same 
number of trade union workers, with the same wage as before. A reserve army of labour 
is in this way created. In a similar context, other companies may be able to attract 
needed manpower at a lower wage, even in the presence of a system of shared techno-
logical progress as described above. In the model I have hypothesized, in effect, a laid 
off worker is in principle capable of starting a new project while having the technologi-
cal potentialities to compete with the already existing firms. But it is problematic to as-
sume that she also has the effective perception of the convenience of such an option in 
respect to accepting a low-wage post. It is important to notice, in fact, that the concept 
of “asymmetry of power” as I have been using it can also take the form of the economic 
advantage illustrated by the idea of “asymmetric information” between buyer and seller 
as theorized, for instance, by G. Akerlof. As he introduced this concept, he noticed that 
the seller adjusts the price of an item based on her knowledge of the prices of 
similar items on the market and the condition of the item among other factors. 
The buyer similarly can have information about the prices of similar items in the 
market. But what he probably does not have is the same depth of information 
about the quality of the item as its seller [...]
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   Even if the situation I am considering is not even parallel to this one – since it is the 
“buyer” (of labour) who owns more information - , we can interpret it as a mechanism 
in which a group of individuals is “more certain” about the social quality and utility of 
their products and that they can use this higher certainty to gain a contractual advantage. 
“Asymmetric information” here must not be read as an inequality of information about 
the same item or phenomenon, but as a gap in the general level of information intended 
as awareness of one’s economic connections. An unemployed worker is likely to per-
ceive much more uncertainty - also considering the general decrease of aggregate de-
mand typical of such a social situation –in her project to borrow money to set up a new 
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firm even if in theory it could bring her a higher level of income than a low-paid but 
certain job. 
In conclusion, we have the structural possibility of a lowering of aggregate bargaining 
power in the class of workers, which deconstructs the hypothesis that a maximization of 
reciprocal power can be achieved by means of highly organized trade unions. We have 
also the structural possibility that the cost of credit or funding granted by any private en-
tity may not depend only on supply-demand laws. Or, better to say, the possibility that 
the terms of credit granting may not be represented by the mutual interaction of only the 
factors of cost of money and demand for money, without inserting other elements such 
as uncertainty caused by decrease or oscillation of aggregate demand and incomes.
275
 
Importantly, even if we suppose perfectly risk-taking banks or the existence of interest-
free credit granted by a state institution, the illustrated alteration of bargaining power 
would take place anyway, since it corresponds to a drop of perception of mutual utility 
by “low” class agents which intrinsically precludes any possibility of decisive action by 
the instrument of “credit”. 
 
 
9 – A system of cooperatives as best solution 
 
It is time, now, to elucidate a possible way to escape this impasse. What is implied in 
this analysis is that the structural possibility of an economic submission of a category of 
individuals by another one refers to the fact that the possession of certain instruments of 
production can offer a larger spectrum of modalities and situations for obtaining wealth 
with respect to other instruments. 
The always possible bargaining supremacy of one typology of instruments over the 
other would reveal therefore the necessity that an equal process of production involves 
an equal possession of machineries and labour skills – or, at least, an equal right of 
managing and utilizing the fruits of their functioning by the actors who take part in the 
process of production. 
This would provoke the virtual disappearance of the categories of suppliers and deman-
ders of labour, since it would potentially provide every economic agent with all the 
means of production in a way which would make the concepts of “labour supplier” and 
“labour demander” converge. Let us see how. 
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In order to make these two roles effectively coincide within a market economy, it is 
necessary to incentivize or institute by law the cooperative form within the management 
of the firms. Cooperativism can ensure the convergence of the status of “labour sup-
plier” and “labour demander” within a microeconomic perspective, by making the typi-
cal asymmetries produced by the reciprocal power of the two roles disappear. As Rich-
ard Wolff points out, the equal ownership of the use-value of the means of production is 
correlated with a democratic decision on «what to produce, how to produce, where to 
produce and what to do with the profit».
276
 The absence of the effects of an imbalanced 
bargaining power between labour suppliers and demanders can be appreciated, above 
all, in the opportunity of democratically choosing the criteria according to which the 
revenue is distributed, which can respond to a specific parameter of “equal contribu-
tion”. This can have a positive social impact, in comparison with the classic two-role 
structure of firms, mostly when it is necessary to decide how to reallocate revenue in the 
case of profit lowering.
277
 
Moreover, as Booth and Fortis report, 
evidence confirms that employee ownership and employee control increase pro-
ductivity and profitability relative to conventional firms. A University of Michi-
gan study found that thirty employee owned firms showed a higher level of profit 
than other firms in their respective industries […]The explanation for higher 
productivity in employee owned and controlled enterprises is easy to understand. 
Employees who share in the profits and influence the policies and goals of an en-
terprise will more readily internalize enterprise objectives as their own, and will 
consequently put forward a higher degree of work effort than employees in con-
ventional enterprises
278
 
   The problem faced by the authors studying this organizational method are, mostly, re-
lated to political or logistical feasibility, also because the majority of the cooperatives 
present today have risen in response to business failures caused by a general economic 
distress. For example, cases of worker self-management have proliferated in Argentina 
after the crisis of 2001 and they have found themselves dealing with problems of gen-
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eral lack of capital.
279
 They are, nevertheless, structured in two basic management bod-
ies, 
the administrative council and the general assembly of all members. In tradi-
tional cooperatives, the administrative council oversees management, while as-
semblies are organized only for a few particular reasons: annual reports and 
leadership elections. Everything else is decided by the council, and only one an-
nual assembly is required by the law
280
 
Wolff outlines other typologies of organization which a cooperative firm may wish to 
adopt:  
periodically, in any workers’ self-directed enterprise, the collective of workers 
that produces a surplus gathers to collectively receive that surplus and distribute 
it […] To take another example, the board of a workers’ self-directed enterprise 
would likely see the need to secure certain management function. It might, like 
its capitalist counterparts, hire professional managers. On the other hand, it 
might prefer instead, for many reasons, to substitute a rotational system whereby 
all surplus-producing workers are periodically rotated through management posi-
tions. The board might see this as an appropriate way to avoid reifying people 
into fixed positions of manager and managed positions […]
281
 
   The best known experiment of cooperative system is, perhaps, the so called 
“Mondragon network”. In it one can notice, as well as the equalitarian distribution of 
profit, a more effective and equally distributed expectation for the personal profitability 
of investing one’s own energy and resources in the enterprise. Mondragon, in fact, 
developed a system of individual internal accounts into which 70% of the profits 
(a more accurate term is surplus) of the cooperative were placed. Each member 
had such an internal account. 30% were put into a collective account for operat-
ing capital and expansion, with a portion of that being earmarked for the com-
munity. The individual internal accounts noted receipt of the portion of the sur-
plus earmarked for it, but this was then automatically loaned back to the coop-
erative, with interest paid. Upon leaving, members receive 75% of the accumu-
lated funds credited to their internal account, while 25% is retained as the capi-
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talization which made the job possible. This system essentially allows the coop-
erative to capitalize close to 100% of its yearly profit and gives it a capacity for 
internal capital accumulation unequalled by any capitalist enterprise. It also es-
tablishes an ongoing flow-through relation between the individual and collective 
portions of the surplus
282
 
   Despite its uncertain practical feasibility – due to cultural or political reasons and to 
possible logistic obstacles in the implementation of the democratic power of a great 
number of cooperative members – the cooperative system is a necessary device to main-
tain the focus on an allocation of instruments possession which results in an equal and 
optimized provision of bargaining power. 
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         V 
Mitigating imbalances at a macroeconomic level: a reformation of the concept of 
credit 
 
 
In this last chapter of my work I resume the focal discussion about the conception of 
credit which would fit the pragmatic aim of maximizing-equalizing reciprocal bargain-
ing power. I do that by means of a reflection about a possible pragmatist interpretation 
of the Hegelian mechanism of mutual recognition, in which I perfect the overall analysis 
made so far about reciprocal “attraction” and expectations. I illustrate Hegel’s teleologi-
cal conception of mutual acknowledgement – whereby it corresponds to the highest 
possible mutual recognition and fulfilment of desires and, therefore, of individuals’ op-
portunities and benefits – since it shares with Rorty and Derrida the same ethical preoc-
cupation of doing justice to each individual’s features, by making them flourish and 
succeed within social life. It also shares the same aporias, but the conceptual tools of 
optimizations of mutual recognition and expectation provide us with the language to 
overcome them at a macroeconomic level through an adequate form of the instrument of 
credit – about which I propose a concrete case study. The scope of the chapter is to ex-
plain in detail why a private kind of fund lender and, in general, the currently accepted 
typologies, are not suitable to optimize reciprocal expectation (or “confidence link”) 
within an exchange economy. Since it will be an all-encompassing discussion, I will re-
call reasons – such as the “individualistic” logic in assessing risk and uncertainty – 
which would actually be dispelled within the economic system I have fostered so far. 
There will also be a recall, however, to banking system behaviours – such as quantita-
tive evaluation of potential borrowers or financial speculation - which would be able to 
prejudice even an ideal system made of worker-owned firms with shared skill and tech-
nical-organizational advances. Finally, it will be clear how this “sharing” of advances 
should also – or, maybe, mostly - be the outcome of this very ethically sustainable form 
of credit. In this way, the proposed system of credit granting will complete the general 
picture of the economic system I would support in order to approach as much as possi-
ble the ethical aim of doing “justice to the Other”, which is the underlying problem of 
the entire itinerary of this dissertation. 
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         1 - Hegel and full reciprocal recognition interpreted as a pragmatic necessity 
 
Taking inspiration from Hegel’s dialectic one can offer a view of how ethical develop-
ment can be considered as coincident with the ontological task of the recognition of the 
other self-consciousnesses. Such recognition has to be understood as the acknowledge-
ment and acceptance of the other’s desires, due to the fact that they are seen as having 
an active role in the self-recognition and fulfilment of one’s own desires. The final goal 
of this dynamic would be the creation of institutions based on solid reciprocity whose 
effect is the progress of universal benefit and completion.
283
 
Hegel, in fact, reminds us that an individual’s awareness of her own necessities and de-
sires – or, in other words, of her own human “nature, “being” – can only achieve its 
fullest realization after clashing with the self-consciousness of other individuals. For 
Hegel, notoriously, authentic human self-consciousness cannot develop within the do-
minion of the mere sensuality and perception of pure objectivity. In the immediate 
realm of inert objects, in fact, consciousness can spot a contradiction, it can perceive the 
desire to overcome it and it can satisfy this desire by negating the contradiction – by 
understanding that it was only due to the consciousness’ manner of relating with the ob-
jects - , so that it is ready to begin the process again.
284
 But without clashing with an-
other self-consciousness, it cannot achieve the awareness of its own desiring as a human 
desiring. A self-consciousness needs to meet another self-consciousness which recog-
nizes it as desiring, so that its desiring is reflected, as in a mirror, in the actions and re-
actions of this other self-consciousness. For Hegel, «self-consciousness must be desire; 
but we achieve a fully objective sense of ourselves only by relating to something irre-
ducibly independent in which we find our own identity reflected. Such a thing can only 
                                                          
283
 «The word ethical does not stand here for a pre-established moral doctrine, nor for a categorical im-
perative meant to guide consciousness throughout its formative path. In the Phenomenology, the priority 
of the ethical is the absolute priority of practical agency over its grounding reasons, as well as the inter-
subjective foundation underlying each and every mode of recognition – be it epistemological or ‘ethical’, 
in the stricter sense of the word. The priority of the ethical amounts to a Faustian call to action, but in a 
very particular way. The incomplete self recognizes in another incomplete self the possibility of comple-
tion. However, this completion process, which anticipates Hegel’s realm of Spirit, does not correspond to 
the restoring of an initial, undivided self. On the contrary, the Phenomenology aims to show that the vo-
cation of human identity is not tautological, but systematic – and moreover, that it depends upon a system 
that opposes not only two individuals but the whole world, via a global web of recognitions and counter-
recognitions. The fate of Spirit and the fate of History itself can only be attained through the discovery of 
a universally systematic identity, in which everything is dependent upon everything else – a mode of 
identity to which the I is, at last, a We, and vice-versa. According to Hegel, this absolute reciprocity is the 
only possible alternative to the decayed consciousness model, whose aporetic nature the Platonic tradition 
forcefully highlighted» (Dias 2013, P. 18). 
284
 McTaggart and McTaggart, 2000 [1922]. Pp. 13-14, P.113. 
199 
 
 
 
be another self-consciousness that recognizes us. Logically, therefore, concrete self-
consciousness must be social and intersubjective».
285
 
Let us paraphrase this idea in order to point out the character of necessity it implies for 
the task of human “realization” as an ethical and pragmatic task. To talk about a dialec-
tical advance for a consciousness means, for Hegel, to describe a process of overcoming 
the perceived contradictions in order to reach a stage in which “being” and “thought” 
coincide and in which an achievement reflects what is felt as spontaneous, “natural” for 
a consciousness to be. 
To assert that the completion of human self-consciousness can only be reached by 
means of a social recognition of one’s desiring corresponds to a description of the proc-
ess just quoted in its taking place within the contexts of “human society”. This means 
that in order to make one’s awareness coincide with – or at least approach - what it is 
felt as spontaneous, “natural” to be, an agreement between two or more self-
consciousnesses about what is reciprocally maximally satisfying and natural within the 
constraints of intersubjective life is necessary. In the moment in which two self-
consciousnesses “recognize” each other’s desires they do not do anything but construct 
an agreement on how to mutually act and react in order to overcome the lacks and con-
tradictions - felt by at least one of them - which can undermine the overall relationship 
by provoking instability. 
In this interpretation of Hegel’s conception of rationality, as well as the requirement of 
the relationship with another self-consciousness – or with a similar, “human” con-
sciousness - , one needs a “full” reciprocity in such a relationship, whose overall task is 
the goal of reciprocal maximized satisfaction – or “utility” – in a human agreement. 
 
In order to explain the character of necessity of these elements for human realization it 
would be useful to unveil the pragmatic essence of this overall process. First of all, the 
necessity of a relationship with another self-consciousness can be interpreted as the fact 
that the realization of an identity cannot be pragmatically maximized – and, therefore, 
complete – if it does not encounter the only entities capable of concentrating their force, 
instruments and energy to the specific goal of shaping or fulfilling the other’s desires in 
order to create a preferable kind of relationship. The will to “create a preferable kind of 
relationship” is here seen as an impulse toward reciprocal attraction - explained by the 
recognition of reciprocal utility. Reciprocal utility, reciprocal recognition or attraction 
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are, in effects, three names denoting the same dynamics as the one described in the 
Phenomenology as the ambiguous interdependence of a self-consciousness and its 
Other: «each sees the other do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of 
the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the same. 
Action by one side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be 
brought about by both». 
286
 Due to its very need to be actively and socially recognized 
by the actions of the other, a self-consciousness is “attracted” to this latter and tries to 
assume the identity which, according to its own interpretation of social demand, it be-
lieves the other itself manifests as socially useful or necessary («each does itself what it 
demands of the other»), in order to get this other involved and to compel it to recogni-
tion. The former self-consciousness, in this way, tries to gain a certain “bargaining 
power” in respect of the other by recognizing features and necessities of this latter. 
To put it in still another way, any human agreement can be interpreted as a recognition 
of reciprocal instrumental utility – considered in its broad sense – and a consequent at-
tempt to obtain what is desired while giving in exchange something which is desired by 
the partner in order to build up the relationship. Recognition of reciprocal utility can 
manifest itself, within civil society, in the establishment of market: «In this dependence 
and reciprocity of work and the satisfaction of needs, subjective selfishness turns into a 
contribution towards the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else. By a dialectical 
movement, the particular is mediated by the universal so that each individual, in earn-
ing, producing, and enjoying on his own account, thereby earns and produces for the en-
joyment of others».
287
 Such an attempt to achieve what is desirable can also be intended 
as a compromise between the naturalness of different individuals. The weaker one can 
aim at what is her present available desirable alternative in the case of accepting the 
lesser evil by subordinating herself to a stronger and violent authority, as the slave who 
consents to be dominated by the master out of fear of death. 
To summarize, the potentially pragmatically “superior” performance of the relationship 
with another self-consciousness rather than with only the realm of inert objects is due to 
the active reciprocal utility and attraction which only among desiring entities – and not 
between merely “self-aware” ones and objects – can occur: «The desire to be certain of 
ourselves in our very relation to others is fulfilled not by consuming things, but by in-
teracting with another self-consciousness – one that is not only capable of abstract self-
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awareness, but also takes the form of desire and relates to a self-consciousness other 
than itself». 
288
 
The next element I listed, the necessity of an authentically and fully reciprocal recogni-
tion for the realization of one’s self-consciousness can also be explained by referring to 
its pragmatic significance. If a subject is not “free” to have the instruments to bargain in 
exchange for its full desires it will not be able to express an identity which requires 
maximized pragmatic fulfilment by the other. For example, if a former slave is free to 
claim equal social right to possess a piece of land and equipment to work on her own, 
the fact that she can produce something to sell will require, by the former master, a 
pragmatically improved identity in order to maintain the wanted bargaining power. The 
former master, for instance, will need to set up a technological improvement to make 
her product more convenient or alluring. This new kind of entrepreneur would be the 
“still more useful” identity reflected by the environment created by the former slave as 
socially necessary to be fully recognized. This would be the new identity which the 
former master will spontaneously assume in order to have her will and desires recog-
nized. Such a mechanism of circular improvement of reciprocal pragmatic bargaining 
power may be potentially spread to the whole society: the more reciprocal bargaining 
power and attractiveness increase as symptoms of the necessity of recognition, the more 
reciprocal shaping and fulfilment of desires can improve in a pragmatic sense. It is this 
very reciprocal shaping of desires which makes the entire such process to be ultimately 
focused on the recognition of the highest potential demands of each individual’s will 
and “naturalness”. In this way one can recognize in the other’s demand and offering the 
highest possible recognition-realization of oneself: «I can succeed in being taken to be 
an agent […] only if I recognize the other as such, respond to the other on the basis of 
such equal claims to entitlements – otherwise I cannot recognize his recognition of me 
[…]». 
289
 All this coincides, also, with the third element I have listed above, the goal of 
reciprocal maximized satisfaction – or “utility” – in a human agreement. To recognize 
and fulfil “the highest potential demand of each individual’s will” within intersubjective 
life means to make a human environment «become the rational system of the will’s de-
termination».
290
 A determination which is, after all, what Hegel puts at the root of any 
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right 
291
 – and of what we can call “ethics”, if this latter has to coincide with doing jus-
tice to the other’s will. 
 
 
2 - Dialectical aporias and maximization of reciprocal utility 
 
So far the dynamic of reciprocal recognition has been described in its theoretical possi-
bilities. By exploring its practical performance, nevertheless, one can discover how such 
a reciprocity – and, consequently, the achievement of a maximization of reciprocal util-
ity – turns out to be aporetic. This is because, as has already been suggested, a human 
being acknowledges another individual’s desires only to the extent that she perceives a 
certain agreement with this latter as being convenient. Thus, for instance, if a wealthy 
lender estimates as too risky for her own reserves the granting of a loan to a small en-
trepreneur she will not do that or she will require a very high rate of interest. Or, also, 
imperfect information may lead to an investor overvaluing an enterprise, taking part in 
the formation of the blindness and haphazardness of boom-and-bust market cycles, 
which even Hegel himself describes in his lectures in 1823 
292
 while questioning the 
ethical completeness of free trade policies in civil society. 
This observation opens the paths to the numerous criticisms which have been made to 
Hegelian dialectic, such as Adorno’s typical claim that Hegelian dialectical agreement 
among self-consciousnesses is not accomplished in a positive fashion but in a negative 
one, as a coercion, since each individual’s desire and willingness would be only a by-
product of her role in a certain arbitrary hierarchy.
293
 In Philosophy of Right, for in-
stance, Hegel presents the institution of the Corporation as a dialectical advance in re-
spect to the unrestricted free market economy typical of civil society.
294
 One of the 
functions of the Corporation would be to create something which we can define as a 
“communitarian ethics”, a responsible choice by its members about what is socially 
more useful to produce and, also, to consume. This would serve to mitigate the effects 
of chronic poverty which Hegel acknowledges as endemic of free market and which he 
attributes to the producers’ difficulty to adapt themselves to the contingent preferences 
of the consumers. But the perpetration of the coercion here lies in the fact that the gen-
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eral typology of organization of production is not put into question in the perceived con-
tradictions. Consciousnesses are so addicted to a specific contingent social structure that 
issues which would be central to understanding unfair wealth discrepancy – such as 
somebody’s excessive advantage in market competition or different bargaining power 
between workers and business men – are not even perceived as contradictory. Individu-
als’ aspirations and desires derived from this imbalanced social structure are read as 
“spontaneous”. 
The realization of Hegel’s social purpose can be compromised and become aporetic be-
cause of the presence of particular institutions such as the ones just hinted at. These, ei-
ther for the maintenance of asymmetric bargaining power among individuals or for a 
lack of adequate awareness and information about the pragmatic features of society, 
perpetrate a partial or myopic logic, impeding a fully reciprocal and satisfying construc-
tion, recognition and fulfilment of desires. 
A difference has to be established here, therefore, between a kind of rationality which 
aims at the telos of maximizing reciprocal recognition and fulfilment of desires and 
other kinds of rationality. Such a difference has to consist in the pragmatic criteria 
which a form of rationality uses in order to allocate and create the material and intellec-
tual instruments which shape and fulfil reciprocal desires. On the one hand, in fact, 
there can be a kind of rationality whose purpose is to recognize each individual’s poten-
tial desire in order to provide them with the adequate instruments in order to equalize 
and maximize reciprocal “attraction” or “utility” within every human relationship. On 
the other hand, there can be a kind of rationality which utilizes currently perceived ne-
cessities or current motives for reaching an agreement. Perceived necessities due to cur-
rent allocation of instruments and bargaining power or due to a lack of adequate instru-
ments to recognize and fulfil the other’s potential demands – in order to perform a “re-
ciprocally convenient” or suitable agreement. For example, as in the case of the wealthy 
lender, of the Corporation or of the investor who lack adequate information about a 
community’s potential desires. 
All these examples show how the second type of rationality – the “dialectical” rational-
ity – is always in danger of considering two or more fulfilments of desires as pragmati-
cally equivalent and, therefore, suitable to be “exchanged”, mutually achieved within an 
agreement even if these desires are the fruits of imbalanced possessions of instruments. 
This kind of rationality is also always in danger of considering such an agreement as the 
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best possible social choice even if the perceived best suitability of the agreement is fruit 
of a lack of adequate means to evaluate each agent’s potential desires in details. 
All these forms of rationality have to be considered “arbitrary” in comparison with the 
goal of maximization of reciprocal utility, in the sense that their functioning is based on 
language games which are at odds with the language game consisting in “recognizing 
potential desires and enhancing potential highest reciprocal utility”. This last concept 
will be soon clarified as it will be illustrated how the current structure of financial credit 
corresponds to similar arbitrary language games. 
 
 
3 - A normative statement on the function of credit 
 
Within an exchange economy, the process of credit granting is the social institution 
which more than any other can put into action the reciprocal recognition and fulfilment 
of desires within a community which Hegel’s dialectical ethics implies. 
To summarize what I outlined earlier, we can synthesize the principle which founds an 
economy based on exchange in the factor of reciprocal bargaining power. Any individ-
ual, in order to maximize the fulfilment of her desires, needs to assume a certain iden-
tity, role to maximize her “attractiveness” and the utility which her product has for the 
other members of the circuit, so as to bargain the maximum in exchange. She needs to 
maximize, in other words, her active recognition of the others’ desires and their recogni-
tion of her own desires. 
Within such an ideal scenario, the dialectic of reciprocal recognition illustrated by 
Hegel is definitely represented: the bargaining performed by these actors is the eco-
nomic translation of what I called earlier “an agreement between two self-
consciousnesses about what is reciprocally satisfying and natural within the constraints 
of intersubjective life”. 
In this framework, credit can be defined as a form of anticipated agreement which a 
community achieves with a producer’s self-consciousness, an anticipation of the reward 
the producer should obtain with her product, whose possibility is necessary because it is 
structurally possible that a temporal discrepancy exists between the recognition of a fu-
ture agreement on reciprocal exchanges and the producer’s possession of the material 
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resources useful to support herself and to realize the product to exchange.
295
 And, since 
the “purpose of a community” – according to what has been argued earlier - imposes a 
maximization of reciprocal utility, the potential production endorsed by credit should 
bring about the highest possible satisfaction which can be reached in the potential de-
manders. This concept also includes, for instance, the evaluation of the externalities 
which can be caused by financing a certain firm. These can correspond, among the posi-
tive ones, to the spread of technological progress due to innovations which an enterprise 
utilizes. Among the negative ones, to funding companies which would produce a too 
imbalanced competition and a non-harmonious technological development and growth 
of aggregate power – which, as we have seen in the example of the master and the slave, 
needs to imply a certain “equality of potentialities” in order not to preclude the virtuous 
cycle consisting in the piecemeal improvement of reciprocal attractiveness as result of 
the attempt to increase personal bargaining power by any individual. 
Conceived in this way, the ethical function of credit granting should be to recognize the 
highest productive potentiality of any individual, to put it in relation with the potential 
necessities and desires of a community and to provide the adequate economic tools so 
that every economic agent is able to implement the corresponding production and trans-
actions. In other words, credit should put the material and relational conditions for a 
maximized and equal reciprocal economic usefulness. 
All this has been already synthesized by saying that credit should be a form of invest-
ment by a community in its own future. The only language game it should reflect is to 
provide each economic agent with adequate instruments in order to equalize and maxi-
mize their reciprocal utility and bargaining power, in this case considered within the 
scenario of an exchange economy. Consequently, as claimed earlier, “any political ac-
tion concerning credit which we would be able to be described as a formal language 
game which is different from that, would necessarily represent an alienation from the 
proper ethical purpose of a community. It would represent, in fact, a relation of forces 
which develops according to laws which are different from the ones which guarantee 
that all instruments necessary for all individuals’ equal maximization of mutual utility-
satisfaction are rightly allocated”. 
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Accepting such a definition as the one whereby credit pursues the task of absolute recip-
rocity implied in Hegel’s dialectic, I will now outline a model of credit – the currently 
accepted one – which does not fulfil it. Secondly, I will combine some theoretical in-
sights by Stiglitz with a concrete Italian experiment of complementary currency to show 
a model of credit which does fulfil the given definition. 
 
 
4 - The language games driving the logic of the current financial system 
 
There are at least three sets of reasons why the current system of credit granting does 
not coincide with the language game here illustrated. 
 
1 - The first one has to do with the monetary structure of the banking system. Although 
commercial banks can grant loans by electronically crediting the bank account of their 
customers with a certain deposit without practical limits, they do need central bank 
money in order to settle every transfer a customer requires them to carry out.
296
 In fact 
Banks first decide how much to lend depending on the profitable lending oppor-
tunities available to them — which will, crucially, depend on the interest rate set 
by the [central bank]. It is these lending decisions that determine how many bank 
deposits are created by the banking system. The amount of bank deposits in turn 
influences how much central bank money banks want to hold in reserve (to meet 
withdrawals by the public, make payments to other banks, or meet regulatory li-
quidity requirements), which is then, in normal times, supplied on demand by the 
[central bank] 
297
 
   Central bank money has a cost and this gives rise to several issues. Firstly, at a certain 
juncture, a bank may transfer to other banks a quantity of central bank money larger 
than the quantity it obtains from the rest of the banking circuit or by issuing shares. 
298
 
Such a bank is therefore forced to borrow a further amount to make new loans, altering 
either the economic return on new lending or the interest rates it charges – which would 
reduce people’s desire to borrow. In fact «whether through deposits or other liabilities, 
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the bank would need to make sure it was attracting and retaining some kind of funds in 
order to keep expanding lending. And the cost of that needs to be measured against the 
interest the bank expects to earn on the loans it is making, which in turn depends on the 
level of Bank Rate [set by the central bank]». 
299
 Moreover, because of non-performing 
loans or financial gambling losses, a commercial bank may lose central bank money, 
causing the same problems in the return on new lending as just described, also because 
it needs to retain liquidity to make up for losses and fulfil due payments soon to avoid 
additional interest charges. 
Because of such a private risk commercial banks may become structurally risk-averse, 
meaning that in order to safeguard their private business they may tend to avoid financ-
ing small entrepreneurs and innovations which are quite difficult to assess, despite the 
fact that they may give a great contribution to the technological and social advancement 
of a community. 
300
 This is also favoured by the fact that banks often prefer to avoid 
lending rather than increase interest rates. In fact, as Stiglitz and Greenwald have 
shown, «raising the rate of interest may not increase the expected return to a loan; at 
higher interest rates one obtains a lower quality set of applicants (the adverse selection 
effect) and each applicant undertakes greater risks (the moral hazard, or adverse incen-
tive, effect)». 
301
 Stiglitz and Weiss also explain that such a risk aversion can take place 
even within a context of general financial equilibrium: 
in equilibrium a loan market may be characterized by credit rationing. Banks 
making loans are concerned about the interest rate they receive on the loan, and 
the riskiness of the loan. However, the interest rate a bank charges may itself af-
fect the riskiness of the pool of loans by either: 1) sorting potential borrowers 
(the adverse selection effect); or 2) affecting the actions of borrowers (the incen-
tive effect) […]It is difficult to identify “good borrowers”, and to do so requires 
the bank to use a variety of screening devices. The interest rate which an indi-
vidual is willing to pay may act as one such screening device: those who are 
willing to pay high interest rates may, on average, be worse risks; they are will-
ing to borrow at high interest rates because they perceive their probability of re-
paying the loan to be low […] 
302
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   Due to this overall structure at least three language games different from the one I 
enunciated above are played and possibly mixed and overlapped. In the first place credit 
granting, as the latest paragraph implies, can be the result of the assessments of dis-
tinctly private, individual risk or return, which represent a different pragmatic scenario 
in respect to the collective risk-benefit ratio which should be taken as parameter for an 
“investment which the entire society makes in order to maximize each individual’s in-
strumental potentiality and utility”. An individual lender who assesses her personal risk, 
in fact, can be indifferent about the possible technical and occupational advance which 
an investment on a start-up may bring to the entire society and very concerned about a 
possible personal loss of, say, sixty-thousands euros. A hypothetic publicly run institu-
tion - financed with tax revenue or fiat money in order to address productive invest-
ments - , for instance, can instead decide, having also the support of public opinion, that 
a possible “waste” of that sum is indifferent or negligible in comparison with the possi-
ble advantage of a successful investment – even considering that, rather than a waste, 
that would be an allocation of purchasing power toward non-productive individuals 
who, by spending that money, would not spoil society’s mood of confidence and good 
expectations so much. 
In the structure of credit granting outlined above, in the second place, availability of 
credit can be the corollary of the effects of a bank’s private losses – which can be traced 
back to results of either financial “gambling” or mere bad decisions 
303
 - which diminish 
the contextual availability of what can be considered credit “raw material” (central bank 
money). In fact, credit availability – and the assessment of private risk stated above - 
can be also read as dependent on each bank specific flow and supply of a socially in-
vented credit raw material which varies according to previous bad or good decisions by 
the bank – as well as according to specific central monetary policies whose correspon-
dence to the “ethical language game” which has to determine credit availability should 
be examined. The logic inherent to this material condition exacerbates the distance of 
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the rationality currently driving the assignment of credit from the language game whose 
scope should be only to maximize and equalize reciprocal bargaining power. 
Since such a contextual availability of central bank money coincides, mostly, with the 
availability of liquidity in depositors, shareholders, financial investors’, a third aspect 
can be identified as diverting the monetary structure of the banking system from achiev-
ing the ethical role here appointed. Its functioning can be in fact considered as depend-
ing on the contextual availability of money as “reserve of value” indicating the success 
of previous transactions or loans. More precisely, level of credit granting and assess-
ment of private advantage by credit institutions can result from the capacity of paying 
back by preceding borrowers and by the evaluation of the income situation of the com-
munity where a potential new borrower lives, in order to calculate the level of effective 
capacity to demand by her potential customers. It is clear that a similar established 
framework reduces a credit institution from being an instrument aimed at creating recip-
rocal attraction and bargaining power – which is implicit in the task of “maximizing” it 
– to being a mere function of the currently expected or potential level of reciprocity. But 
an ethically optimized mechanism for the conferment of credit should “put the material 
and relational conditions for building a maximized and equal reciprocal economic use-
fulness first”. Assuming, for instance, an extreme case of recession where all actors 
have little or zero income. The “rational” behaviour of such a mechanism should be to 
encourage those who have immediately ready productive potentialities to put more 
products into the market by providing adequate credit to their potential customers. 
These latter, obviously, need to be initially selected among the economic agents whose 
products have also immediate or short-medium time of production and immediate de-
mand. This is in order to create reciprocal trust, to allow them to pay back their loans 
relatively soon without acting as “parasites” in their bargaining and purchasing power 
and so as not to cause exaggerated inflation. As soon as the productive network and the 
reciprocal confidence become large and strong enough, credit can be extended to entre-
preneurs or professionals who have a longer time of research and investment or whose 
product demand is less basic and immediate – all this being according to the “principle” 
whereby bargaining power needs to develop in a harmonic, “fully reciprocal” manner. 
In order to implement similar measures a system of credit has to utilize a holistic logic 
according to which the contemporary concession of different loans and the parallel con-
fidence in increase of economic demand can be calculated as likely to form a social re-
sult which will be greater than the sum of its single “components”. This is different 
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from the abstract and individualistic logic necessarily used by a private bank, in which 
diffidence about the possibility that other lender institutes put into action lending deci-
sions which increase aggregate demand needs to prevail – creating a self-fulfilling un-
certainty. Also, a similar holistic rationality needs a credit system which does not exces-
sively care about the risk that a certain loan may be paid back very late – or, in the ex-
treme case, never. Credit institutions currently managing credit supply, as we have seen, 
need to safeguard their economic advantage and tend to be risk-averse. 
Private risk assessment, concern due to the scarcity and the cost of raw material and de-
pendence on contextual availability of income are logics which build language games 
which are very different from the one credit granting should respect. 
 
2- A second set of reasons whereby commercial banks are not suitable to maximize 
reciprocal utility concerns the very criteria they use to assess potential borrowers. Often 
credit institutions are not well integrated within a local community and use criteria 
prevalently based on quantitative data such as the financial situation of a company, its 
credit scores and payment history. These may offer insufficient data about the potential 
social utility of a borrower 
304
 or it may advantage already competitive firms. To this 
extent, so called “relationship lending” may utilize more suitable language games in its 
criteria for credit granting. This kind of institutions use 
relationship information, which is often “soft” data, such as the information 
about character and reliability of the firm’s owner, and which may be difficult to 
quantify, verify, and communicate through the normal transmission channels of a 
banking organization[…]. Relationship lending is associated with a fundamen-
tally different lending process than transactions-based lending technologies, such 
as financial statement lending, asset-based lending, or credit scoring
305
 
   However, «the analysis suggests that under relationship lending, the accumulation 
over time of “soft” information by the loan officer creates agency problems throughout 
the banking organization that may best be resolved by structuring the bank as a small, 
closely-held organization with few managerial layers». 
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The nature of data which an institution chooses or is able to follow in order to assess a 
borrower also contributes to the distortion of the language game which should corre-
spond to the financing of an activity. 
 
3- The third factor we need to list has to do with financial instruments, which allow 
economic actors, for instance, to buy and sell the status of a “credit seller” – through 
bond markets – and even to bet on the value of an exchange and on the profitability of a 
credit – through future markets. It is inherent to this kind of trade that expectations 
moving these operations are also determined by past or contemporary decisions of ac-
tors performing the same typology of operations. It creates a self-referential dynamic 
which decontextualizes the formation of these expectations in respect to the direct and 
continuous evaluation of the economic potentialities of the realities to which a financial 
instrument refers. 
307
 As Scott-Quinn points out, 
bubbles should not occur if capital markets function in the way textbooks de-
scribe, since prices of financial assets should always reflect ‘true’ risk and ra-
tional expectations. When a bubble is developing, what is happening is that 
prices in the secondary market, where repricing happens continuously (since 
most secondary markets are continuous), move away from the price that reflects 
true cash flows and risk
308
  
   In a more peremptory way, it is useful to recall the fact that financial market sponta-
neous logic does not favour “long term projects” but, rather, the formation of specula-
tive schemes. Bagnai remarks how «in chapter XII of his General Theory, Keynes 
makes a very simple claim: markets are not interested in “making the best long term 
forecast for an investment probable return” so to direct capitals to investments which 
are on average the most productive and which most generate growth and employment 
[…] To behave in such a way would not be rational for them». 
309
 Using the words of 
Keynes: 
It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to matters 
which are very uncertain. It is reasonable, therefore, to be guided to a consider-
able degree by the facts about which we feel somewhat confident [such as finan-
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cial assets price change], even though they may be less decisively relevant to the 
issue than other facts about which our knowledge is vague and scanty 
310
  
   The scenario just described coincides with a language game totally different from “an 
investment which a community makes in order to maximize and equalize all individu-
als’ instrumental potentiality and reciprocal utility”. In fact, factors which are different 
from an evaluation about whether an investment is suitable to approach that goal influ-
ence price, risk and decision of credit granting. 
Now I would like to indicate a proposal to realize the idea of credit granting as an in-
vestment by the entire society in its long-term future in order to create economic actors 
who are equally maximized in their potentiality. 
 
 
5 - An ethically sustainable form of credit 
 
A first description of this proposal has to do with what would follow from considering 
Joseph Stiglitz’s theoretical support of the idea of a “learning society”. 
311
 After notic-
ing the huge contribution which technological and skill advancement has brought in the 
improvement of living standards in comparison to other factors, Stiglitz’s concern about 
how a simple free market in which investment and funding depend on private evaluation 
of risk and convenience is not suitable to maximize social “learning” has been under-
lined. 
For instance, an entrepreneur may find it too risky or unprofitable to borrow and invest 
in an innovative project, since the expected return would be too low to justify the risk or 
the interests required to pay. This is also due to the technological spillover, which en-
sures that the advantage of the innovation will be spread among the community. For the 
same reason a lender may not favour an unpredictable and under-collateralized innova-
tion project. 
These fallacies stem again from a concept of credit which works through a language 
game which pertains a “commodity” logic: its distribution and its demand are both in 
function of the expected profit of a private individual. But if “credit” is interpreted as an 
act by means of which a community – in its entirety – invests in its own progress, this 
appears as an incomplete and narrow logic, resulting instead in it being convenient in 
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the eyes of a government or whatever central “authority” to influence the spread of 
knowledge. 
As Greenwald and Stiglitz claim, 
in light of the pervasive market failures associated with innovation and learning, 
the commonly heard objection to industrial policies - the mantra that government 
should not be involved in “picking winners” - is beside the point: the objective of 
the government is to identify, and “correct” externalities and other market fail-
ures. While it is now widely accepted that there can be large negative external-
ities (e.g. from pollution, or from excessive risk taking in the financial sector), 
we are concerned here with an equally important set of positive externalities
312
 
   What would consist in a suitable methods to implement Stiglitz’s recommendation for 
economic policies and structures which enhance both learning and learning spillovers 
313
 is to appoint credit allocation to a public group of consultants which would supply 
fiat money free of interest and maturity date. The process of credit granting would be 
split in sufficiently local commissions so as to use personal, contextual and qualitative 
criteria of evaluation to reduce uncertainty. Risk of failure would be minimized and, in 
any case, would be effectively “spread” over the entire society – not on one or a few 
lenders - resulting in being almost negligible. The only side effect in case of a bad 
evaluation in granting credit would be a slight increase in circulating money without in-
crease of circulating goods, which would trigger slight inflationary pressures or growth 
of aggregate demand, which are not necessarily detrimental phenomena. 
314
 
Moreover, as opposed to what a private lender would do in order to preserve her profit, 
this public commission would be able to favour entrepreneurs to engage in an innova-
tive investment which brings a lot of technological learning spillover. It can use subsi-
dies in a form of partial waivers of money to be paid back or, in the extreme cases, it 
can force this kind of investment through strict selection. What I have just outlined is 
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not an original or theoretical idea: it is being currently experimented in an Italian com-
munity of entrepreneurs based on a complementary currency. This economic circuit is 
called Affari Senza Soldi, and was set up in Tuscany in 2013 and counts more than 300 
firms in that region today. 
 
In Affari Senza Soldi transactions among firms and workers registered in the circuit are 
settled by means of the conferment or the detraction of virtual money on and from their 
specific current account, according to the price determined within the market of the cir-
cuit. A small percentage of payment is settled in Euros, to cover the expenses for taxes 
and for goods not purchasable from the circuit, such as petrol. In order to be consistent 
with the Italian law, virtual money is formally registered as accounts receivable on the 
economic agents’ balance sheets, while transfers use the administrative tool of the en-
dorsement of a promissory note. 
315
 
Credit granted by Affari Senza Soldi consists of virtual fiat liquidity directly granted by 
the association – juridically it is considered a case of deferred payment granted by the 
“company” which the association legally is. Once granted, it can only be paid back, ob-
viously, by earning the circuit virtual money. Each time a firm or an entrepreneur wants 
to join the circuit or to require a certain amount of credit to set up an innovative project, 
a committee arranges a rigorous evaluation. In it, the committee takes into account, 
above all, the potential demand which the products will be able to match within the lo-
cal circuit and the necessity or the redundancy of the typology of project in respect to 
the activities already present within the community. The committee also assesses the 
technical validity of the project itself and its feasibility. 
The methodology usually utilized to carry out this typology of assessments is an empiri-
cal investigation combined with the creation of sociograms. The empirical investigation 
consists in a personal and informal conversation with each single worker or entrepre-
neur who corresponds to one “neural connection” of the neural web of a local area. The 
result is a diagram listing the percentage of the several entries which constitute the 
overall cost and price of a product or service (labour, energy, raw material, etc.), to-
gether with a list of the different kinds of actual and potential customers available 
within the context. This is integrated with some additional information such as recipro-
                                                          
315
 Assignment or deduction of money to or from current accounts is performed by means of a software 
accessible from the website. Every account holder owns a credit card code – which is also in hard-copy 
format. The seller of the goods or service receives the credit card code of the buyer, she inserts the code 
of this latter in her own current account and credits the amount. Afterwards, a notification service sends a 
check email to both of them. 
215 
 
 
 
cal evaluations and opinions by the members of the social fabric, reciprocal personal 
congeniality or aversion, level of actual material connections on a territory (roads, 
means of transportations, morphology of the area). 
The final goal of this dissertation, in the first stages of the introduction of the comple-
mentary currency in a certain region, is to draw up a model through which to figure out 
a framework of connections which would be sufficiently autonomous as to be consid-
ered a roughly “closed” circuit – for instance, constituted by producers of different 
kinds of food, manufacturing and other basic goods. This means that the members of 
such a circuit would be able to sell their product within the circuit and to satisfy their 
primary needs by using all the ‘virtual’ money they earn from their sales. In this way, 
the consultants working for Affari Senza Soldi are able to incentivize production, mak-
ing each entrepreneur aware that she will certainly receive liquidity for her work; liquid-
ity which will be recovered by her customer by working within the circuit. From this 
perspective, the character of trust-creation which complementary currency is about is 
evident, serving as a tool to overcome the problems caused by credit crunch. Trust is 
also created by the mechanism of import-substitution which will follow the fact that 
products demanded through money granted by Affari Senza Soldi will grow in compari-
son with products demanded through Euros. This, in effect, will circularly trigger 
greater production and investment in different goods and technologies. 
The gathered data are utilized to study the production chains which can gradually be in-
serted into the first core of the circuit, in order to calculate how to use the increment of 
liquidity and the “import substitution” effects produced by the ‘virtual’ currency with 
the purpose of enhancing the economic power of these chains and of inserting into the 
social web unused energetic, material and human potentialities present in the context. 
As the economic web keeps becoming richer and more self-sufficient, the central com-
mittee can set several devices in order to borrow Euros to invest in material and tech-
nologies which are not yet available within the local area – with the purpose of, para-
doxically, being as independent of Euros as much as possible in the future. It can be es-
tablish, for instance, that the members who “export” goods to individuals who only use 
Euros have their “foreign currency” exchanged with an equivalent sum of Affari Senza 
Soldi’s money so as to build a public Euro reserve, to be used to pay back loans. A 
slight “tax” would be imposed to balance all individual’s effective contribution to this 
exchange of currencies and, therefore, even to the reserve. 
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Tuscany’s circuit is currently using a loan to invest in ambitious projects which will al-
low its members to exchange goods in ‘virtual’ money almost for the 100% of transac-
tions. Among other things, the funding will be used to produce hydrogen cars, to reopen 
a paper mill functioning with low environmental impact, to produce clothes made of 
hemp, nettle and other fibres available within the perimeter of the circuit. Another inter-
esting plan is to refurbish and repopulate two entire villages of potentially 1300 people 
who will exchange goods and services entirely in Affari Senza Soldi’s money. 
Even if the ones described are the only instruments declared by the consultants working 
in the realization of the circuit, supplementary tools can also be considered, databases 
published by the local Chamber of Commerce and Industry or by the national statistics 
institute, as well as academic studies about the unexploited local economic potentiali-
ties. 
 
Although it is still a social experiment, the institutional framework through which Affari 
Senza Soldi and all consultants forming its committee grant credit to borrowers presents 
some features which are oriented towards a concept of credit functioning as a commu-
nity recognition of the potential reciprocal usefulness of its members. In particular, we 
can notice 
- The absence of lender reserve constraints, both in a legal and material sense. 
Since the central committee utilizes fiat virtual money, it cannot “run out of liquidity” 
and find unprofitable or difficult to obtain liquidity to settle transactions, as may occur 
with modern banks. 
- The abolition of any maturity date or interest, since they make sense only if all 
risk burdens a few individuals and consist in a limitation of the entrepreneur’s produc-
tive potentiality. 
- The division of consultants in a lot of local groups, in order to rigorously judge a 
borrower according to personal and contextual needs and potentialities, as we have al-
ready seen talking about their methodology. No quantitative criteria as the ones given 
by, say, credit rating agencies is considered. For any consultant of the circuit it is essen-
tial to be personally well-established within the productive and interpersonal environ-
ment of her very small area. To each consultant a precise list of clients is assigned. Usu-
ally, each of them does not follow more than 30-50 clients, 80-100 clients can be 
reached if the consultant is already specialized in a specific local sector (i.e. hotel indus-
try, timber industry). As Alessio Bini, the founder of the initiative, remarks, «consult-
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ants also create reciprocal trust within the circuit by supervising the exchanges among 
her clients and between these latter and other consultant’s clients, acting therefore as a 
team». 
Each consultant, due to her vocation, tends to specialize in one particular production 
chain. In order not to generate productive disequilibria between groups of clients of dif-
ferent areas and sectors, a further agency of consultants based on the work of local con-
sultants is established. It is called “Gabella Minore”, in remembrance of the real medie-
val function of Gabellieri. Its task is to incentivize exchanges between areas of clients 
who are specialized in different kinds of productions and, above all, to put into practice 
all possible commercial strategies in order to harmonize such exchanges, for the pur-
pose of making the community tend toward economic autonomy as much as possible. 
The Gabella Minore has a territorial jurisdiction which does not correspond to the ad-
ministrative borders of an Italian province, but covers an economical and historically 
homogeneous area. Often such an area is smaller than an Italian province. In order to 
outline the perimeter of this jurisdiction the following is taken into account: 
•    studies about local history, retracing details on foreign occupations and invaders; 
•    local road network; 
•    present habits in performing close commercial exchanges: food, clothes daily con-
sumption goods. 
The earnings of the Gabellieri consist in a share of the commissions which Affari Senza 
Soldi receives – for any transaction - from the economic agents whom they follow. The 
ordinary consultants also receive a fixed monthly payment. 
Despite the actions striving for production balancing, within the areas of Gabelle Minori 
the particular degree of specialization of local community will provoke productivity 
overabundance anyway. This case is typical, for example, of the very common situation 
concerning productive Italian districts where entire neighbourhoods or, even, areas in-
cluding several towns have specialized in the textile industry or leather and shoe manu-
facture. 
For this reason, the same framework, managed by a group of consultants called 
“Gabella Maggiore”, is being built to coordinate trade between the areas supervised by 
the Gabella Minore and, possibly, between different Italian regions in the future. 
316
 
                                                          
316
 Notice that commercial transactions using Affari Senza Soldi’s money – without any exchange rate 
with “another” complementary currency – are only considered within a perimeter formed by what can be 
evaluated as optimal currency areas according to Mundell (1961) and Bagnai (2012). 
218 
 
 
 
From this picture one can draw the idea of how a “global” evaluation of what is needed 
to invest in becomes an intersection of local rigorous assessments. 
Mr. Bini explains how the circuit is especially concerned with the technical advantage 
which local networks have in recognizing human economic desires and, therefore, po-
tentially beneficial investments in granting credit. The rule is to maximize local sector 
potentiality first and, secondly, to put each area’s “comparative advantage” into connec-
tion – notice that these two stages are intended in a logical rather than chronological or-
der. What is spared is the difficulty which a directly global or national network of lend-
ers usually has in evaluating the most meaningful desires and necessities which each 
node potentially and holistically develops and transforms within its specific human and 
cultural context. 
317
 The consequence of such a difficulty is in fact a loss of awareness 
of how much one’s production would actually maximize utility for the entire commu-
nity. 
In addition, it is important to notice that: 
- Credits given by Affari Senza Soldi represent a form of financing whereby the 
selection of the firms is not made according to the level of – usually short-term – indi-
vidual profit for the financier, contrary to the equity market. They do not privilege big 
joint stock companies which produce huge personal profit but often create imbalances in 
the market – through a too hard and sudden competitiveness impossible to catch up with 
or through long-term instability in the Stock Exchange, if it is present. “Non-
commercial” credit issuers can afford to favour small activities which equilibrate the lo-
cal community in the long-term and make it gradually grow. Tuscany’s Affari Senza 
Soldi, for example, is currently explicitly putting farming and industrial manufacture 
first. 
The founder of the circuit also declares: «the legal form of the firm is taken into account 
in order to favour the human factor. In the decision to accept new members, sole pro-
prietorship or family businesses are favoured over partnership and, above all, over lim-
ited liability companies. These latter function as a Leviathan which is potentially im-
mortal, but capable of disappearing as soon as predicaments occur. Their owners and 
investors can take advantage of a process of shunning of responsibility incentivized by 
current Western laws». 
318
 From this comparison, it is interesting to note that forms of 
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big cooperatives of workers without limited liabilities also seem to be endowed with 
what Mr. Bini here singles out as human responsibility or “human factor”. 
- Finally, financial speculation and, in general, financial instruments are com-
pletely abolished, being simply superfluous and a form of value distortion in such a set-
ting. 
What stands out from this overview of the functioning of Affari Senza Soldi is, there-
fore, the absence of the technical and “pragmatic” characteristics which make the cur-
rent system of credit granting tend often to credit rationing, or at least to credit rationing 
mostly in respect of small-medium enterprises – the same characteristics which may 
cause, on the other hand, occurrences of financial bubbles. The specific qualitative 
method used to evaluate the single potential borrowers – and the potential members of 
the circuit - moreover, suggests that a similar organization can have the capacity to in-
centivize or actively push the economic agents to make their products more suitable for 
a harmonic contextual economic growth, even without necessarily excluding from credit 
distribution the agents who have structural limits to such an adaptation. This kind of in-
centive would have very different social outcomes in comparison with the ones typical 
of the traditional financial system, where companies which cut expenses and long-term 
investments in order to achieve a large but temporary increase in profit are privileged by 
– usually also “temporary” - creditors and shareholders, or where funding incentivizes 
the exponential growth of a few companies which compromise balanced economic 
growth. 
The model of Affari Senza Soldi can represent a scenario in which financing coincides 
with a pure recognition of each individual’s needs and desires rigorously connected 
with an equal recognition and enhancement of each economic actor’s productive poten-
tiality. But it can be perfected by including, in the process of credit distribution, an in-
volvement of potential borrowers within institutions of collaborative progress. These 
can recall the spirit of the Sharing Economy 
319
, enlarging the concept to include engi-
neering and research as well as consumption, or of Open Source Ecology, a network of 
farmers, engineers and designers who are currently «developing a set of open source 
blueprints for the Global Village Construction Set (GVCS) – a set of the 50 most impor-
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and Pisa in the period between May 2015 and January 2016. 
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tant machines that are needed for modern life to exist – , everything from a tractor, to an 
oven, to a circuit maker, that can be made for a fraction of commercial costs, and whose 
designs can be shared online for free».
320
  
In the envisaged scenario, the commission of credit issuers can undertake the commit-
ment to actively making sure that potential borrowers take part in similar collaborative 
organizations. 
Affari Senza Soldi is only one of the recent experiments of complementary currencies 
which have been trying to deal with economic marginalization. Indicative studies on al-
ternative social institutions and behaviour aimed at enhancing the potentiality of market 
exchanges and credit allocation can be found, for instance, in Smets and ten Kate 
(2008), Ruddick at al. (2015), Della Peruta and Torre (2015) and Andriani (2014). Sey-
fang (2002, 2003, 2004) and Littera et al. (2014), in particular, have recently brought to 
attention the cases of, respectively, time banking and Sardex, a complementary currency 
circulating in the Italian island of Sardinia. The reason why I chose to focus on Senza 
Soldi is that it is, as far as I was able to verify, the only case study in which all elements 
listed above are present together and in a significant way. 
Time banks, for instance, «aim to help people to ‘spend time building community’ 
through the mechanism of members exchanging time and help among themselves, via a 
‘time broker’ who matches members’ needs and abilities, to produce a ‘reciprocal vol-
unteering’ scheme. It is particularly aimed at those on the margins of the conventional 
economy – the jobless, those in low income households, the retired etc.». 
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 Neverthe-
less, although these initiatives share the same intention of re-inserting work-force into 
the economy by means of enhancing reciprocal information and trust within small con-
texts, similar models lack a systematic monetary mechanism which, as in Senza Soldi, 
ensures the capacity to invest in technological advances and, potentially, in start-ups. 
The work of Taylor (1971, 1977, 1979), instead, sheds light on the specificity of credit 
unions as financial cooperatives aimed at remedying economic exclusion caused by 
credit institutions functioning through arbitrary language games. Credit unions are di-
rectly controlled by their associates and their purpose is to support community devel-
opment, providing credit at competitive rates and other financial services to its mem-
bers: «the members provide both the demand for and supply of loanable funds and the 
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CU must intermediate between these members». 
322
 As a close look at Taylor’s model 
can show, nevertheless, credit unions do not succeed, in their structure and mechanism 
of credit allocation, in getting rid of the language game whereby capacity of credit has 
to be in function of the availability of a certain “raw material” of credit. In fact, as can 
be inferred by Spencer (1996), Taylor’s model of credit union implies that the expan-
sion of its assets and liabilities is effectively in function of the expansion of reserves ac-
cumulated through past profit. 
 
 
In conclusion, the proposed framework would not mean the abolishment of free market 
but, rather, it would maximize its benefits. It would not prevent the establishment of a 
legal system of rewards for individual inventions or freedom in the decisions of how to 
run an enterprise, but it would maximize potential reciprocal usefulness. 
If built in this way, how and when credit is issued would not be determined by personal 
or incomplete expectations of risk and profit. It would not be determined by the value of 
the already circulating commodities and by already formed imbalanced social relations 
of force. To the contrary, credit would actively shape equal relations of force and suit-
able commodity values. When credit stops being a commodity which is traded accord-
ing to partial logics it can be conceived as pure recognition of the potentialities and de-
sires of individuals and would maximize everybody’s capacity to offer suitable products 
and to require something desirable in exchange, fulfilling Hegel’s purpose of absolute 
reciprocity. Through this new conception of credit we can reformulate Hegel’s catego-
ries by redefining his notion of authentic freedom. This conception of freedom, notori-
ously, dissociates itself from any notion of negative freedom and liberation from “envi-
ronmental conditions”. Instead it embraces instead the idea whereby the highest free-
dom coincides with the state which lets consciousness determine itself, according to 
how it “feels itself in its full identity and satisfaction” within certain historical and so-
cial relations and constraints: 
Nothing can achieve self-determination by dominating or abstracting from the 
particular conditions that influence it, but only by finding the identity of its con-
trolling orientation and activity within those conditions. Only this will count as 
identifying with those conditions, and so we can already see some of the con-
straints that must be built into any conception of the rational consent of an agent 
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to her circumstances: such consent can only mean that the agent finds herself 
able to express herself not only in the products but in the form of her own activ-
ity and expression. She must be able to find in those conditions the resources for 
non-alienated self-transformation
323
 
   According to what has been argued earlier in respect of society as a whole, an “alien-
ated transformation” is a social transformation triggered by a form of rationality shaped 
by an abstraction of a particular perception of necessity and desires from the overall ac-
count of current or potential necessities and desires – due to current allocation of in-
struments and bargaining power or due to a lack of adequate instruments to recognize 
and fulfil the other’s potential demands. That is an abstraction which prevents such a ra-
tionality from recognizing the highest possible reciprocal utility and, therefore, satisfac-
tion and human realization. In this sense, human society would be alienated from what 
it would recognize as its own full and “natural” identity. A “non-alienated” social trans-
formation – a state of freedom which would be as “authentic” as possible in Hegelian 
terms - can be achieved thanks to the optimization of personal opportunities. This ends 
up coinciding with the optimization of interpersonal agreements, that is to say of the ca-
pacity to reciprocally offer and to have one’s actual and potential desires fulfilled. This 
is reached by means of particular economic institutions whose goal is to recognize and 
make justice to each individual potentiality as much as possible. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The most relevant result of this work can be summarised in a substantial change of the 
philosophical approach towards “ethical” issues. It can be summed up as follows: the 
research for an authority reflecting a more original naturalness of human beings, essen-
tial in the authors who have been quoted in the first two chapters, has been transformed 
into the authority of the research, understood as the concrete observation of the “contin-
gent structure” of functioning of determined social economic instruments within deter-
mined contexts. Such a concrete, empirical observation of a contingent structure finds 
its practical and philosophical scope in the search for equal and maximized reciprocal 
bargaining power among economic actors. 
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The difference in the method between the first and the second attitude may appear sub-
tle but it is in fact considerable in its practical outcomes. This is because the pursuit of 
the goal of maximization of reciprocal bargaining power - and, therefore, the very sense 
of the commitment in the observation described above – would be undermined by the 
very nature of the first approach. It would be undermined by the search for a “more reli-
able” kind of authority which would in general respect the “natural” needs and desires 
of all singularities. 
Any similar research, in fact, has been showed in its methodological effect of limitation 
in the investigation. As in any metaphysical approach, a philosophical speculation 
which fosters the privilege of a specific kind of “human figure” or human language as 
valuable per se in fact dismisses a concrete verification of how such a figure or lan-
guage behaves in particular contexts. It dismisses, in effect, the investigation on how 
any logic, linguistic or economic instrument behaves in specific singular cases. While in 
the introduction I hinted at several “privileged languages and authorities” assumed by 
the post-metaphysical and post-structural traditions or by the dialectic and pragmatic 
“schools”, my attention in this thesis has focused on the authority of the liberal-ironist 
promoted by Rorty and on the reliance on the authority of the “coming other” by Der-
rida. Together with all the others exemplars of philosophical authorities, the formulation 
of these “ethical” solutions would aim at doing justice to a “more authentic” contingent 
naturalness of all singular individuals, to what their contingent “nature” would agree to 
do. What they produce is instead trust in a certain human figure whose evaluations, 
needs and desires are equally alienated because they are shaped by an arbitrary distribu-
tion of social and economic tools. 
A concrete analysis of the structural functioning of these tools within determined con-
texts is a less metaphysical method, which puts minor constraints on the results which 
an investigation on human practical satisfaction could reach. It is true that any decision 
about what current social desires are and what the adequate instruments to fulfil them 
are is always inscribed within a contingent knowledge of a context and, therefore, it is 
dependent on the evaluation of an arbitrary “authority”. But the difference between a 
Rortyan or Derridean authority and an “instrumental” investigation is that the formers 
are more likely to limit their evaluation to what stands out in a certain moment as the 
conversationally agreed solution to a problem – to what is perceived by the Other or by 
the liberal-ironist as desirable in a certain moment. This may occur without investigat-
ing whether there may be an even “better” allocation of instruments and potentialities. 
224 
 
 
 
To perform a similar investigation, instead, I needed to pick specific scenarios in detail 
and carry out an analysis of the logic in which their specific instruments work in those 
cases. The functioning of these instruments is contingent and the criteria for their best 
disposition cannot be synthesized in a general formula or moral parameter. The best dis-
tribution of instruments in order to achieve a maximization and equalization of recipro-
cal bargaining power needs to be evaluated in each particular context separately. The 
only legitimate “pragmatist” initiative is, in this sense, an examination of the material 
and legal tools likely to be possessed by economic agents within a chosen context and a 
reflection about the concrete effects which their structure causes in each particular way 
in which they can be distributed and organized. The respect of the contingency of any 
given case is in this way combined with the search for any possible durably observable 
character of their functioning. Such a relatively durable character is evaluated in its ade-
quacy to an “ethical” life, according to the quantity and the equality of reciprocal expec-
tations or “attractiveness” it ensures among economic agents. 
An organization of production in which owners of machineries are different from own-
ers of labour force is, for instance, assessed as inadequate to achieve a maximization of 
reciprocal satisfaction, even in the case of perfectly functioning trade unions. Thanks to 
the peculiar structure of these two sets of instruments, in fact, the possessors of means 
of production may always have a bargaining advantage over skilled workers. Even as-
suming a perfectly distributed allocation of credit and technical knowledge, the neces-
sary dynamics of the particular case containing such a bargaining discrepancy is found 
as likely to cause an asymmetry of information – and, consequently, of power – be-
tween the two “categories” of producers. This undermines the willingness, by exploited 
workers, to borrow funds to set up their own firms. These structurally possible discrep-
ancies are instead averted in the case of an organization in production made of workers-
owned firms. 
 
Throughout this examination and construction of hypothetical scenarios, no new macro-
economic theory or empirical discovery about the features of economic tools or about 
the behaviour of human expectation is presented. What is done is, firstly, the recogni-
tion of the consistency of the quoted economic theories with their philosophical “ver-
sion”, which discloses the existence of a certain formal structure in human pragmatic 
inter-personal behaviour. Such theories are treated as a technical translation of the phi-
losophical concept of authority as faced in the third chapter. A concept later connected 
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with a particular interpretation of Hegel and which concerns the role of perceived recip-
rocal utility in social and economic relationships and how temporal and instrumental 
discrepancies in capacities can undermine an individual’s awareness of the others’ abil-
ity to give something in exchange – and, consequently, her own willingness and ability 
to do that. 
Secondly, the knowledge drawn from these theories and their philosophical interpreta-
tion is utilised to focus on understanding when a certain allocation of economic instru-
ments is coincident with a durable maximization of reciprocal expectations. A similar 
situation occurs, for the most part, when each economic agent is equally able to utilise 
and exploit the fruit of qualitatively optimized machineries and labour skills. Also, the 
instrument of credit needs to be allocated in order to only fulfil the task of maximizing 
the production of mutually satisfying goods and no other tasks. They may appear as 
quite trivial prescriptions. Nevertheless, they are overlooked by the economic theories 
which I quoted and, therefore, must be the result of a well addressed and holistic look at 
what I called the “formal pragmatic structure” implicit in these theories themselves. 
Economic theories, in effect, usually do not address the problem of maximization of re-
ciprocal satisfaction just because they are concerned mostly with regional and partial 
questions. 
While discussing the most adequate logic which credit allocation should assume, for in-
stance, I referred to a great extent to the work by Stiglitz about the problems of risk 
aversion, adverse selection and how to favour a distribution of credit and investment 
which would benefit the creation of enterprises facilitating the spread of knowledge. His 
works are excellent in giving solutions to such specific social goals. But the very logic 
of economic methodology is not concerned with setting up a systematic analysis of the 
role of these social goals in the formation of a maximally satisfying society. In other 
words, Stiglitz can explain that a learning society is better for the quality of human life 
but he does not necessarily explain it as a consequence of the fact that it structurally en-
hances and equalizes reciprocal utility and trust and that this enhancement at its highest 
possible level should be the “essential” pragmatic highest goal. He mostly embeds his 
thesis in purely empirical terms and observations. This means that the reader of Stiglitz 
is not compelled to understand his analysis under the all-comprehensive scope of opti-
mizing every agent’s bargaining power. She does not feel compelled to push her ethical 
commitment toward an analysis of all the other ways of granting credit which may or 
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may not ensure that. If this is not the task of an economist, it is the task of an ethical 
philosopher. 
Similarly, Keynes’ works were perhaps the first ones to systematically analyse the mac-
roeconomic consequences of the inexistence of the “Walrasian auctioneer” – that is of 
an authority which models perfectly and instantaneously flexible prices and wages in 
order to immediately rebalance markets after a shock.
324
 This inability to instantane-
ously re-coordinate on a grand scale demand, investments and supply makes reciprocal 
expectation drop with a consequent under-utilisation of labour force. Keynes’ contribu-
tion is essential to uncover and explain the reasons of the possible persistence of under-
exploited reciprocal potential usefulness within an economic web - reasons which have 
been overwhelmingly used in this thesis. His proposals, though, have been developed to 
address regional economic issues, which are consequences of needs and desires shaped 
by arbitrary dispositions of economic instruments. His best known proposals to rebal-
ance aggregate demand through government action can be read, for instance, as the re-
sponse to the necessity, by entrepreneurs, to reacquire shares of market and to the ne-
cessity, by consumers, to recover a certain purchasing power. The attention is not fo-
cused on what are for this dissertation general pragmatic issues such as the maintenance 
of an equal power among agents. 
 
Refusal of transcendental (or quasi-transcendental) structures and languages as fostering 
authorities which only allegedly do more justice to the Other; contextual observations 
focused on the highest possible reciprocal bargaining power given by the available in-
struments; study of technical characteristics of economic instruments only as a means to 
understand the balance of power among all the economic agents involved, neglecting 
the “regional” ends of the essays of economics. This, in synthesis, is the methodological 
approach of my dissertation in its difference from both purely philosophical-ontological 
approach and technical economic one. 
The last thing I would like to point out in this conclusive chapter is the difference be-
tween my approach and the one by an author who is well-known for promoting the in-
tersection between economic and philosophical analysis, Amartya Sen. 
Sen has already been quoted while talking about the problem of equality in relation with 
Paretian conception of utilitarianism. Although he is critical of the very term of “indi-
vidual utility” – so much employed throughout this work – in order to discuss about the 
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preferable allocation of goods within a community, his ideas are actually very consistent 
with the ones here expressed. He shows in fact scepticism toward any objective notion 
of personal “utility”, maybe identified with a specific kind of pleasure, as not taking 
into account the relative freedom and self-determination which a subject had in order to 
choose it and to achieve it. In other words, Sen finds it “arbitrary” to assess in itself the 
pleasure a person presently has, because that does not put it in relation with all unex-
pressed ways of realizations this person could have reached, maybe even preferably. In 
order to best take advantage of these potentialities and to do justice to these potential 
desires, one has to understand social fairness as a maximization of individuals’ “capa-
bilities”. That is to say, their «capacity to convert income and commodities into valu-
able achievements»,
325
 which also depends on personal characteristics and cultural fac-
tors. In fact, 
if social realizations are assessed in terms of capabilities that people actually 
have, rather than in terms of their utilities or happiness (as Jeremy Bentham and 
other utilitarians recommend), then some very significant departures are brought 
about. First, human lives are then seen inclusively, taking note of the substantive 
freedoms that people enjoy, rather than ignoring everything other than the pleas-
ures or utilities they end up having. There is also a second significant aspect of 
freedom: it makes us accountable for what we do
326
 
   Another way to see the question concerns the fallacy that a majority voting rule can 
produce in the attempt to achieve the best collective preference and, allegedly, the high-
est collective utility. The majority rule, in fact, is another example of procedure based 
on a class of information which is not complete in respect of what would be needed to 
assess the “overall” degree of welfare of a community. In particular, it does not take 
into account how much a minority becomes worse-off as consequence of a particular 
preference decision, in comparison with how much the majority becomes better-off:  
Consider the case of dividing a cake among three persons, called (not very 
imaginatively) r, 2, and 3, with the assumption that each person votes to maxi-
mize only her own share of the cake. (This assumption simplifies the example, 
but nothing fundamental depends on it, and it can be replaced by other types of 
preferences.) Take any division of the cake among the three. We can always 
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bring about a "majority improvement" by taking a part of anyone person's share 
(let us say, person r's share), and then dividing it between the other two (viz., 2 
and 3). This way of "improving" the social outcome would work given that the 
social judgment is by majority rule-even if the person thus victimized (viz., r) 
happens to be the poorest of the three
327
 
   Sen’s stress on capabilities is an attitude which is very similar to providing each indi-
vidual with optimized economic instruments, even if discussed in a broader context than 
a simple macroeconomic one. But the fact that in the overall Sen’s theory it is missing a 
specific systematic proposal in regard to themes such as credit reformation, relation-
ships of power within the structure of firms and the problem of financial bubbles may 
not be only a pragmatic shortcoming of his theory and may not be only dependent on a 
refusal to deal with specifically economic issues. 
It is in fact relevant to notice that, surprisingly, Sen does not tackle the problem of 
maximization of potentialities explicitly in terms of reciprocal satisfaction and com-
mitment in the satisfaction of reciprocal desires. In contrast to what an economic ap-
proach to ethics would suggest, the essential necessity of enhancing one’s bargaining 
power in relation to the others is not systematically developed while discussing the ba-
sic ingredients to one’s capabilities and well-being. The fact that each other’s needs and 
desires are mutually influenced and must be mutually fulfilled according to reciprocal 
power is perhaps implied in the capabilities approach, but it is not analysed in its conse-
quences for ethical priority. The recall to capabilities becomes a mere reference to the 
necessity of essential capacities to achieve some benefits. It hardly addresses the issue 
toward the economic tools useful to obtain the capacity to satisfy the other’s desires and 
to obtain, therefore, bargaining power within a context of division of labour. 
The capabilities approach is incomplete if the task is to bring one’s satisfaction to its 
highest degree within an environment where exchange economy is prevalent. If the goal 
is to increase the quality of life of less fortunate people, one cannot disregard the fact 
that imperfections in credit and financial market play a crucial role in the maintenance 
of disparities. Even if Sen recognises this fact, he is quite vague in elaborating the fea-
tures of a credit system (or of a firm structure) which would encourage the development 
of capabilities useful to optimise one’s ability to commercially respond to the other’s 
needs and desires. What is not sufficiently dealt with in Sen’s theory appears to be, 
therefore, the essential role of reciprocal “attraction” and recognition in the perfection 
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of one’s social happiness; the structure which has been analysed in this dissertation by 
means of a pragmatic reading of Hegelian dialectic. Sen disregards the ethical weight of 
the structure of mutual bargaining power and he is not interested in applying such a spe-
cific approach to the assessment of determinate economic tools. One can say that, with-
out the precise methodology given by a similar approach, to take a general position 
about the just allocation of socio-economic tools is, in effect, pointless within a contin-
gent conception of the world. 
 
Such a flaw is reflected in how Sen suggests to act in order to tackle contingency of 
human preferences. The fact that these preferences can change according to each spe-
cific context, Sen argues, makes the problem of preferable values in justice a very com-
plicated one. Different kinds of values may be put in contrast when we have the prob-
lem of deciding which one produces the highest benefit and there is no general or tran-
scendental rule to apply. In view of this situation, the priority for Sen seems to be deal-
ing with this “state of contingency” as it presents itself to our eyes, as the examples re-
ported in The Idea of Justice appear to convey: 
Sen spends a good deal of time worrying about the problems for justice that are 
presented by incommensurable values. To illustrate this, he supplies the example 
of trying to decide which of three children should get a flute: Anne, the only one 
who knows how to play it; Bob, the only one who is so poor that he has no other 
toys; or Carla who made the flute. Sen reasons that a utilitarian would likely give 
it to Anne, an egalitarian would give it to Bob, and a libertarian would give it to 
Carla. He returns to this example repeatedly, which he takes to illustrate the fact 
that there is no compelling way to choose among appeals to happiness, economic 
equity, or entitlement to the fruits of one’s labour
328
 
   Whatever answer a comparative approach to justice may reach in a similar occurrence, 
from the point of view of my methodology to put the question in these terms is wrong 
and misleading at its very root. It does not make sense to immediately focus on the allo-
cation of the flute. The priority of the “instrumental” approach to justice of this disserta-
tion would be, in cases like this, to understand how to supply the children with the ade-
quate instruments in order to maximize reciprocal usefulness and bargaining power “in 
general”, not only in relation to the flute. Once this situation is realised or at least ap-
                                                          
328
 Shapiro 2011, P. 1256; see also Sen 2009, Pp. 14, 201. 
230 
 
 
 
proached, there will be an agreement among the children in which someone will re-
nounce the flute in exchange for something else and one of them will be willing to offer 
something in exchange for the exclusive ownership of the flute. For instance, the poor 
one will no longer be so interested in the flute, he will be satisfied with a board game 
which the others now have purchased or even invented and in which he is invited by 
them to take part, probably because they enjoy his participation. The one who made the 
flute will be pleased with a little reward from the one who can play it and not necessar-
ily with the flute. The one who knows how to play it will be happy to offer something to 
the previous one in order to have the toy. The flute ownership, in other words, will be 
the expression of an agreement among highest possible reciprocal bargaining powers 
which decide how to reach the highest reciprocal satisfaction with their potential re-
sources. 
That is not to say that Sen’s approach would be “wrong” in allocating the flute. It might 
as well choose the best distribution within the restricted set of potential capabilities im-
mediately ‘visible’ in the description of the example. It may choose to give the flute to 
the poor child in order to improve her capability to amuse herself. Such a capability 
may be judged as the most important in that singular context, even if the child would be 
much happier with another toy. But this is the problem: without an explicit commitment 
to the improvement of reciprocal usefulness - and possibly on the specific socio-
economic instruments able to realize it - one can in fact consider only certain capabili-
ties accessible within a restricted sphere of personal potentialities, which may not cover 
the entire range of social potentialities. In this sense, a simple focus on personal capa-
bilities may become an abstracted question which diverts from focusing on the potenti-
alities which an individual has once she is in relation with different kinds of individuals. 
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